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This dissertation includes two essays in applied microeconomics. In Chapter 1, I investigate
how much people value local government spending. This is important to measure to better
inform government policies and theories of public finance and urban economics, especially when
considering how to allocate government spending across locations. To estimate this, I build a
quantitative spatial general equilibrium model and combine it with the empirical environment of
South Korea where I can leverage a quasi-natural experiment of tax policy reforms to estimate
the valuation. I find that an extra dollar of local government spending is valued at 75 cents of
their private consumption equivalent. Having obtained the estimate, I embed the measurement
into a broader model of the South Korean economy and ask a broader question that involves
a general equilibrium analysis of the optimal fiscal transfers across locations: what is the best
way to transfer tax revenue across locations in the context where this revenue would be used
to finance local government spending. What I find is that fiscal arrangements with small
redistribution relative to the actual extent of redistribution observed in South Korea would
have positive aggregate effects on welfare. However, completely eliminating the transfer scheme
would result in a large welfare loss. In addition to these substantive findings, this chapter has
a methodological contribution. The key aspect is to account for two forms of mobility: where
ii
people choose to live, or migration, and where people choose to work, or commuting, which have
been thus far studied separately. Throughout my analysis, I show that accounting for both of
these margins of mobility is key to correctly estimating the valuation for local government
spending and measuring fundamental parameters in the spatial economics literature, which also
appear in my framework, namely the elasticities of migration and commuting with respect to
spatial frictions. In Chapter 2, I examine the effects of pro-natalist cash transfers on fertility
outcomes in South Korea. I exploit the rich cross-sectional variation in cash-transfer generosity
over time using 15 years to identify the causal effects of these transfers on the number of births
and their health outcomes. Overall, the results provide evidence that cash transfer is an effective
policy measure to increase completed fertility and the number of children every born per woman
without adversely impacting infant health outcomes and sex composition at birth. Decomposing
the birth rates by parity, I find that cash transfers offered for a specific birth parity only affected
the parity-specific birth rates. Furthermore, the cash transfers did not change the fertility rate
of adolescents.
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Chapter 1
The Valuation of Local Government
Spending: Gravity Approach and
Aggregate Implications
Wookun Kim, UCLA1
How much do people value local government spending? What are the effects of fiscal
transfers that finance this spending? I develop a spatial equilibrium framework where
people’s simultaneous migration and commuting choices reveal preferences. I combine this
framework with administrative data from South Korea and leverage plausibly exogenous
variation in local government spending across districts induced by national tax reforms
in 2008 and 2012. The estimated mobility responses imply that workers value each
additional dollar of per-capita local government spending by 75 cents of their after-tax
income. The general-equilibrium counterfactuals imply that a fiscal arrangement with
lower redistribution would result in aggregate gains. A key aspect of my analysis is that
bilateral migration and commuting decisions are made jointly. Ignoring any of these
margins biases the estimates of preferences for public goods, and of distance elasticities
of migration or commuting which play a central role in quantitative spatial models.
1 Link to most recent version: www.wookunkim.com/research. I am extremely grateful to my advisor
Pablo Fajgelbaum for his guidance and support. I thank Adriana Lleras-Muney, Kathleen McGarry,
and Jonathan Vogel for their encouragement and suggestions. Youssef Benzarti and Manisha Shah
provided valuable advice. I acknowledge Do Young Yoon, Brett McCully, and many other participants
at Southern Methodist University, The HKUST, GRIPS, LKYSPP NUS, UCLA applied-micro and
international seminars, the UCSB Applied Micro Lunch, the USC-UCI-UCLA Urban Research Sym-
posium, the Warwick Ph.D. Economics Conference, the LACAE, and the All CA Labor Economics
Conference at UCSC for helpful comments. This project was supported in part by the UCLA Ziman
Center’s Rosalinde and Arthur Gilbert Program in Real Estate, Finance and Urban Economics and the
California Center for Population Research at UCLA with the grant (T32HD007545; P2CHD041055)
from the NICHD. The content is solely my responsibility and does not represent the official views of
the NICHD and the NIH. All errors are mine.
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1.1 Introduction
How much do people value local government goods? Answering this question is important
to inform questions in public finance and urban economics. In this paper, I implement
a new gravity approach to measure these preferences. I implement this approach in the
context of South Korea, a highly decentralized economy with large heterogeneity in local
spending across districts. Then, I compute the optimal levels of fiscal redistribution
implied by this measurement.
In the spirit of Tiebout (1956), my approach to estimate the valuation of local govern-
ment spending is based on mobility. The key novel feature is that preferences for govern-
ment spending are revealed by people’s bilateral migration and commuting decisions in
a context where moving is costly. Accounting jointly for both margins of mobility—mi-
gration and commuting—is important because these choices are linked and may respond
to government spending. Workers may move to places with generous provision of local
government goods, but they may also find places attractive to live in if they facilitate
access to jobs via commuting. Furthermore, the location of origin (i.e., from where a
worker migrates) may influence the choice of both residence and workplace. Using a
gravity equation that captures these margins and quasi-natural variation in government
spending, I find that the marginal valuation of a dollar of local government spending is
equal to 75 cents of disposable income. A key takeaway from my analysis is that ignor-
ing any of these dimensions (place of origin, place of residence, and workplace) biases
the estimates of preferences for public goods and of distance elasticities of migration or
commuting which play a central role in quantitative spatial models.
The empirical setting of this paper is South Korea. There are three key aspects of
the South Korean economy that make it an ideal environment for my analysis. First,
local government spending varies across 222 granular spatial units. These spatial units,
referred to as districts, partition the mainland of South Korea.2 Each district has a lo-
cal government which provisions local public goods. This local spending is financed via
income tax from its residents, a part of which is locally retained while the rest is redis-
tributed across districts.3 Second, national tax policy reforms in 2008 and 2012 reduced
2Districts in this paper correspond to 222 administrative units in South Korea called Si, Gun, or Gu.
To give a sense of the scale, the total land area of South Korea is about 1 percent of the U.S. or about
the same size as the state of Kentucky.
3 The national government of South Korea redistributes local tax revenue across districts via intergov-
ernmental transfers. The Local Subsidy Act describes a set of formulas computing the amount of
intergovernmental transfers each district receives. The rules of redistribution favor districts with lower
amenity values and higher population density. There was no major changes in the formula since its
enactment in 1994. See Section 1.2.3 for more details.
2
the income tax rates providing a quasi-natural experiment to estimate the preferences for
local government spending. Although these reforms modified national tax policies, they
resulted in differential changes in local government revenues because each district had a
different socio-economic composition that determined tax base. Due to budget balanc-
ing, these changes in local government revenues led to equivalent changes in its spending.
Third, I can observe bilateral migration and commuting decisions every 5 years from
2005 to 2015. I use restricted-access administrative data from the Population Census of
South Korea to construct a geo-coded panel data set of the number of workers in terms of
three locations, which I define by their district of residence 5 years ago, current district
of residence, and workplace district.
To guide the analysis, I use a quantitative spatial equilibrium model with a number
of features in common with Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) and Monte et al. (2018). As in their
frameworks, workers decide where to work and where to live taking wages and floor-space
prices into account. The model accommodates an arbitrary number of spatial units (cor-
responding to the districts in my data). Districts are different in terms of local amenities
as a residence and in terms of productivity as a workplace, while commuting costs vary
by district pair. The supply of floor space is endogenously determined for commercial or
residential use. Following these frameworks, I also incorporate idiosyncratic preferences
for residential and employment locations in the spirit of McFadden (1974) and Eaton and
Kortum (2002).4
In addition to these standard features, I incorporate two key margins. First, as in
Morten and Oliveira (2018), workers are heterogeneous in terms of their place of previous
residence, which empirically corresponds to where people lived 5 years ago. This margin
implies additional spatial frictions on top of commuting. Specifically, I allow the spatial
frictions between previous and current residences (i.e., migration) and between previous
residence and workplace location (i.e., job finding). Second, residential decisions depend
on local government spending, which are financed through a fiscal transfer scheme that
corresponds to what I observe in Korea. Local government spending may lead to agglom-
eration or congestion spillovers depending on the extent of rivalry associated with how
much people benefit from local government goods.5 The framework generates a gravity
equation, which expresses the fraction of workers from each origin living in a residence
and commuting to a workplace location as a function of spatial frictions between these
locations, spatial frictions with respect to the previous residence, wages at the workplace,
4 See Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017) for a review of quantitative spatial models.
5 E.g., under full rivalry, local government goods are simply publicly provided private goods. Under no
rivalry, these goods behave like an agglomeration externality.
3
and government spending, density and home prices at the residence.
I implement a two-step approach to estimate people’s valuation for government goods
and spatial frictions. First, I recover reduced-form elasticities governing worker mobility.
My identification strategy to estimate the preferences for local government spending is
to compare how the decisions of migration and commuting changed due to an increase
in local government spending, ceteris paribus. I construct instrumental variables based
on the tax reforms discussed above and historical residential density to estimate the
reduced-form elasticities of worker mobility with respect to local government spending,
residential density, and home prices. I find that the probability of migration increases by
1.07 percent for a 1 percent increase in local government expenditure and decreases by 0.8
percent and 0.5 percent for a 1 percent increase in residential density and home prices,
respectively. The results imply that there is rivalry associated with local government
goods (i.e., a dollar tax in contribution of a worker is shared with his fellow residents to
a certain extent). These estimates, nonetheless, are not enough to recover the valuation
of local government spending. For that, I also need to know how much people move in
response to spatial frictions and wages. Using the mobility response to wages, I can then
express the response to government spending in disposable-wage equivalent units and
recover and estimate the utility parameters.
In the second step, I use the structural properties of the model and estimate the effects
of spatial frictions (i.e., costs of migration, commuting, and job finding) and wages on
worker mobility. I estimate the distance elasticities of migration, commuting, and job
finding to be negative and stable over time. I show that estimating the distance elasticity
of migration while not taking commuting into account and the distance elasticity of
commuting without accounting for migration lead to large biases. With respect to the
distance elasticity of migration, the upward bias arises because workers migrate over
long distance when they are better compensated from the local labor market at the
destination.6 Estimating the distance elasticity of commuting while not accounting for
migration leads to an overestimation because there are additional costs associated with
commuting due to the costs of migration and job finding in addition to the direct cost
of commuting explained by the distance of commuting.7 These biases primarily arise
6 For example, Bryan and Morten (2018) estimates the distance elasticity of migration based on the
migration patterns in the U.S. and Indonesia without taking commuting into account. Based on the
migration pattern in South Korea alone, I estimate a value of the elasticity similar to theirs, which
is about 4.7 times smaller in magnitude than my estimate based on both migration and commuting
patterns.
7Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) estimates this elasticity in the context of the City of Berlin, Germany. My
estimate following their estimation strategy is similar to wht they found, which is 2.1 times larger in
magnitude (more negative) than the estimate based on both migration and commuting.
4
because the previous literature studied migration and commuting under the assumption
that previous residential location does not affect where workers work, which the data
unequivocally rejects.
Following the approach in Ahlfeldt et al. (2015), I estimate how much people move
in response to wages (i.e., the Fréchet shape parameter). Using this estimate, I re-scale
the estimated reduced-form elasticity of worker mobility with respect of local government
spending and compute the marginal valuation of local government goods in dollars. As a
result, I find that workers on average value an additional dollar of local government goods
equal to 75 cents of their after-tax income. This estimate is similar to the point estimate
of Suárez-Serrato and Wingender (2014), who use a different source of variation in the
U.S. context.8 In order to correctly estimate how much people value local government
goods, it is important to take both margins of mobility into account especially when
spatial units are finely defined. The valuation of local government spending is biased
upward if migration is not taken into account and downward if commuting is not taken
into account.
Using the estimated general equilibrium model, I quantify the welfare consequences
of the spatial distribution of local government spending. I conduct a set of counter-
factual policy experiments to shed light on the optimal modes of fiscal decentralization
(local taxation vs. redistribution). Across counterfactual exercises, I vary the extent of
redistribution, i.e., how much local government spending depends on redistributive in-
tergovernmental transfers relative to local taxation. Many countries around the world
(e.g., Canada, Germany, Australia and Japan) make fiscal transfers across regions, simi-
lar to the South Korean system featured in this paper. I allow for counterfactual regimes
to mimic what is observed in other countries, ranging from a high redistribution (as in
Canada and Denmark) and little redistribution (as in the U.S.).
I find that there would be a welfare improvement if the extent of redistribution ob-
served in 2015 were reduced. However, the complete elimination of the redistributive
intergovernmental transfers would lead to a sizable loss of welfare. The results indicate
that transfers of income are too high from fiscally strong districts (i.e., districts with
higher average income) to the weak (i.e., districts with lower average income) under the
redistribution policy observed in 2015. The benefit of the transfers in the net-receiving
districts is dominated by the loss in the net-contributing districts. Lastly, I show that
different assumptions on spatial mobility of workers (e.g., costless migration and pro-
8 Suárez-Serrato and Wingender (2014) estimate the valuation of government spending in the context of
the U.S. They exploit the population revisions following the decennial Census (“Census Shock”) and
the measurement error in population levels during non-Census years to isolate exogenous variation in
federal spending across counties in the U.S.
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hibitively costly commuting) call for a significantly different extent of redistribution. For
example, if no spatial frictions of migration and job finding are assumed as in the com-
muting literature, a fiscal arrangement with significantly lower redistribution appears
optimal. In this scenario, a lower extent of redistribution improves the overall welfare by
reducing the incentive for workers to reside in net-receiving districts at the expense of
longer commute.
My paper builds upon several existing literatures. The public finance literature ex-
amines the effects of government policies on the spatial distribution of workers. Tax
differentials across space incentivize workers to move across the state and country bor-
ders (Kleven et al., 2014; Akcigit et al., 2016; Moretti and Wilson, 2017). Some papers
estimate positive amenity values for government spending and regulations from housing
prices (Cellini et al., 2010; Black, 1999; Chay and Greenstone, 2005) in the spirit of
Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982). There are only a few papers that directly estimate
how much workers value government goods using government spending. Using a spatial
general equilibrium framework, Suárez-Serrato and Wingender (2014) estimate the effect
of federal spending on local economies in the U.S. by exploiting changes in population
levels used to determine the size of federal funding for localities due to Census shocks
(Suárez-Serrato and Wingender, 2016). Fajgelbaum et al. (2019) rely on tax differences
across U.S. states over time and the spatial proximity to other states to estimate worker
preferences for government expenditure.9
My approach includes various novel features relative to these papers. First, the spa-
tial unit used in this paper is finer than the spatial units commonly considered in the
literature (e.g., states and county groups in the U.S.). Given the granular spatial units,
I leverage both migration and commuting patterns to estimate how much workers value
local government goods and services. Second, I provide a new identification strategy us-
ing national tax reforms as a source of plausibly exogenous variation in local government
spending to estimate the elasticity of worker mobility. Third, I estimate the effect of
residential density on worker mobility by following the standard approach used in the
urban economics literature to estimate agglomeration and congestion forces (Ciccone and
Hall, 1996; Combes and Gobillon 2015; de la Roca and Puga, 2017).
This paper also contributes to the fiscal decentralization literature. The majority of
the papers in this literature focus on theoretically and empirically examining the conse-
quences of the changes in fiscal autonomy of local governing entities.10 There are relatively
9Gelbach (2004) focuses on the female population in the U.S. eligible for state welfare programs and
finds that the interstate migration patterns of this population are not sensitive to the distribution of
welfare benefits across states.
10 For instance, Fisman and Gatti (2002) documents that fiscal decentralization leads to a lower level of
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few empirical papers studying the effects of policy instruments employed for fiscal decen-
tralization (e.g., local taxation and redistribution). Government goods and services are
often public, thus creating fiscal spillovers. Wildasin (1980) finds that households may
locate in an optimal fashion in the presence of the spatial distribution of local government
spending and notes that fiscal spillovers may result in non-optimality. Fajgelbaum and
Gaubert (2018) characterize the optimal transfers for efficient allocations and the policies
implementing the transfers. Albouy (2012) presents a theoretical framework to determine
efficient and equitable transfers across localities and evaluates the welfare consequences of
the equalization policy in Canada. I contribute to the literature on fiscal decentralization
by computing the optimal mix of location taxation and redistribution.
Lastly, this paper contributes to a growing literature on quantitative economic geogra-
phy models. There are a number of recent papers that have studied the migration and
commuting decision, separately. In the case of migration, Bryan and Morten (2018) study
the cost of migration as a source of friction that results in labor market misallocation
using the case of Indonesia. Morten and Oliveira (2018) quantify the impact of transport
networks using the construction of a radial highway system in Brazil when workers can
migrate across space. Moretti and Wilson (2017) estimate the negative effects of tax rate
differences across states on the migration of star-scientists in the U.S.11 In the case of com-
muting, Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) and Tsivanidis (2019) study the commuting patterns and
their contributions to the spatial distribution of economic activity in the city of Berlin,
Germany and in the city of Bogotá, Columbia, respectively. The literature on migration
assumes that workers live and work in the same locations. The literature on commuting
assumes often implicitly zero spatial frictions associated with migration and job finding.
Monte et al. (2018) have a notion of migration in addition to commuting; however, they
assume that where workers migrate from does not affect their commuting decisions. To
the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to present a spatial equilibrium model
featuring both bilateral migration and commuting in the economic geography literature.
Furthermore, these papers concerning the geographical mobility of workers do not study
the roles of the public sector.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 1.2, I describe the data
sources and the key aspects of the South Korean economy. In Section 1.3, I present a
corruption. Bianchi et al. (2019) show that fiscal decentralization led to a higher female labor force
participation because local governing authorities expanded nursery schools. See Oates (1999) for a
broader literature review on fiscal federalism.
11 There are more papers studying the migration patterns in the U.S., Vietnam, and Brazil based on
spatial equilibrium models: e.g., Piyapromdee (2017); Albert and Monras (2019); Balboni (2019);
Pellegrina and Sotelo (2019). My model abstracts away from the dynamic model presented in Caliendo
et al. (2019).
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partial equilibrium model in which workers choose where to live and where to work in the
presence of local government goods and services as well as costs associated with mobility.
Then, I estimate the elasticities of worker mobility with respect to local government
spending, residential density, and home prices in Section 1.4. Section 1.5 focuses on the
effects of spatial frictions on worker mobility and estimate three reduced-form elasticities
measuring the responsiveness of worker mobility (migration, commuting, and job finding)
with respect to distance between localities. In Section 1.6 and 1.7, I embed the partial
equilibrium model presented in Section 1.3 into a general equilibrium setup and describe
how I parameterize the model. Finally, I consider counterfactual policy experiments
concerning the extent of redistribution and its aggregate welfare implications in Section
1.8. Section 1.9 concludes.
1.2 Data and Background
In this section, I discuss some key aspects of the South Korean economy and the data I
have collected to study how the spatial distribution of local government spending affects
the spatial mobility of workers and, more broadly, how it affects the aggregate welfare of
workers. Specifically, in Section 1.2.1, I discuss main data sources of the key variables for
my empirical study. In Section 1.2.2, I define the geographic units used in this study and
document the migration and commuting patterns in South Korea. Lastly, Section 1.2.3
discusses the national policies on local public finance and describe national tax reforms
in 2008 and 2012.
1.2.1 Data
The observed spatial distribution of workers is a consequence of decisions on two margins
of geographical mobility of workers—migration and commuting. Therefore, my empirical
analysis has a specific data requirement. First, I need data that records worker’s previous
residence, current residence, and current employment location. Second, the data has to
be spatially representative. Third, local government spending should vary at the same
spatial disaggregation across which workers activley make both migration and commuting
decisions. South Korea is one of the few countries, which meet all of the requirements.
My main data source for the spatial distribution of workers is the restricted Population
Census of South Korea. The Population Census of South Korea is conducted every five
years and sample 20 percent of the entire population. I use the three most recent waves
from 2005, 2010, and 2015. I restrict the sample to working male household heads between
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the ages of 25 to 60, who commute a round trip of less than 180 kilometers.12 The sample
size is about 3.5 million households. The Census questionnaire asks district of residency
five year ago, current district of residence, and district of workplace location. Based on
this information, I construct a panel data set of the distribution of workers by residence
five years ago, current residence, and workplace location.
Data on local government spending was collected from the administrative data (Year-
book of Local Public finance) from the Ministry of Interior and Safety of South Korea. I
digitized local government information by total revenue and revenue from the following
sources: local income taxes and intergovernmental transfers. This information allows
me to recover the share of the intergovernmental transfer each locality received from the
national government in a given year. In addition, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure,
and Transport publishes the land price fluctuation rates for each district. I collected this
information for 2005, 2010, and 2015. The fluctuation rate is defined as a ratio of the
average land price in a given year to the average land price in 2004.
I supplement the main data set with local characteristics in 2015 using the adminis-
trative data from various government agencies to complete the parameterization of the
spatial general equilibrium model I present later in the paper. The two key variables
are wages and housing prices.13 A major limitation of the Population Census is that the
information on wealth and income is not surveyed. Instead, I use the Economic Census
of 2015, which surveys the universe of establishments, and compute the average annual
wages in each district. The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport maintains
the universe of housing transactions from 2006 to 2015. I construct district-level prices
per unit of floor space in 2015 by employing a Case-Shiller type repeated sales approach
at the district level, similarly done in Ahlfeldt et al. (2015). Lastly, I compute distance
between every pair of districts by connecting their centroids.14
12 The reason for restricting the same to male household heads is motivated by the fact that migration
decisions are made at the household level. Over 90 percent of the households in the Population
Census have male household heads. The female labor force participation in South Korea is one of the
lowest among the OECD countries (Lee, 2017). The age restriction is to only include workers who
have completed education. Also, less than 1 percent of workers report a commuting distance over 90
kilometers in each direction.
13 See Appendix 1.11 for the complete list of additional variables and their sources.
14 In addition to the key variables explained above, I collect other local characteristics (e.g., land use,
suicide rates, divorce rates, and number of firms) for cross-validation exercises and over-identification
checks carried out later in the paper. See Appendix 1.11 for details.
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1.2.2 Spatial Mobility in South Korea
South Korea has the 11th largest economy in the world, comparable to Canada and Spain
in terms of GDP and GDP per capita, respectively. While South Korea is only about 1
percent of the U.S. geographically, the population level was as high as 51 million in 2015,
about 16 percent of the population in the U.S.
The spatial units used in this paper are districts in South Korea, which are the smallest
administrative units with local governing authority. I will hereon refer to these district-
level governing entities as local governments, I focus on the 222 contiguous districts that
partition the South Korean mainland, excluding the districts of Jeju Island.15 The average
size of each district is 224,310 in terms of population (91,471 households), approximately
twice as large as the average population of a county in the U.S.
I describe two dimensions of spatial mobility—commuting and migration—in South
Korea. First, I begin with the commuting patterns in South Korea. Workers in South
Korea spend about 7.3 percent of their workday commuting between their residence
and workplace locations, reflecting the commuting patterns documented in Monte et al.
(2018) for the U.S. and Schafer (2000) for 26 countries around the world.16
In Panel A of Table 1.1, I report summary statistics on commuting patterns in 2005,
2010, and 2015. On average, about 27 percent of residents work outside their district
of residence and about 30 percent of workers commute to work from other districts. In
addition, I plot the fraction of residents commuting to other districts against distance
between residence and workplace in Panel (a) of Figure 1.1. I observe that the proba-
bilities of commuting decreases in distance. This implies that the cost associated with
commuting increases in distance consistent with prior literature (Ahlfeldt et al., 2015;
Monte et al., 2018; Tsivanidis, 2019).
Second, with respect to migration, about one in seven households migrate across district
borders annually; the implied annual inter-district migration rate is around 13 percent.17
Aggregated at the province level (i.e., 16 groups of districts), the annual migration rate in
South Korea is 5 percent, similar to the inter-county migration rate in the U.S. reported
15As of 2005, there are 226 local governments, four of which were split as a consequence of redistricting.
I keep the administrative units consistent to the administrative boundaries set in 2005 by defining
groups of districts for those which underwent redistricting.
16 See Redding and Turner (2015) for further discussion on cost of commuting and transportation costs.
17 I do not observe annual migration patterns in the Population Census. Instead, the annual migration
rates are calculated using the restricted-use administrative records of the universe of migrants in South
Korea during the same time period (2005-2015). The migrant records are not used for analysis in this
paper because it does not provide information on where migrants work.
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in Molloy et al. (2011).18 In Panel B of Table 1.1, I report the probabilities of migration
over 5 years at the district level. On average, about 19 percent of residents in a district
are migrants who have migrated from other districts within 5 years, while 18 percent of
residents have migrated out of their residence in the past 5 years. Panel (b) of Figure 1.1
plots the probabilities of migration conditional on location of origin against the distance
between the origin and current residence. In line with the literature on migration, I also
observe that the probability of migration decreases with distance (Bryan and Morten,
2018; Morten and Oliveira, 2018).
In Figure 1.2, I plot the number of households in the figure on the left and local expen-
diture on the right by district. There are districts with generous local expenditure and
many households. This pattern suggests that workers are more likely to reside in districts
with more generous provision of local government goods and services. Additionally, local
determinants like wages, home prices, and amenities also influence worker’s migration and
commuting decisions. The spatial distributions of these additional forces also explains
the distribution of workers across localities. Figure 1.3 provide suggestive evidence that
workers are willing to migrate further and commute longer to live in a district with a
relatively higher level of local government expenditure and lower home prices.
1.2.3 Local Government Revenue and Tax Reforms in 2008 and
2012
The total local government expenditure accounts about 8 percent of South Korean GDP
in 2015. I focus on two main sources of local government revenue: local income taxes
and intergovernmental transfers, which constitute 14 percent and 72 percent of local
government spending, respectively.19 Panel C of Table 1.1 reports the summary statistics
of local government expenditure for 222 districts in the years 2005, 2010, and 2015. The
average total local expenditure is 363 billion KRW (approximately 363 million USD);
the average per-capita local expenditure is 7,638 USD, widely ranging from 906 USD to
29,622 USD.20
18 Therefore, the contrast in annual migration rates between South Korea (inter-district) and the U.S.
(inter-county) can be explained by geographical size differences between U.S. counties and South
Korean districts.
19 The remaining 14 percent of local government revenue is comprised of non-tax receipts (e.g., fees,
charges, and fines) and borrowing, last of which is only about 0.06 percent on average. Hereon, I
refer to the sum of local income taxes and intergovernmental transfers as local government revenue or
expenditure.
20 For simplicity, I will continue assuming the unit of government spending (and wages) in USD through-
out the remainder of the paper.
11
There is substantial spatial variability in the degree to which districts depend on local
income taxes and intergovernmental transfers for their total local spending. Local income
tax constitutes on average about 16.8 percent of the total local revenue. Intergovernmen-
tal transfers constitutes about 83.2 percent of total local spending.21 The share of local
government revenue from local income tax ranges from 2.1 percent to 56 percent.
The national fiscal policies (progressive income tax system and extents of fiscal de-
centralization and redistribution) and local tax bases (number of workers and their in-
come) determine local government revenue. The Local Autonomy Act—first enacted in
1949—was revived in 1991 after 30 years of suspension due to military dictatorships that
ended in 1987. The purpose of the Act was to “strive for democracy and efficiency of local
autonomous administration and to ensure balanced development of local areas...” (Local
Autonomy Act, 1991). The national government amended the Local Tax Act and Local
Subsidy Act to enable local autonomy in 1994. The Local Tax Act and Local Subsidy
Act together with the Income Tax Act promulgates progressive income tax rates. I will
refer to the collection of these three Acts as the national fiscal policies.
The national fiscal policies determine the size of local governments in two ways. First,
local governments collect income tax from their residents according to the income tax rates
outlined in the Income Tax Act, which is uniform across all districts. Local governments
retain a fixed share of their income taxes and deliver the rest to the national government.
I refer to the fixed share as local-national revenue sharing and the amount of income tax
revenue left at the local level as local income tax. Lastly, the national government allocates
a fixed share of its tax revenue for redistribution. Then, the national government makes
intergovernmental transfers to each local government, calculated by a set of formula
determining the shares of the total fund allotted to each local government.22 In sum,
the extent of fiscal decentralization (the fraction of total tax revenue local governments
spend) and the rules of redistribution (how to allocate intergovernmental transfers across
21 In Appendix 1.12.1, Figure 1.9 plots the spatial distribution of local tax revenue in Panel (a) and the
ratios of local tax revenue to total local spending in Panel (b). Likewise, Panel (c) and (d) plots the
spatial distribution of intergovernmental transfers and the contribution of intergovernmental transfers
to total local spending for each district. According to Figure 1.9, there is a considerable variation in
how fiscally strong localities are.
22 The Local Subsidy Act details the formula employed to determine how much intergovernmental trans-
fers to be rebated to each locality. The overarching objective of intergovernmental transfers is to help
develop “the public administration of local governments in a sound manner with the adjustment of
their finances by subsidizing financial resources necessary for the public administration of local gov-
ernments” (Local Subsidy Act, 1994). There are a number of countries both developed and developing
(e.g., Germany, UK, Canada, Australia, and India) with a similar local finance instrument (equaliza-
tion grants) to promote balanced financial capacities horizontally. While the U.S. does not have a
federal system directly aiming to reduce differences in fiscal capacities across localities, many of the
federal grants and policies have features that are implicitly equalizing across states and localities (e.g.,
EITC, SNAP, medicare, and medicaid).
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local governments) determine local government revenues.
Tax Reforms
there were two major reforms on national tax policies: one in 2008 and the other in 2012.
Figure 1.4 plots the marginal income tax rates before and after the tax reforms in 2008
and 2012. In 2008, the Income Tax Act was amended to substantially decrease income
tax rates across income brackets: from 11 percent to 8.8 percent for the low income
bracket (annual income less than 12 million KRW); from 22 percent to 18.7 percent for
the middle income group (12 million to 46 million KRW); and from 33 percent to 28.2
percent for the high income group (46 million to 88 million KRW).23 In 2012, the national
government further reduced the income tax rates to 6.6 percent for the low income group,
to 16.5 percent for the middle, and to 26.4 percent for the high group. The tax reforms
did not affect the rules of redistribution outlined in the Local Subsidy Act. Figure 1.10
in Appendix 1.12.1 plots the current shares of intergovernmental transfers to the shares
5 years ago. The estimated slopes comparing the redistribution policies in a given year
to these five years ago are close to 1.
1.3 Discrete Choice Model of Worker Location De-
cisions
In this section, I present a discrete choice model, in which workers make decisions on
migration and commuting. In the model, a worker decides where to live and where to
work, taking wages, prices of residential floor space, local government goods and services,
and the location choices of all other workers into account. My model is different from
the spatial equilibrium models commonly used in the recent literature examining the
spatial mobility of workers in two ways. First, similar to Fajgelbaum et al. (2019), I
augment the model by introducing goods and services provisioned by local governments.
Second, the model features both commuting (Ahlfeldt et al., 2015; Tsivanidis, 2019)
and migration decisions (Bryan and Morten, 2018; Morten and Oliveira, 2018) which
have been independently studied. There are iceberg costs of worker mobility rising from
three spatial frictions: migration, commuting, and job finding. The key prediction of the
23 The total number of income brackets had been four until the second amendment in 2012, which
introduced one additional income brackets for the even richer. For my analysis, I focus on the lowest
three income brackets which include more than 95 percent of workers in South Korea according to the
Ministry of Strategy and Finance of South Korea. I also note that the first reform in 2008 resulted
in small changes in the cutoffs of each bracket to account for inflation since the last change in 1994.
Since the first reform, the cutoffs for the lowest three income brackets remain the same.
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model is a gravity equation which summarizes the distribution of workers in terms of
initial residence, current residence, and workplace location.
1.3.1 Model Environment
The whole economy has R measure of workers (also, interchangeably referred to as res-
idents) and comprises of J discrete number of spatial units (i.e., districts), indexed by
r for current residence, m for workplace, and o for initial residence. As a residence,
each district is characterized by exogenous local amenities Br, per-unit floor space price
Qr, and local government goods and services gr. As a workplace, a district is charac-
terized by wage wm, which is subject to income tax. Therefore, workers commuting to
district m receive after-tax income equal to (1 − τm)wm for their private consumption
of the single final good crm and residential floor space hrm in residence of district r. In
addition, there are iceberg costs of worker mobility across space in three dimensions:
migration Dor, commuting Drm, and job finding Dom, summarized in a single disutility
index Dorm = εormDorDrmDom where εorm is a stochastic error term following a log-
normal distribution with its mean equal to 1. The first two spatial frictions follow the
standard formulations in the literature on migration and commuting. The spatial fric-
tion captures the iceberg cost associated with finding a job in workplace location m from
initial residence o.
Workers are born in or assigned to initial residence o (also, interchangeably referred
to as origin). The initial distribution of workers is given by pio. I assume each worker
inelastically supplies one unit of labor. After observing an idiosyncratic utility shock
for every possible pair of residence r and workplace m, a worker chooses a residence-
workplace pair that maximizes his utility given his initial residence, after-tax wages,
floor space prices, local government expenditure, location choices of other workers, local
amenities, and the iceberg costs of mobility.
1.3.2 Worker’s Location Decisions
The preferences of a worker i are defined over amenities, consumption of the single fi-
nal good, consumption of floor space for housing, public goods, and the iceberg costs
associated with migration, commuting, and job finding. The direct utility of a worker i
who chooses to move from his initial residence o to a new residence r and commutes to
a workplace m is zirmuorm(crm, hrm), where crm is consumption of the single final good
(numeraire) and hrm is consumption of floor space for housing.
First, uorm(crm, hrm) corresponds to the systemic component of the preference and
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follows the Cobb-Douglas form:
uorm(crm, hrm) =
Br
Dorm
(crm
β
)β( hrm
1− β
)1−β
gλr . (1.1)
Amenity fundamental Br captures intrinsic residential characteristics that make district
r more or less attractive to live in (e.g., the weather, beaches, and scenic views). The
parameter β determines the share of expenditure on the final consumption good.24 Fol-
lowing Fajgelbaum et al. (2019) and Albouy (2012), real government expenditure enjoyed
by each worker living in district r gr is local government expenditure Gr, normalized by
a function of the total number of workers living in district r Rr:
gr =
Gr
Rθr
. (1.2)
The parameter θ controls the extent to which local government goods and services are
rival and ranges from 0 if non-rival (pure public good) to 1 if rival (publicly-provided
private good). The parameter λ ≥ 0 captures the weight of local government goods and
services in preferences relative to consumption of the single final good and floor space for
housing.
Given unit price of floor space for housing Qr and after-tax wage (1 − τm)wm, the
budget constraint is crm + Qrhrm = (1 − τm)wm. The Cobb-Douglas preference implies
that β share of after-tax wage is allocated to the consumption of the single final good and
the rest to the consumption of residential floor space. Therefore, the indirect utility of a
worker i choosing to live in district r and commute to districtm is Viorm = zirmvorm,where
vorm =
Br(1− τm)wm
DormQ
1−β
r
(Gr
Rθr
)λ
. (1.3)
The systemic component of the indirect utility increases in local amenities Br, wage wm,
and local government expenditureGr, while it decreases in per-unit price of floor spaceQr,
residential population Rr, and spatial frictions Dorm = εormDorDrmDom. The composite
iceberg cost associated with migration, commuting, and job finding Dorm enters the
indirect utility function multiplicatively. Therefore, there is an isomorphic formulation in
which after-tax wages are reduced due to commuting and job finding costs, and amenity
values are decreased due to migration cost.
Second, zirm is an idiosyncratic preference shock that captures the idea that each in-
dividual worker has idiosyncratic reasons to find a residence and a workplace more or
less attractive. I model this heterogeneity in preference in spirit of McFadden (1974) and
24Davis and Ortalo-Magné provide empirical evidence supporting the constant housing expenditure
share, using the U.S. as a case study.
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Eaton and Kortum (2002). For a worker i residing in district r and working in work-
place location m, the idiosyncratic component of his utility is drawn from an independent
Fréchet distribution:
Pr(zirm < z) = exp(−TrMmz), (1.4)
where the parameter Tr > 0 determines the average utility of living in district r; the
parameterMm > 0 determines the average utility of working in district m; and the shape
parameter  > 1 governs the dispersion of the utility draw.25 Then, the distribution of
workers living in district r and working in district m by initial residence o:
piorm =
(
B˜r(1−τm)w˜m
DormQ
1−β
r
(
Gr
Rθr
)λ)
pio∑J
r′=1
∑J
m′=1
(
B˜r′ (1−τm′ )w˜m′
Dor′m′Q
1−β
r′
(
Gr′
Rθ
r′
)λ) ≡ ΦormpioΦo ,where Φo =
J∑
r′=1
J∑
m′=1
Φorm.
(1.5)
Because some of the unobserved local characteristics (i.e., Tr and Mm) always appear in
the gravity equation together with unobserved local amenities Br and wages wm, I define
the following composite terms denoted by a tilde: adjusted amenities B˜r = BrT 1/r and
adjusted wages w˜m = wmM1/m .
Workers are more likely to live in a residences with a high amenity value and local
government expenditure and lower per-unit floor space price, net of congestion/agglom-
eration forces and migration costs.26 Workers are more likely to commute to workplace
locations with higher after-tax wages net of commuting and job finding costs.
1.4 Key Reduced-Form Elasticities of Worker Mobil-
ity
In this section, I estimate the reduced-form elasticities of worker mobility with respect
to local government expenditure, residential density, and floor space prices derived from
25 The indirect utility Virmr0 is Fréchet distributed since Viorm is a monotonic function of the Fréchet
distributed idiosyncratic preference shock zirm. The maximum utility is itself Fréchet distributed
appealing to the stability postulate.
26 In Appendix 1.14.1, I discuss how I derive the gravity equation (1.5). It is also general enough to
produce the gravity equations summarizing the spatial distribution of workers that the literature on
commuting and migration have considered based on economic geography models (Ahlfeldt et al., 2015;
Bryan and Morten, 2018; Morten and Oliveira, 2018; Monte et al., 2018; Moretti and Wilson, 2017).
In Appendix 1.14.2, I show that the gravity equations used elsewhere can be derived based on the
gravity equation (1.5).
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the observed distribution of worker mobility in South Korea. Section 1.4.1 discusses an
econometric specification, which I derive using the gravity equation, a key prediction of
the spatial equilibrium model presented in the preceding section. In order to consistently
estimate the reduced form elasticities of interest, I exploit the episodes of national tax
reforms discussed in Section 1.2.3 as well as information on the historical residential
density. In Section 1.4.2 and 1.4.3, I present the estimation results and discuss the
interpretation and robustness of the estimated reduced-form elasticities.
1.4.1 Estimation Strategy
The gravity equation (1.5) describes how workers sort across districts in terms of resi-
dential and workplace locations from previous residence. I take the log transformation
of both sides of the gravity equation and obtain the following econometric specification
by augmenting the terms with time subscript whenever applicable to permit the panel
structure of the data:
lnpiorm,t = φom,t + φor + φrm + λ︸︷︷︸
βG
lnGr,t − θλ︸︷︷︸
βR
lnRr,t − (1− β)︸ ︷︷ ︸
βQ
lnQr,t + ζorm,t. (1.6)
The coefficients in front of log local government expenditure (βG = λ), log number of
workers living in r (βR = θλ), and log prices of floor space (βQ = (1 − β)) are the
reduced-form elasticities in question and are functions of structural parameters. The
job finding fixed effects interacted with year dummy variables φom,t flexibly capture the
workplace-specific factors (e.g., after-tax wages and average utility from working in dis-
trict m) and the factors specific to the origins (e.g., number of workers who used to live
in o and the denominator of the gravity equation (1.5)) as well as the iceberg cost of job
finding. The migration fixed effects φor and the commuting fixed effects φrm capture the
time-invariant component of the iceberg costs of migration and commuting as well as the
intrinsic residential characteristics of district r that makes it a more or less attractive
place to live in.27 Lastly, the error term ζorm,t includes the rest of the factors in equa-
tion 1.5 (i.e., adjusted amenities and time-varying stochastic components of the spatial
frictions net of costs associated with job finding).
The errors in Equation 1.6 can be correlated in two ways. First, there is a classic
clustering concern explained in Moulton (1990). Second, one may worry about the serial
27Note that land area for each district is absorbed into the migration and commuting fixed effects because
area is a time-variant feature of each locality. This implies that βR can be interpreted as the elasticity
of worker’s mobility with respect to residential density.
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correlation over time within a panel dimension Bertrand et al. (2004). In order to address
these concerns, I report standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and allow
multi-way clusterings. I allow errors to correlate across previous residences and across
workplace locations sharing the same current residence in a given year. In addition,
the serial correlation within each of the panel dimension (a triplet of previous residence,
current residence, and workplace location) over time.
1.4.1.1 Fixed Effects
The mapping between the econometric specification (1.6) and the gravity equation from
the spatial model (1.5) helps to understand potential confounders and consequent bi-
ases. First, the job finding fixed effects interacted with year dummy variables φom,t =
ln(1− τm,t)w˜m,t exp(−δdom)pio,t/Φo,t control for the benefit from choosing to work in m
net of the job finding cost from previous residence o. Workers are more likely to choose
workplaces with higher net benefits. Given higher returns from workplace location, work-
ers are willing to accept a lower amount of local government spending at their residential
location. Furthermore, worker’s valuation of a given workplace location depends on their
origin because for example they rely on their network to find higher paying jobs, and this
network is usually formed at the origin (Card, 2001; Cadena and Kovak, 2016). Thus, if
one does not control for the different levels of the attractiveness of the nearby workplace
by origin, the OLS estimate of βG will be downward biased.
Next, a higher net labor market return attracts residents. This positive correlation
between the residential density and the labor market return biases the OLS estimate of
βR upward. Workers with higher after-tax wages would be able to afford higher housing
prices. Similarly, excluding the job finding by year fixed effects biases the OLS estimates
of βR and βQ because residential density and home prices partially reflect the fact that
there are attractive workplaces nearby for workers of a given origin.
Second, omitting the migration fixed effects φor = −ρdor and commuting fixed effects
φrm = −κdrm are likely to bias the OLS estimate of βG downward. While the costs of
migration and commuting inhibit worker mobility, workers may choose residences with
higher local government expenditures to offset their migration and commuting costs. Dis-
tricts that are attractive to live in are likely to have higher housing prices and residential
densities. If so, the costs of migration and commuting are likely correlated positively with
the residential density and housing prices, again in the sense of compensating differentials.
Then, OLS estimates of βR and βQ would be biased downward.28
28Note that local government expenditure, residential density, and housing prices are correlated with
each other. It is useful to have a sense of the potential directions of bias in the conventional way
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1.4.1.2 Endogeneity
Even after conditioning on the set of fixed effects discussed above, OLS estimates of βG,
βR, and βQ suffer from endogeneity due to omitted variable bias and measurement errors.
The error term ζorm,t = ln B˜r,tε−orm,t includes the adjusted local amenity values. Local
government expenditures and local amenities are likely negatively correlated because
redistributive intergovernmental transfers favor places with low amenity values ceteris
paribus. This negative correlation between amenity values and government expenditures
would generate a downward bias in the OLS estimate of βG. Next, districts with higher
amenities attract inflows of migrants, which lead to a higher residential population. This
means the OLS estimate of βR would be overestimated. Lastly, high amenity values would
be priced into home prices in the sense of hedonic pricing. Then, the OLS estimate of βQ
would suffer from an upward bias in this case toward zero.
Furthermore, there is an additional concern of measurement error with respect to Qr.
I do not directly observe the home prices for 2005, 2010, and 2015. Instead, I use data
on land prices as a proxy. Assuming classical measurement error, an OLS estimate of
coefficient βQ would be attenuated. In fact, because all of the endogenous regressors are
correlated with each other, all the other OLS estimates would also be biased.
1.4.1.3 Instrumental Variables
Because the estimating equation (1.6) has three endogenous variables, in order to con-
sistently estimate their coefficients, I propose three instrumental variables based on the
national tax reforms and the historical values of residential density. For each district r, I
first construct two instrumental variables, exploiting the episodes of tax reforms in 2008
and 2012 discussed in Section 1.2.3:
IV br,t = τb,tpib|r,2000, (1.7)
where the income tax rates τb,t change over time; subscript b denote each of the two income
brackets I use (low and high). The values of τb,t are unique in each year t and income
bracket b because the reforms took place between the years when the Population Census
was conducted (2005, 2010, and 2015). Furthermore, I leverage the variation in the pre-
determined share of workers by educational attainment level b, symmetrically defined in
by thinking about the relationship between omitted variables and the dependent variable and the
relationship between omitted variables and the endogenous regressors. Nevertheless, the covariances
among the endogenous variables as well as their relationship with an omitted variable need to be taken
into account in order to properly characterize the directions of potential omitted variable bias. The
system of equations summarized in (1.38) in Appendix shows the complexity of the omitted variable
bias with three endogenous variables.
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terms of two levels (low for workers who have completed high school at most and high for
workers with some college degrees), for each district in 2000 pib|r,2000. The predetermined
local educational distribution proxies the distribution of workers by income brackets in
each district.29
The instrumental variables (IV lowr,t and IV
high
r,t ) capture the tax contributions of low and
high income groups predicted by income distribution in 2000. Therefore, by construction,
the relevance of the instrumental variables follows immediately from the local government
budgetary structure: government expenditures increase in tax contributions. To satisfy
the exclusion restriction, the instrumental variables must not directly influence workers
to prefer one residence over another, except through their impacts on local government
expenditures, floor space prices, and residential densities. There are two sources of varia-
tion in the proposed instruments. One source is tax rate changes over time. Conditional
on wages (φom,t), workers are subject to the same tax rates regardless of their residen-
tial and employment locations. Thus, the tax rates do not directly affect their location
decisions. Another source is the cross-sectional variation in the educational distribution
within each district in 2000. Although my model does not take a stance on the sorting
by skill levels, the previous literature has found that workers sort based on education or
skill levels as skill-mix determines residential amenities (Eeckhout et al., 2014; Diamond,
2016; Fajgelbaum and Gaubert, 2018). The validity of the proposed instruments still
holds as long as the tax reforms changed the educational composition in each district. In
Appendix 1.12.6, I confirm that the tax reforms are orthogonal to changes in educational
composition within each district over time. Therefore, the instrumental variables con-
structed based on the national fiscal policy reforms remain valid with potential sorting
by skill levels.
Second, the last instrumental variable IV Rr,t is based on the historical residential den-
sity as previously used in Ciccone and Hall (1996) and de la Roca and Puga (2017)..
Specifically, I use the natural logarithm of the number of households in r thirty years
ago (lnRr,t−30) as the data allows a lag of up to 30 years: the number of households
in 1975, 1980, and 1985. As Combes and Gobillon (2015) explain, historical values of
residential density are usually considered relevant due to inertia in local population as
local housing stock and infrastructure last over time. They are also believed to be ex-
ogenous to contemporaneous local characeteristics that affect worker mobility because
the changes in the type of economic activity and historical events like war reshape the
29 The sum of the proposed instrumental variables (
∑
b IV
b
r,t) shares the same structure as Bartik-type in-
struments widely used on the literature Bartik (1991). Borusyak et al. (2018) and Goldsmith-Pinkham
et al. (2018) discuss sources of variation in shift-share instruments and identification approaches. See
Adão et al. (forthcoming) for inference procedures when employing shift-share instruments.
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economic landscape.30 The validity of the instrument hinges on the assumption that
historical residential densities do not directly affect the worker location decisions today.31
This assumption is violated in the unlikely situation in which workers rely on the pop-
ulation levels 30 years ago, instead of its contemporaneous or more recent levels, when
deciding where to live today.
To consistently estimate the reduced-form elasticities of worker mobility with respect to
local government expenditure, residential density, and home prices (βG, βR and βQ), I use
the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator with the following identification assumption:
E

IV lowr,t ζorm,t |φom,t, φor, φrm
IV highr,t ζorm,t |φom,t, φor, φrm
IV Rr,tζorm,t |φom,t, φor, φrm
 = 0. (1.8)
1.4.2 Estimation Results
In Table 1.2, I report the OLS estimates of the elasticities of mobility to local government
expenditure, residential density, and home prices. In Column (1), I report the OLS
estimates without including any fixed effects. The OLS estimate of βG is negative, against
the expectation that workers value local government goods. The estimated coefficient
in front of the log number of households is 0.12, which implies strong agglomeration.
According to the estimated coefficient of βQ, a 1 percent increase in home prices decreases
worker mobility by 0.042 percent.
In Column (2), I report the OLS estimates with the fixed effects of job finding inter-
acted with year dummy variables. Compared to the estimate in Column (1), the OLS
estimate of βG increases to 0.097. This increase can be explained by netting out the
negative correlation between local government expenditures and labor market returns
from redistributive intergovernmental transfers. Furthermore, the estimated elasticity of
worker mobility with respect to residential density decreases to 0.061, implying that there
is a positive association between after-tax wages discounted by the cost associated with
job finding and residential density in line with intuition. Lastly, the OLS estimate of βQ
increases to -0.01; however, this estimate is statistically not different from zero. On the
one hand, the increase in the estimate of βQ is against the direction of bias associated
with omitting the fixed effects. On the other hand, the estimated value is likely a result
of an attenuation bias due to measurement error.
30 In the case of South Korea, a series of military dictatorship lasted about three decades until 1987.
31 The validity of the historical residential density as an instrumental variable can be also justified using
the demographic balancing equation used in demography (Preston et al., 2000).
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In Column (3) and (4), I gradually add the fixed effects of migration pairs and com-
muting pairs to purge out the confounding effects of costs associated with migration and
commuting on worker mobility. Because compensating differentials imply a positive cor-
relation between the costs of mobility and local government expenditures, the coefficient
estimate of βG should increase as a result of the additional fixed effects. However, the
OLS estimate of βG changes little in Column (3) and (4). The result reflects the omitted
variable bias towards zero from unobserved local amenity values, which are negatively
correlated with local government expenditures and positively affects worker mobility.
With respect to the estimates of βR and βQ, the OLS estimates increase compared to
the estimated values reported in Column (2) in line with the potential directions of bias
discussed.32
Table 1.3 summarizes the two-stage least squares results in Column (2), (3), and (4)
and compares the results with the OLS results in Column (1). Note that the OLS
estimates reported in Column (1) are the same as the ones in Column (4) of Table 1.2.
First, according to the estimates in Column (2), log local government expenditure is
positively correlated with the predicted tax contributions from the low and high income
groups, IV low and IV high. The magnitudes of the estimates are similar because both tax
contributions are measured in KRW. The lag residential density IV R is also positively
correlated with log local government expenditure. Second, the current residential density
is positively correlated with the predicted tax contributions, but negatively correlated
with the historical residential density. Conditional on the set of fixed effects, a negative
coefficient in front of the historical residential density implies that the districts that grew
at higher rates 30 years ago currently grow relatively slower. The last first stage result
concerns the home prices. Log home prices are positively correlated with the predicted tax
contributions as well as the historical residential density. All the the coefficients reported
in Column (2), (3), and (4) are statistically different from zero at the 1 percent level. To
formally test the strength of the first stage results, I compute various F-stats including
SW conditional F-stats, which test the explanatory power of the excluded instruments in
the presence of multiple endogenous variables (Sanderson and Windmeijer, 2016; Stock
et al., 2002). I report the SW conditional F-stats and verify the strength of the first
stages.
32 The estimates in Column (4) is based on the fully saturated specification (1.6). According the estimated
coefficients in Column (4), worker mobility increases by 0.1 percent with respect to 1 percent increase
in local government expenditure and by 0.59 percent with respect to 1 percent increase in residential
density. The estimated elasticity of worker mobility with respect to home prices is not only statistically
insignificant, but also economically small. The OLS estimates are contaminated by measurement errors
in home prices and the omitted variable bias from excluding local amenity values that make residence
more attractive and are correlated with the included regressors.
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In Column (5) of Table 1.3, I report the 2SLS estimates of the elasticities of worker’s
mobility to local government expenditure, residential density, and home prices. First, the
estimated elasticity to local government expenditure is statistically different from zero
and substantially larger compared to the OLS estimate in Column (1). As discussed
earlier, this large increase implies that there is a substantial downward bias rising from
omitting time-varying local amenities, which are negatively correlated with local govern-
ment expenditures, but make residences more attractive. The result indicates that one
percent increase in local government expenditure increases the probability of worker’s
mobility (equivalently the conditional probability of migration) by 1.07 percent.
Second, the estimated elasticity of worker mobility with respect to residential density
becomes negative. However, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the estimate is
different from zero. Statistical insignificance notwithstanding, the change in the sign
of the elasticity indicates that there is a considerable bias toward zero resulting from
omitting local amenities which the 2SLS strategy addresses. According to the estimate, a
1 percent increase in residential density leads to a 0.844 percent decrease of the conditional
probability of migration.
Based on the structural relationship between the estimated elasticities, I further esti-
mate the value of the structural parameter θ = −βR/βG, which capture the extent of
rivalry associated with local government goods and services, by the Delta method. The
estimated value of parameter θ is 0.787 with a standard error equal to 0.315. The mag-
nitude of the estimate suggests a non-negligible effect of rivalry from residential density.
Lastly, the estimated elasticity of worker mobility with respect to home prices is equal
to -0.49, substatially larger than the OLS estimate in Column (1). As explained earlier,
there are two sources of bias to the OLS estimate of βQ. One is the omitted variable bias.
Because amenity values and home prices are positively correlated, the OLS estimate in
Column (1) is biased upward towards zero. The other is measurement errors, attenuating
the effect of home prices on worker mobility towards zero. The 2SLS estimates which
correct for these issues show that the conditional probability of migration decreases by
0.49 percent as home prices increase by 1 percent.33
1.4.3 Interpretation of Estimates
The elasticity of worker’s mobility to government expenditure has not been extensively
estimated in the previous literature. Suárez-Serrato and Wingender (2014) estimate 1.46
33 In Table 1.13 in Appendix, I report the estimation results based on an alternative, parsimonious spec-
ification in which time-varying origin-workplace fixed effects are replaced with fixed effects separately
for time-by-origin, time-by-workplace, and origin-pair. The results are robust.
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for the elasticity of population at the county group level by leveraging exogenous variation
in federal spending in the U.S. Fajgelbaum et al. (2019) obtains a similar value of the
elasticity based on the number of workers at the state level in the U.S. Although the
comparison is not perfect since they consider different source of variation, time periods,
and geography, my estimate of 1.07 is close to their estimates.34
The literature on agglomeration economies includes population density as part of ameni-
ties and productivity (Ciccone and Hall, 1996; Glaeser and Mare, 2001; Ahlfeldt et al.,
2015; de la Roca and Puga, 2017). The magnitude of its effect has been estimated to
be positive, but rather small; the existing values of agglomeration parameter range from
0.01 to 0.06. This being said, the congestion parameter via local government goods θ in
my model includes the agglomeration force.35 Overall, I find that local government goods
and services are rival. However, since it is not fully rival, a tax contribution from an ad-
ditional resident is shared with all the other residents. Therefore, the effect of residential
density on worker mobility is net agglomerating.
Lastly, the estimation results suggest that spatial frictions reflected in the iceberg costs
of migration, commuting, and job finding are important determinants of worker’s location
decisions. In Table 1.11 in Appendix, I report the OLS estimates including each of
the fixed effects separately and show that the effects of local government expenditures,
residential density, and home prices on worker mobility is sensitive to job finding costs in
Column (2), migration costs in Column (3), and commuting costs in Column (4).
In Table 1.14 in Appendix, I compare the OLS and 2SLS estimates based on both
migration and commuting flows in Column (1) and (2) to the OLS and 2SLS estimates
based on migration flows alone in Column (3) and (4) and commuting flows alone in
Column (5) and (6). The 2SLS estimates in Column (4) and Column (6) are biased
because the exclusion restriction in each case is violated. On the one hand, based on
the migration pattern alone, the effect of local government spending on the probability
of migration is underestimated because workers move to places with higher commuting
potentials, which compensate the lack of local government spending. On the other hand,
the same effect is overestimated by about 5 times based on the commuting pattern alone
because, in addition to direct cost of commuting, there exist migration and job finding
costs that enable each commute. This set of estimation results emphasizes the importance
34My estimate of βG is slightly smaller than the ones estimated in Suárez-Serrato and Wingender (2014)
and Fajgelbaum et al. (2019). This is likely because they study the effects of government expenditures
that affect firms as well as workers.
35 There is a simple isomorphic formulation in which the agglomeration force is directly featured in the
model. If the local amenities Br is endogenous and depends on amenity fundamentals br and residential
density Rγr , where γ captures the residential agglomeration force. Then, the reduced-form parameter
βR = (θλ− γ) and βR/βG = θ − γ/λ.
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of jointly accounting for both migration and commuting and for proper conditioning to
consistently estimate the elasticities of worker mobility with respect to local government
spending, residential density, and floor space prices.
1.5 Estimation of Spatial Frictions
Spatial frictions make it difficult for workers to reallocate across space. The model pre-
sented in Section 1.3 features the iceberg costs of worker mobility including three spatial
frictions: the costs associated with migration, commuting, and job finding. In this section,
I estimate the effects of spatial frictions on the spatial mobility of workers. I shed light
on the importance of jointly considering migration and commuting decisions in correctly
estimating the distance-elasticities of migration and commuting.36
1.5.1 Spatial Frictions in Migration and Commuting Decisions
I rewrite the gravity equation (1.5) by grouping the location-specific factors by residence
φr, by workplace location φm, and by previous residence φo:
piorm =
φoφrφm
(εormDorDrmDom︸ ︷︷ ︸
Dorm
)
. (1.9)
I refer to Equation (1.9) as a generalized gravity equation of migration and commuting
as this equation generalizes the gravity equations in the literature on migration and
commuting.
Based on Equation (1.9), the expression for the spatial distribution of workers by their
origins and current residences is given by:
pior =
φoφr
Dor
J∑
m=1
φm
(εormDrmDom)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ALMAorεor
. (1.10)
The key difference between the expression above (1.10) and the one considered in the
literature on migration is the last term
∑J
m=1 φm/(εormDrmDom)
. This additional term
can be expressed in terms of stochastic εor and systemic components. I refer the systemic
component of the additional term to as augmented labor market access (ALMA). ALMA
shares a similar structure with the labor market access (LMA) in Morten and Oliveira
36Recovering unobserved factors in the model requires the estimates of these elasticities as discussed in
Section 1.7.3.
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(2018) and more generally with the market access approach in Donaldson and Hornbeck
(2016), but includes an additional factor Dom. On the one hand, the conventional LMA
has a unique value for each of current residences (i.e., destinations) since it captures
the benefit of accessing the local labor market net of commuting costs. On the other
hand, ALMA allows LMA to vary by previous residences (i.e., origins) to account for
heterogeneous costs of job finding and captures the benefit of accessing the local labor
market net of both commuting and job finding costs.
ALMA captures the idea that workers from different origins value the same local labor
market of a residence differently due to the cost of job finding. The extent to which
workers can benefit from the labor market of a certain residence may depend on where
they migrate from due to, for instance, a migrant network that makes job finding easier for
workers from a certain origin relative to those from somewhere else (Card, 2001; Cadena
and Kovak, 2016). Although ALMA does not explicitly appear in the gravity equations
used in the migration literature, ALMA provides an important information about how
workers sort across space. Workers conditional on their origins are more likely to migrate
to a residence with higher ALMA, while a higher value of ALMA enables workers to
afford a higher cost of migration.
Second, the literature on commuting employs a gravity equation, which summarizes
the spatial distribution of workers in terms of their current residential and workplace
locations. By summing piorm in Equation (1.9) over initial residences, I obtain a gravity
equation that characterizes the commuting patterns of workers:
pirm =
φrφm
Drm
J∑
o=1
φo
(εormDorDom)︸ ︷︷ ︸
AMMArmεrm
. (1.11)
Again, the key difference between the gravity equation above (1.11) and the one consid-
ered in the literature on commuting is the last term
∑J
o=1 φo/(εormDorDom)
. This term
can be written in terms of stochastic εrm and systemic components, last of which I term
augmented migrant (worker) market access (AMMA). AMMA captures the average
appeal of a commute (between a residence and a workplace location) for migrants net of
costs associated with migration and job finding. Therefore, there are two types of costs
that explain the commuting patterns One type is a usual direct cost of commuting Drm.
The other is an indirect cost that captures the idea that it is costly to move to residence
r and find a job in workplace location m from previous residence o in order to commute
between r and m. Similar to the direct cost of commuting, this indirect cost makes the
appeal of a commute less attractive.
AMMA measures how accessible each commute is for workers originating from different
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places on average and varies at the commute-pair level.37 On the one hand, it is likely to
see more workers carrying out a certain commute when this commute has a higher value
of AMMA. On the other hand, if the commute is costly, the appeal of this commute is
lower and so is AMMA. While the literature on commuting is silent about the role of
AMMA as a determinant of commuting decisions, accounting for AMMA is important
to correctly estimate the distance elasticity of commuting.
1.5.2 Estimation Strategies and Results
I take a step towards evaluating how much spatial frictions quantitatively explain the
spatial distribution of workers observed from the Population Census of South Korea. As
defined in Section 1.3, I impose a structure on each of the bilateral linkages such that
these linkages depend on distances djk between localities j and k as similarly done in, for
instance, Morten and Oliveira (2018) for the cost of migration and Ahlfeldt et al. (2015)
for the cost of commuting:
Dor = exp(ρdor), Drm = exp(κdrm), Dom = exp(δdom). (1.12)
The parameters ρ, κ, and δ control the sizes of migration, commuting, and job finding
costs with respect to distances between spatial units. The motivation for imposing the
same structure on the cost of job finding as the costs of migration and commuting is that
finding a job is harder for workers who are located farther away from potential job sites.
Taking into account that the data is available for cross-sections of 3 years (2005, 2010,
and 2015), I augment the gravity equation by adding time subscripts:
piorm,t =
φr,tφm,tφo,t
εorm,t exp(ρdor + κdrm + δdom)
. (1.13)
I estimate the reduced-form elasticities of worker mobility with respect to distances (ρ,
κ, δ) using the South Korean Census. 38
1.5.2.1 Cost of Migration with respect to Distance
I take the log transformation of both sides of the generalized gravity equation (1.13)with
time subscripts and the structure of bilateral linkages to obtain the expression as follows:
37 The term augmented migrant market access reflects a concept that different commutes have differential
capacities to access and attract migrants.
38 In Appendix 1.12.2, I conduct a type of decomposition exercise to shed light on the contribution of the
spatial linkages jointly and discretely to the observed variation in the spatial distribution of workers.
The spatial linkages individually explain about 23 to 70 percent of the observed variation.
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ln piorm,t = φrm,t + φom,t − ρdor + εmigorm,t, (1.14)
where the current residence by workplace fixed effects interacted with year dummies
φrm,t capture time-varying location specific factors at the current residence lnφr,t, the
workplace lnφm,t, and the cost of commuting −κdrm. The origin by workplace fixed
effects interacted with year dummies φom,t capture time varying location specific factors
at origin lnφo,t as well as the cost of job finding −δdor. The parameter ρ is the semi-
elasticity of migration flows with respect to distances of migration. The expected sign of
−ρ is negative because workers are less likely to migrate to places that are farther away.
The last term εmigorm,t corresponds to the log of the stochastic error εorm,t; I assume this
error term is orthogonal to distances of migration.39 I allow the errors to be correlated
across migration pairs.
In Table 1.4, I start with a simple OLS estimation without any fixed effects and gradu-
ally add two sets of fixed effects (commuting pairs φrm,t and job finding pairs φom,t), one
at a time. The estimate in Column (1) without any fixed effects is -0.002, statistically
different from zero. This estimate is likely biased from omitting the determinants of mi-
gration that are correlated with distance of migration. For instance, if workers migrate
longer distances to find better jobs (higher wages), the estimate is biased toward zero.
In order to purge out the net benefits of living in r and commuting to workplace m, I
include pairwise fixed effects for commuting pairs φrm,t. The estimated coefficient is now
slightly more negative at -0.004, reported in Column (2).
In Column (3), I flexibly control for the cost of job finding by adding pairwise fixed
effect for job finding pairs φom,t; this specification corresponds to Equation (1.14). The
estimated semi-elasticity is -0.033 and means that the probability of migration decreases
by 3.3 percent with respect to a one-kilometer increase in the distance of migration. The
large difference between the estimates in Column (2) and Column (3) implies that there
exists a substantial upward bias rising from failing to account for the difficulty in finding
jobs for workers who are migration from more distant places. The estimate in Column
(3) captures the positive relationship between distance and the cost of migration, net of
the costs associated with commuting and job finding.
Given that the distance of migration is a time-invariant feature that links the spatial
39 I estimate Equation (1.14) using a linear fixed effects estimator. The identification assumption is
that, the distances of migration are uncorrelated with all other determinants of residential location
choices conditional on the fixed effects. The error term may capture random measurement error in
distances of migration. Although I do not observe exact distances of migration, the magnitude of
potential measurement errors with respect to distance of migration are likely to be small because the
geographical units are defined more finely compared to the spatial units considered in the previous
literature.
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units, I test whether or not the semi-elasticity of migration to distance varies over time.
I include two additional regressors to Equation (1.14): distance interacted with dummy
variables for year 2005 and 2010. The coefficients in front of the additional regressors
tell us how different the semi-elasticities are in 2005 and 2010 relative to in 2015. The
estimation result is reported in Column (4). The magnitudes of the estimated coefficients
are economically small and statistically not different from zero. I conclude that the semi-
elasticity of migration to distance is relatively constant, and therefore is a time-invariant
feature describing the data.40
Lastly, I examine the consequence of using the probability of migration, a dependent
variable commonly used in the previous literature on migration, to estimate the semi-
elasticity of migration with respect to distance. I estimate a specification analogous to
what the literature uses to estimate as follows:
ln pior,t = φ˜r,t + φ˜ot − ρdor + εmigor,t , (1.15)
where the current residence and the origin fixed effects interacted with year dummies (φ˜r,t
and φ˜o,t) capture any push and pull factors specific to the origin and current residence
that affect migration. To consistently estimate the semi-elasticity of migration to distance
−ρ, the error term εmigor,t must be orthogonal to either distance dor or the dependent
variable lnpior,t, or both. The gravity equation helps to unpack the error term. Based on
Equation (1.10) with time subscripts on all the terms except distances, εmigor,t corresponds
to lnALMAor,tεor,t = ln
∑J
m=1
φm,t
(εorm,tDrmDom)
. An estimate without controlling for the
effects of ALMAor,t on migration flows would be biased towards zero because, as explained
above, ALMAor,t is correlated positively with both distance and the observed migration
flows. I estimate Equation (1.14) and report the estimated coefficient in front of distance
in Column (5). Conforming to the expected direction of the omitted variable bias, the
estimate is only about a fifth of the estimate in Column (3) because workers are willing
to migrate longer distances when they face higher returns from the local labor market at
the destination.41
40 The results are robust to estimating the distance elasticity of migration pooling observations for each
year (2005, 2010, and 2015).
41 The estimate in Column (5) of Table 1.4 falls within the range of available estimates in the literature.
Bryan and Morten (2018) estimates the elasticity of migration to distance in the U.S. (-0.553) and
Indonesia (-0.717). Re-scaling the estimated semi-elasticity of -0.007 by the average migration distance
(75.34 kilometers), the implied elasticity of migration to distance based on my estimate is -0.53.
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1.5.2.2 Cost of Commuting with respect to Distance
To estimate the semi-elasticity of commuting with respect to distance, I derive the fol-
lowing specification based on the generalized gravity equation:
ln piorm,t = φor,t + φom,t − κdrm + εcomorm,t, (1.16)
where the origin by current residence fixed effects interacted with year dummies φor,t
capture time-varying location specific factors at the origin lnφo,t and the current resi-
dence lnφr,t as well as the cost of migration −ρdor; the origin by workplace fixed effects
interacted with year dummies φom,t capture time-varying location specific factors at the
workplace lnφm,t as well as the cost of job finding −δdom. The parameter −κ is the
semi-elasticity of commuting flows with respect to distance of commuting. Because work-
ers are less likely to commute longer distances from their location of residence, the sign
of the semi-elasticity must be negative. The stochastic error term εmigorm,t, orthogonal to
distances of commuting, includes the log of the stochastic error. I allow the errors to be
correlated across commuting pairs.
Table 1.5 report the estimation results. Like before, I start with a simple OLS esti-
mation without any fixed effects and gradually add two sets of fixed effects (migration
pairs φor,t and job finding pairs φom,t), one at a time. The estimate without any fixed
effects is -0.013, statistically different from zero in Column (1). This estimate is likely
biased from omitting determinants of commuting flows that are correlated with distance
of commuting. For example, workers who migrated from places farther away may not
want to bear higher commuting costs in addition to cost of migration. Then, the estimate
is biased toward zero. In order to account for the omitted variable bias associated with
migration cost, I introduce the migration pair fixed effects in Column (2). As expected,
the estimate reported in Column (2) is -0.035, more negative compared to the estimate
in Column (1). Furthermore, the returns from working in m net of job finding cost,
captured by Dom,t are positively correlated with the commuting flows and allows workers
to afford higher commuting cost. This implies another bias toward zero.
In order to address this issue, Column (3) estimates the semi-elasticity of commuting
flows with respect to distance with both fixed effects of migration and job finding pairs.
The estimated elasticity in Column (3) is -0.045: a one-kilometer increase in commuting
distance decreases the probability of commuting by 4.5 percent.42 To understand how
42 Travel time is also widely used to define a cost of geographical mobility (Ahlfeldt et al., 2015; Morten
and Oliveira, 2018). In Appendix 1.12.4, I show that travel time associated with commuting has a
one-to-one relationship with distance of commuting. I re-estimate Equation (1.16) by using commute
time reported in the Population census as an endogenous regressor, instrumented with distance of
30
stable the semi-elasticity of commuting to distance over time is, I additionally include
distance interacted with year dummy variables for 2005 and 2010. The estimation results
in Column (4) indicate that the semi-elasticity of commuting with respect to distance is
stable over time.
Next, I examine what happens if the bilateral linkages of migration and commuting
are not accounted for when estimating the semi-elasticity of commuting with respect
to distance. To do so, I follow the literature on commuting and use the probability of
commuting ln pirm,t as a dependent variable and estimate the following specification:
ln pirm,t = φ˜r,t + φ˜m,t − κdrm + εcomrm,t, (1.17)
where the residence and the workplace fixed effects interacted with year dummies (φ˜r,t
and φ˜m,t) capture any factors specific to residence and workplace that affect commuting
(costs of living and wages). In order to consistently estimate the semi-elasticity of com-
muting to distance κ, the error term εcomrm,t must be uncorrelated to either distance drm
or the probability of commuting lnpirm,t, or both. Similar to the case of migration, the
log of Equation (1.11) with time subscripts whenever applicable has a direct correspon-
dence with Equation (1.17). The residual term εcomrm,t is equal to lnAMMArm,tεrm,t =
ln
∑J
o=1
φo,t
(εorm,tDorDom)
. It is clear that an increase in lnAMMArm,t increases the proba-
bility of commuting. Estimating κ without controlling for the effects of lnAMMArm,t
on commuting flows would be biased away from zero if a high commuting cost is associ-
ated with a low value of AMMArm,t. Column (5) reports the estimated semi-elasticity
based on Equation (1.17). The estimate is -0.074, which is more negative compared to
the estimate in Column (3) in line with the intuition.43
1.5.2.3 Cost of Job Finding with respect to Distance
In this subsection, I estimate the semi-elasticity of job finding with respect to distance.
I derive an estimating equation by taking the log transformation of Equation (1.13):
lnpiorm,t = φrm,t + φor,t − δdom + εjform,t, (1.18)
commuting. The estimated semi-elasticity (-0.036) is stastistically not different from the estimate in
Column (3) of Table 1.5 (-0.033).
43 The estimate in Column (5) of Table 1.5 is close to the available estimates in the literature. Ahlfeldt
et al. (2015) estimates the same semi-elasticity based the inter-district commuting flows in Berlin,
Germany in 2008 contemporaneous to the time period considered in this paper. Their estimated
semi-elasticity of commuting with respect to distance (also measured in kilometer) is equal to -0.07.
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where the commute-pair fixed effects φrm,t capture net benefits of living in r and working
inm, ln φr,tφm,t
Drm
(e.g., housing prices, wages, and commuting cost); the migration-pair fixed
effects φor,t capture the cost of migration −ρdor as well as any factors that make o a more
or less attractive residence to stay lnφo,t; the sign of the parameter δ is likely positive
because it is harder to find jobs that are farther away from where workers migrate; the
last term εjform,t captures the random noise. I allow the errors to be correlated across job
finding pairs.
The simple OLS estimate of the semi-elasticity of job finding with respect to without
any fixed effects is -0.001, reported in Column (1) of Table 1.6. Workers are willing to
accept a high cost of job finding (equivalently, a large dom) if doing so allows them to
find a pair of residence and workplace locations with higher wage, lower cost of living
and lower commuting costs. These correlations results in bias towards zero. In Column
(2), I introduce the pairs fixed effects for residence and workplace locations and find an
estimate more negative, compared to Column (1). Furthermore, because the distance of
migration and the distance of job finding are positively correlated and workers are less
like to migrate farther away, the estimate in Column (2) is still biased toward zero.
Column (3) reports the estimated semi-elasticity of job finding with respect to distance
with both fixed effects as prescribed in Equation (1.18). According to Column (3), the
probability of job finding decreases by 1.6 percent for a one-kilometer increase in distance
of job finding. To examine how stable the semi-elastisticity of job finding is with respect
to distance, I introduce distances interacted with year dummy variables for 2005 and
2010. In Column (4), the coefficient estimate for distance reported in the first row is the
semi-elasticity of job finding to distance in 2015. The difference between the estimate in
Column (4) and the estimate reported in Column (3) is economically small and is not
statistically significant.44
1.5.3 Implications
Taking the gravity framework to the spatial distribution of workers in South Korea, I
find that the spatial linkages between localities (costs of migration, commuting, and job
finding) are important determinants of the spatial distribution of workers. In particular,
44 To the best of my knowledge, there is no existing estimate of the decay parameter δ (i.e. elasticity
of job finding with respect to distance) in the literature. That being said, my estimate of the spatial
decay of job finding can be considered as a reduced-form parameter combining the effects of distance
on job match (employment) and job application (intent for employment), last of which Manning and
Petrongolo (2017) estimate based on a spatial model of job search using the data on the demand and
supply of the job search process in the U.K. They find a relatively strong decay of job applications
in distance. Marinescu and Rathelot (2018) also finds similar results (implied semi-elasticity of job
application to distance equal to 0.02) in the context of the U.S.
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they are systematically explained by distances between spatial units. The estimated
reduced-form elasticities are negative and stable over time.45
I make two important distinctions from the previous literature on migration and com-
muting. First, residence does not need to be a place for both living and working. Second,
where workers come from matters for not only determining where they live, but also
where they work today.46 I find substantial biases with the estimates of the distance
elasticities of migration and commuting reported in the previous literature.
First, the estimated elasticities of migration available in the literature are likely bi-
ased toward zero because the cost of migration is positively correlated with the benefits
from changing residences discounted by costs associated with commuting and job find-
ing (ALMA). This means that workers appear to be willing to migrate longer distance
for better labor market access. Second, the available estimates for distance elasticity of
commuting in the literature are likely biased away from zero (more negative). Because
of omitting the appeal of commuting net of indirect costs rising from migration and job
finding that enable a certain commute (AMMA), workers appear to be more sensitive to
commuting distance than they actually are.47
1.6 Quantitative Spatial General Equilibrium Model
I take a step towards quantifying the welfare consequences of the fiscal arrangements
observed in 2015. Accordingly, I embed the partial equilibrium model of worker’s location
45 This finding, in particular related to migration, is consistent with the assumption on migration friction
in Caliendo et al. (2019), which build the sectoral mobility costs in Dix-Carneiro (2014). Ahlfeldt
et al. (2015) make the same assumption about the semi-elasicity of commuting and applies the same
spatial decay of commuting estimated based on the commuting patterns of workers in the city of Berlin
in 2008 to explain the commuting patterns before and after the division and reunification of East and
West Germany.
46Also, Pellegrina and Sotelo (2019) find that the origins of agricultural workers matter in determining
the types of crops they cultivate they migrate to a different region in the context of Brazil.
47 The results also shed light on timings of mobility decisions. Intuitively, there are two alternative
timings of how workers decide where to live and where to work. First, a worker may decide a residence
where he would like to live (including the option to stay), and then find a job. If this timing is true,
the semi-elasticity of job finding should be estimated to zero controlling for the commuting-pair fixed
effects. Second, a worker may find a job first, then decide where to commute from. If this alternative
timing is true, then the semi-elasticity of commuting should be estimated similarly with or without the
fixed effects accounting for the job finding cost conditional on the migration pair fixed effects. Both
of these alternative timings are inconsistent with the observed spatial distribution of workers. The
findings altogether imply that a certain timing assumption is too restrictive to explain the variations
in the observed spatial distribution of workers. Consistent with these findings, the model presented in
this paper allows workers to make migration and commuting decisions jointly.
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decisions presented in Section 1.3 into a general equilibrium setup. I model the production
of consumption goods and the allocation of floor spaces for residential and commercial
use. Local government spending is determined based on national policies on taxation,
revenue sharing, and the rules of redistribution. In equilibrium, wages, floor space prices,
and local government expenditures are endogenously determined along with the spatial
distribution of workers. Lastly, I define the spatial general equilibrium of the economy.
1.6.1 More on Worker’s Location Decisions
I characterize the market clearing conditions for migration and commuting based on the
gravity equation (1.5) derived in Section 1.3. First, summing the probabilities of choosing
residence r and workplace m conditional on moving from origin o across workplaces, I
obtain the expression for the probabilities of moving to r given origin o:
pir|o =
J∑
m=1
piorm
pio
=
∑J
m=1Φorm
Φo
=
Tr
(
Br
DorQ
1−β
r
(
Gr
Rθr
)λ)∑J
m=1Mm
(
(1−τm)wm
DomDrm
)
∑J
r′=1 Tr′
(
Br′
Dor′Q
1−β
r′
(
Gr′
Rθ
r′
)λ) J∑
m′=1
Mm′
((1− τm′)wm′
Dr′m′Dom
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ALMAor′
.
Workers are more like to migrate a residence with a higher amenity value Br, a higher
benefit from local government goods Gr
Rθr
, and a lower per-unit price of floor space Qr.
In addition, there are two sources of bilateral determinants. The probability of choosing
residence r decreases in the cost of migration Dor, but increases in the benefit of accessing
the labor market discounted by commuting and job finding costs
∑J
m=1Mm
(
(1−τm)wm
DomDrm
)
,
which corresponds to the augmented labor market access ALMAor. Using these con-
ditional probabilities, migration market clearing condition requires that the number of
workers who live in r is equal to the sum of workers migrating to r from all possible
origins o:
Rr =
J∑
o=1
pir|oRo =
J∑
o=1
(
B˜r
DorQ
1−β
r
(
Gr
Rθr
)λ)
ALMAor∑J
r′=1
(
B˜r′
Dor′Q
1−β
r′
(
Gr′
Rθ
r′
)λ)
ALMAor′
Ro. (1.19)
I derive the expression for the probability of commuting commuting to workplace m
conditional on living in residence r. I take the ratio of the unconditional joint distribution
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of workers in terms of their residence and workplace to the the unconditional distribution
of workers by residence as follows:
pim|r =
∑J
o=1 piorm∑J
m′=1
∑J
o′=1 pio′r′m′
=
∑J
r0=1
Φormpio/Φo∑J
m′=1
∑J
o′=1Φo′rm′pio′/Φo′
=
(
(1−τm)w˜m
Drm
)∑J
o=1
pio/Φo
(DorDom)∑J
m′=1
(
(1−τm′ )w˜m′
Drm′
) J∑
o′=1
pio′/Φo′
(Do′rDo′m)︸ ︷︷ ︸
AMMArm′
,
where the terms specific to current residence such as amenities, housing prices, and gov-
ernment goods are canceled out from the numerator and denominator. In line with intu-
ition, workers are more likely to commute to places with higher returns ((1−τm)w˜m) net
of commuting costs Drm. Moreover, the conditional probability of commuting depends on
how costly it is to migrate to residence r and find a job in workplace m,
∑J
o=1
pio/Φo
(DorDom)
,
which corresponds to augmented migrant market access AMMA. Using these probabili-
ties, I obtain the following expression:
Lm =
J∑
r=1
pim|rRr =
J∑
r=1
(
(1−τm)w˜m
Drm
)
AMMArm∑J
m′=1
(
(1−τm′ )w˜m′
Drm′
)
AMMArm′
Rr, (1.20)
where the number of workers employed in m is equated with the number of workers
choosing to commute to m from all possible residences. I refer to this equation as the
commuting market clearing condition.
Expected income of workers living in district r is equal to the sum of the after-tax wages
in all possible workplace locations weighted by the conditional probabilities of commuting
to those locations:
E[(1− τm)wm|r] =
J∑
m=1
(
(1−τm)w˜m
Drm
)
AMMArm∑J
m′=1
(
(1−τm′ )w˜m′
Drm′
)
AMMArm′
(1− τm)wm. (1.21)
Expected income of workers are higher in places with lower costs of commuting Drm as
well as higher AMMArm, the indirect cost of commuting rising from the costs associated
with migration and job finding. Because workers allocate 1− β fraction of their income
to housing, the demand for residential floor space is given by
HRr = (1− β)
E[(1− τm)wm|r]Rr
Qr
. (1.22)
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Lastly, the population mobility implies that the ex-ante expected utility for each initial
residence is the same across all possible residence-workplace pairs. That is,
E[uo] = Γ(
− 1

)Φ1/o = Γ(
− 1

)
[
J∑
r′=1
J∑
m′=1
(B˜r′(1− τm′)w˜m′
Dor′m′Q
1−β
r′
(Gr′
Rθr′
)λ)]1/
≡ u¯o, (1.23)
where the expectation is taken over the distribution of the idiosyncratic component of
utility.48 I construct a measure of economy-wide welfare by taking the average of the
expected utilities (1.23) weighted by the distribution of workers by their origins pio: u¯ =∑J
o=1 u¯opio. This measure corresponds to consumption equivalent worker welfare.
1.6.2 Production
The production of the tradable final good occurs under conditions of perfect competition
and constant returns to scale. In particular, I assume that the production technology
follows Cobb-Douglas as follows:
ym = AmL
α
mH
F
m
1−α (1.24)
where Am is final goods productivity; Lm is labor input; andHFm corresponds to a measure
of floor space used commercially. Profit maximization under perfect competition implies
that labor demand is high in places where productivity Am is high; and wages wm are
lower in places with higher floor space available for commercial use HFm. This is captured
in the labor demand as follows:
Lm =
(αAm
wm
) 1
1−α
HFm. (1.25)
The equilibrium wage equates the labor demand (1.25) to the labor supply (1.20) in each
location. Similarly, the demand for floor space is given by
HFm = (
(1− α)Am
Qm
)
1
αLm. (1.26)
The demand for floor space is high in a district with the low equilibrium floor space price
Qm, high productivity Am, and measure of workers Lm.
48 See Appendix 1.14.1 for the derivation of Equation (1.23).
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1.6.3 Floor Space Market Clearing
There is a fixed floor space for each district Hj, which can be used residentially and
commercially. Atomistic absentee landlords allocate ϑj fraction of Hjto commercial use
and 1−ϑj to residential use. Therefore, market clearing for residential floor space requires
that the demand and supply of residential space are equal to each other (i.e., HFj =
(1− ϑj)Hj):
(1− β)E[(1− τm)wm|r]Rj
Qj
= (1− ϑj)Hj. (1.27)
Commercial floor space market clearing requires that the demand for commercial floor
space equals the supply of floor space allocated to commercial use (i.e., HRj = ϑjHj):
(
(1− α)Aj
Qj
)
1
1−αLj = ϑjHj. (1.28)
The setup of the floor space market in my model is consistent with the standard approach
in the urban literature of assuming fixed supply (Rosen, 1979; Roback, 1982; Tsivanidis,
2019) and allowing residential and commercial uses (Ahlfeldt et al., 2015; Monte et al.,
2018; Tsivanidis, 2019).49
1.6.4 National and Local Governments
Consistent with the national fiscal policies discussed in 1.2.3, I model how local govern-
ment expenditures are determined. First, the national government determines a progres-
sive income tax schedule τ(w), which is increasing in w, for all districts to levy their
residents and collects the fraction of local tax revenue 1 − ς from each district. This
means that ς fraction of total local tax revenue is kept locally, while 1 − ς fraction is
delivered to the national government. I refer the parameter ς to as local-national revenue
sharing. Also, without loss of generality, I express τ(wm) = τm.
Second, the national government operates intergovernmental transfers to supplement
tax revenues retained locally. It allocates χ fraction of the national tax revenue (or equiva-
49 The choice to assume a fixed stock of floor space for each district is to focus on evaluating the conse-
quence of spatial distribution of government spending. It is reasonable to assume that the total stock
of floor space does not adjust instantly. While the total stock for each district is fixed, the model allows
its allocation to residential and commercial uses to vary. As discussed in Redding and Rossi-Hansberg
(2017), assuming absentee landlord following the urban economics literature does not allow the model
to capture full general equilibrium effects. In addition, in my model, a single floor space price for each
unit clears the floor space market clearing conditions for both the residential and commercial floor
space markets. An extension to the model can be easily made to incorporate land use regulations limit
the return to floor space allotted to commercial use as in Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) and Tsivanidis (2019).
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lently, (1−ς)χ fraction of total local tax revenue) for redistribution via intergovernmental
transfers. Then, the national government determines the shares ςj of the budget allotted
for intergovernmental transfers to be delivered to each local governments such that ςj ≥ 0
for all j = 1, ..., J and
∑S
j=1 ςj = 1. I refer to {ςj}Jj=1 as rules of redistribution. Lastly,
the national government uses (1−ς)(1−χ) fraction of total local tax revenue to provision
national government goods and services such as national defense and diplomacy. I assume
that national government goods and services benefit workers equally regardless of where
workers live and work.
Given the national fiscal policies {{τm}Jm=1, ς, χ, {ςj}Jj=1}, measure of workers living
in j (Rj), conditional probabilities of commuting ({pim|j}Jm=1), and wages ({wm}Jm=1)
determine local government budget in district j. A budget balancing equation of local
government in district j is expressed as follows
Gj = ς
J∑
m=1
τmwmpim|jRj︸ ︷︷ ︸
TRj
+ςj(1− ς)χ
J∑
j′=1
TRj′ , (1.29)
where
∑J
m=1 τmwmpim|jRj is equal to local tax revenue collected from workers living in
district j denoted by TRj. Therefore, the first term corresponds to local tax revenue
collected and retained by local government in district j. The second term is the amount
of intergovernmental transfers from the national government, equal to the redistribution
parameter for district j (ςj) multiplied by the total budget allotted for intergovernmental
transfers, (1 − ς)χ∑Sj′=1 TRj′ . The extent of fiscal decentralization is captured by χ˜ =
ς + (1− ς)χ, which corresponds to the fraction of total tax revenue spent locally.
Depending on the rules of redistribution, local government expenditure in a district
may be greater if ςj > TRj/
∑J
j′=1 TRj′ or less than its contribution to intergovernmental
transfers. In this sense, the spatial distribution of local government spending is considered
as a consequence of transfers across districts. The redistribution mechanism described
in this section has features that are structurally similar to a transfer scheme based on
lump-sum tax and government spending laid out in Fajgelbaum and Gaubert (2018) and
more broadly place-based policies (Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2008; Kline and Moretti, 2014).
1.6.5 General Equilibrium
Given vectors of exogenous location characteristics {Tj,Mj, Bj, Aj, djk, Hj}, initial distri-
bution of workers {pio}, total measure of workers R, national fiscal policies {τj, ς, χ, ςj},
and model parameters {α, β, λ, θ, κ, ρ, δ, }, a general equilibrium of this economy is de-
fined as a vector of endogenous objects {Rj, Lj, wj, Qj, ϑj, Gj, u¯o}. These seven compo-
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nents of the equilibrium vector are determined by the migration market clearing (1.19),
commuting market clearing (1.20), labor market clearing (1.25), floor space market clear-
ing for residential and commercial uses (1.27 and 1.28), local government budget balancing
equation (1.29), and population mobility (1.23).
1.7 Parameterization of the GE Model
So far, I have estimated one structural parameter governing the extent of rivalry associ-
ated with benefits from local government spending (θ) in Section 1.4.2 and five reduced-
form elasticities: the elasticities of worker mobility to local government expenditure (λ)
and to home prices ((1 − β)) in Section 1.4.2 and the semi-elasticities of migration,
commuting, and job finding with respect to distance (ρ, κ, δ) in Section 1.5.2. In this
section, I discuss how I estimate the rest of the model parameters and recover unobserved
local characteristics for year 2015.
1.7.1 Labor Share in Production and Housing Expenditure Share
First, the labor share (α=0.823) is estimated by computing average share of labor cost
to the total costs across districts reported in Economic Census in 2015, consistent with
the findings of Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008). Second, I set housing expenditure
1−β equal to 0.15 to match the observed housing expenditure share based on Household
Expenditure Survey in 2015. This value is corroborated with the reported value reported
in OECD (2016).
1.7.2 National Fiscal Policy Parameters
The values of the national policy parameters are directly observed in a collection of laws
governing local fiscal capacities (the Local Tax Act and the Local Subsidy Act). In 2015,
ς = 9.1% of local tax revenue retained after tax collection according to the Local Tax
Act. The Local Subsidy Act allocates χ = 35% of total local tax revenue delivered to the
national government for redistribution. Because I observe the amount of intergovernmen-
tal transfers (ITj) for each district, I recover the values for the redistribution parameters
as follows:
ςj =
ITj∑J
j′=1 ITj′
. (1.30)
The last national policy parameter of interest is the tax rates. The tax rates by income
brackets are observed in the Income Tax Act as discussed in Section 1.2.3. However,
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the observed tax rates cannot be directly used because I do not observe the distribution
of wages within each district, nor does the model feature wage dispersion within each
locality. Without relying on the observed tax rates, I solve for tax rates τm by district
based on the observed local tax revenue (LTr), probability of commuting (pim|r), wages
(wm), and number of workers by residence (Rr) by inverting the following system of
equations:
1
ς

LTr=1
...
LTr=J
 =


τm=1
...
τm=J
 l1×JIJ×J

wm=1
...
wm=J


′ 
pim=1|r=1 · · · pim=J |r=1
... . . . ...
pim=1|r=J · · · pim=J |r=J


Rr=1
...
Rr=J
 ,
(1.31)
where l1×J is a vector with all of its elements equal to 1. Finally, I simplify the tax rates
to a single index (τm = τ ∀m) and calibrate the simplified tax rate equal to 0.245, the
average tax rates from the inversion weighted by number of workers.50
1.7.3 Recovery of Unobserved Local Characteristics
1.7.3.1 Local Productivity
I recover the values for local productivity using the observed wages and floor space prices.
To satisfy the profit maximization and zero profit conditions, equilibrium floor space
prices must satisfy:
Qj = (1− α)
(
α
wj
) α
1−α
A
1
1−α
j . (1.32)
Therefore, given the observed data on wages and floor space prices in 2015 and the param-
eter value of α, I can recover Aj for each district using the equilibrium condition above
(1.32). Figure 1.12 in Appendix 1.13.2 plots the spatial distribution of the recovered val-
ues of local productivity. The greater Seoul area, the Northwestern part of South Korea,
has relatively greater values of productivity, as well as the some of the coastal districts
with ports (e.g., the greater Busan area covering the Southeastern coast) consistent with
coastal and port advantages studied in Balboni (2019) and Ducruet et al. (2019).
50 The counterfactual policy experiments concern with changes in the spatial distribution of spending due
to changes in the intensity of fiscal decentralization and redistribution whiling holding the nationally
determined tax rates fixed.
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1.7.3.2 Fréchet Shape Parameter
I estimate the Fréchet shape parameter, which is equivalent to the elasticity of worker
mobility with respect to wage. I begin by deriving the expression for the probabilities of
working in m conditional on living in r and having moved from o:
pim|ro =
piorm∑J
m′=1 piorm′
=
Φorm∑J
m′=1Φorm′
=
w˜m
exp(κdrm+δdom)∑J
m′=1
w˜
m′
exp(κdrm′+δdom′ )
. (1.33)
I define a composite referred to as adjusted wages ωj = w˜j =Mjwm. I rewrite the above
equation using adjusted wages and take the log transformation of both sides. Using my
estimates of κ = 0.045 and δ = 0.016 and rearranging such that left hand side consists
of only observables, I obtain the following expression:
lnpim|ro + κdrm + δdom = − ln
J∑
m′=1
ωm′
exp(κdrm′ + δdom′)
+ lnωm, (1.34)
where I treat κdrm + δdom as data and I observe lnpim|ro. The left hand side altogether
can be decomposed into two parts: the first term that varies at the current residence
and origin level and the second term that varies at the workplace level. Introducing
stochastic errors to Equation (1.34), I regress the left hand side on the pairwise fixed
effects of current residence and origin and the workplace fixed effects. Then, I recover the
values of log adjusted wages from the estimated workplace fixed effects. Note that these
values are determined independent of  based on the observed distribution of workers and
the costs of commuting and job finding.51
The parameter  controls the variance of log adjusted wages (lnωj) relative to the
variance of log observed wages (lnwm). That is, σ2lnwj =
1
2
σ2lnωjbecause the parameters
Mj are deterministic. Therefore, I estimate the value of  by taking the ratio of the
standard deviations of log adjusted wages and log wages in the data after normalizing
both to have geometric mean equal to 1. The resulting value of  is equal to 3.54; this
means that the worker mobility increases by 3.54 percent for a 1 percent increase in
wages.52
51 In Appendix 1.13.2, I examine the relationship between the recovered values of local productivity and
number of firms in Figure 1.13. Panel (a) shows that districts with higher productivity values have
higher number of firms. In Panel (b), productivity is positively correlated with number of firms which
discharge wastewater.
52 For inference, I randomly sample 111 observations from log observed wages and log adjusted wages
and compute . I repeat this process a number of times, e.g., 1 billion times, to obtain the distribution
of the estimator for . Given the estimated standard error equal to 0.102. I reject the null hypothesis
that  = 0 at the 99% confidence level. The result is robust to different sample sizes (25, 50, 100, 150
and 200).
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There are several other papers which estimate the same parameter. Defining spatial
units as U.S. counties from 2006 to 2010, Monte et al. (2018) finds a point estimate of
the shape parameter equal to 3.3, while Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) estimate its value equal
to 6.83 based on the inter-district commuting patterns in the city of Berlin in 2008. My
estimate falls within the responsible range of the existing estimates in the literature.
With the estimated value of , I recover the structural parameters (λ, ρ, κ, ρ) from the
estimated reduced-form elasticities (λ = λ˜/ = 0.30, ρ = ρ˜/ = 0.009, κ = κ˜/ = 0.013,
δ = δ˜/ = 0.005). Furthermore, the estimated elasticity of worker mobility with respect
to floor space prices reported in Table 1.3 is equal to (1 − β). Based on the estimate
of  = 3.54, the implied value of 1 − β is equal to 0.14, close to the expenditure share
estimated using the Household Expenditure Survey in Section 1.7.1.
Based on the structural value of how much people of local government spending (λ =
0.3), I obtain the valuation of local government spending by computing the compensating
variation. At the median values of per-capita local government spending (7,302 USD)
and household income (18,180 USD) in 2015, workers are willing to give up 75 cent for a
dollar increase in per-capita local government expenditure in their residence.
1.7.3.3 Adjusted Local Amenities
I recover adjusted amenity for each residence that rationalizes the observed spatial dis-
tribution of workers. Similarly to the process described when recovering the adjusted
wages, I begin by deriving the expression for the conditional distribution of workers by
their residences on workplace location and previous residence based on the gravity equa-
tion (1.5):
pir|mo =
piorm∑J
r′=1 pior′m
=
Φorm∑J
r′=1Φor′m
=
B˜rG
λ
r
exp(κdrm+ρdor)Q
(1−β)
r Rθλr∑J
r′=1
B˜
r′G
λ
r′
exp(κdr′m+ρdor′ )Q
(1−β)
r′ R
θλ
r′
. (1.35)
I take the log transformation of both sides of Equation (1.35) and rearrange such that
left hand side only consists of observables:
ln pir|mo−ln G
λ
r
exp(κdrm + ρdor)Q
(1−β)
r Rθλr
= − ln
J∑
r′=1
B˜r′G
λ
r′
exp(κdr′m + ρdor′)Q
(1−β)
r′ R
θλ
r′
+ln B˜r,
(1.36)
where I treat the second term in the left hand side as data given the parameter values.
Introducing stochastic errors, I regress the left hand side on the pairwise fixed effects of
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workplace and origin and the residence fixed effects. Then, I recover the values of log
adjusted amenities from the estimated residence fixed effects (up to scale). Figure 1.14 in
Appendix 1.13.3 plots the spatial distribution of adjusted amenities. The metropolitan
areas tend to have relatively higher amenity values, reflecting urban amenities. Also, the
amenities are higher in the coastal areas, especially the coastal districts in the East and
South.53
1.7.4 Non-targeted Moments
I evaluate how well the model predicts the non-targeted moments. First, I compare the
observed data on number of workers by employment location to the model prediction in
Panel (a) and (b) of Figure 1.5. The two variables have a coefficient correlation of 0.94
with a slope equal to 0.91 in Panel (a). The estimated slope in Panel (a) as well as the
comparison of the cumulative distribution functions in Panel (b) suggest that the model
performs well in explaining the spatial distribution of workers.
Second, in Panel (c) and (d), I compare the observed local tax revenue to the model-
implied local tax revenue by residence. There is a strong positive correlation between
the data and the model-implied local tax revenues with a value of 0.92 and an estimated
slope of 0.95. In addition, I plot the cumulative distribution functions of the data on local
tax revenue and the model-counterpart. Local government spending is equal to the sum
of a fixed fraction of local tax revenues and the intergovernmental transfers, last of which
my calibration matches. Therefore, Panel (c) and (d) show that the model explains the
spatial distribution of local government spending well.
Third, I verify the model prediction on residential floor space. Panel (e) and (f) compare
the residential floor spaces predicted by the model to the observed area of land used for
residential purposes measured in 1000m2 from the Land Use Statistics in 2015. The
correlation coefficient of the two variables is 0.52 and the estimated slope is equal to
0.97. While strong, the relationship between the data and the model-implied values has
a relatively low correlation coefficient. This is because the observed data measures total
land area used residentially, which does not take the ratio of floor space to land area into
53 In Appendix 1.13.3, I assess the relationship between the recovered amenities and local outcomes which
proxy quality of life at the residential locations (Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg, 2013). Panel (a) of Figure
1.15 shows that amenities are higher in places with fewer number of firms discharging wastewater. In
Panel (b), residences with lower suicide rates tend to have higher amenities. Lastly, there is a negative
correlation between divorce rates and amenities in Panel (c). While I do not formally investigate the
relationship between weather and the recovered amenity values as in (Rappaport, 2007), I can infer
that nice weather is positively correlated with the recovered amenities because coastal areas tend to
have mild weather in Summer and Winter relative to inland districts. Therefore, proximity to the
ocean in the coastal districts and its positive relationship with nice weather make coastal districts
relatively more attractive.
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account. Despite the sources of measurement error, the model performs well in capturing
residential floor spaces.
1.8 Counterfactual Policy Experiments
In this section, I quantify the welfare consequences of the spatial distribution of local
government spending. In particular, I vary the extent of redistribution while holding the
rules of redistribution and the extent of fiscal decentralization constant.
1.8.1 Determinants of Rules of Redistribution
The primary objective of the Local Subsidy Act, which determines the rules of redistri-
bution, is to promote equitable economic growth across localities. As a result, the rules
of redistribution is expected to favor residences which are intrinsically less attractive to
live (low values of B˜j) and fiscally weak (low TRj) to promote economic growth in these
districts. It is important to understand the determinants of rules of redistribution be-
cause I conduct counterfactual policy experiments while holding the observed rules of
redistribution fixed in the subsequent section. I formally study the determinants of the
rules of redistribution observed in 2015 in a regression framework. To do so, I regress
the log of the observed rules of redistribution ln ςj on the log of residential density Rj,
recovered amenity values B˜r, local productivity Aj, and employment density Lj. Table
1.8 summarizes the estimation results.
In Column (1), the coefficient in front of the log residential density is positive and
statistically significant. The result implies that the rules of redistribution is higher in
places with higher population density conditional on the geographical area. Introducing
the log recovered values of adjusted amenities and productivity in Column (2) and then
in Column (3), I find that districts with higher amenity values and productivity receives
smaller share of intergovernmental transfers. Lastly, in Column (4), I find that the
employment density of a residence does not affect the rules of redistribution.
1.8.2 Welfare Consequences of Redistribution
In this section, I conduct a series of counterfactual policy experiments in which I vary the
extent of redistribution. Throughout the exercises, I hold the extent of fiscal decentral-
ization (i.e., the fraction of total tax revenue spent locally) constant at the level observed
in 2015 χ˜ = 0.4 as well as the rules of redistribution {ςj}Sj=1. In each of counterfactuals,
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I consider varying extent of redistribution denoted by ς˜, which varies from 0 up to χ˜.
Local government spending is expressed as follows:
Gj = (χ˜− ς˜)TRj + ςj ς˜
S∑
j′=1
TRj′ (1.37)
If ς˜ = 0, local government spending solely depends on local tax revenue. In the other
extreme in which ς˜ = χ˜, intergovernmental transfers completely determine local gov-
ernment expenditures. The observed extent of redistribution is 0.3, which I consider a
baseline.
Figure 1.6 plots the changes in the aggregate welfare of workers u¯ as defined in Section
1.6.1 relative to the baseline level (ς˜ = 30%). When the redistributive intergovernmental
transfers are completely eliminated and local government spending is determined solely
based on local tax revenue (ς˜ = 0%), the aggregate welfare of workers decrease by 1.2
percent. In the other extreme case in which local government spending is completely de-
termined by intergovernmental transfers (ς˜ = 40%), the aggregate welfare also decreases
by 0.3 percent. Considering the varying extent of redistribution (with an increment of
5 percentage points), I find that the aggregate welfare is maximized when the extent of
redistribution is equal to 20 percent. This implies that by lowering the extent of redistri-
bution observed in 2015 by 10 percentage points, the aggregate welfare of workers would
reach its highest, which is 0.12 percent higher than the baseline level.
The extent of redistribution controls the trade-offs between two types of fiscal spillovers.
In districts that are net contributors to redistribution, a dollar tax contribution of a
resident is shared with all the other residents living in the same district, but also with
other workers living in districts that are net receivers.54 Therefore, in the presence of
redistributive intergovernmental transfers, there are two sources of fiscal spillovers: intra-
district and inter-district. The size of intra-district fiscal spillover decreases in the extent
of redistribution. It is also necessarily the case that the size of inter-district fiscal spillover
becomes larger as the extent of redistribution increases.
Therefore, the welfare changes summarized in Figure 1.6 are the consequences of
changes in the extents of intra- and inter-district fiscal spillovers. On the one hand,
when the extent of redistribution is greater than 20 percent, inter-district spillover serves
as a primary source of inefficiency. In this case, intergovernmental transfers raise local
54 To help understand the types of spillovers, it is important to reiterate two important characteristics
of local government spending in South Korea and more broadly local public finance. First, local
government goods and services are not fully rival (i.e., θ < 1). Second, due to redistributive intergov-
ernmental transfers, how much is transferred from districts that are fiscally strong (net contributors)
to those with weak fiscal capacities (net receivers) increases in the extent of redistribution. Higher the
extent of redistribution, larger the fraction of my tax contribution diverted for redistribution.
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government expenditures in net-receiving districts by drawing expenditures from net-
contributing districts. In response, workers are attracted to and move to these places
which have become less undesirable. On the other hand, when the extent of redistribu-
tion is less than 20 percent, intra-district spillover is responsible for lowering the overall
welfare. Similarly, in this case, districts that are fiscally strong would attract additional
residents from the tax contributions of fellow residents shared within each district.
Figure 1.7 shows that the extent of fiscal spillovers is minimized when the extent of re-
distribution is equal to 20 percent. I construct a measure for the extent of fiscal spillovers
ς˜ by computing the standard deviation of local government goods and services net of
worker tax contribution (i.e., how much extra benefit workers enjoy due to spillovers) for
each counterfactual. This measure gauges the dispersion of external benefits of local gov-
ernment spending from intra- and inter-district spillovers. Higher the dispersion, higher
the incentives for the workers to reallocate. At the optimum level of redistribution at 20
percent, the extent of fiscal spillovers is reduced by 20 percent.
Lastly, I conduct the same set of counterfactual policy experiments based on two differ-
ent restrictions commonly imposed in the literature on migration and commuting. First,
the migration literature assumes that workers live and work in the same location. I set the
semi-elasticity of commuting with respect to commuting distance κ equal to infinity, the
semi-elasticity of migration with respect to migration distance ρ equal to 0.007, and the
semi-elasticity of job finding to its distance equal to 0. Second, the commuting literature
assumes costless migration. Likewise, I assume that the distance-elasticities of migration
and job search equal to zero and the semi-elasticity of commuting to commuting distance
equal to 0.074 and compute the counterfactual outcomes. Then, for each of two sets
of redistribution separately, I solve for the new equilibrium and compute counterfactual
changes in the aggregate worker welfare under varying extents of redistribution.
In Panel (a) of Figure 1.8, I plot the welfare changes relative to the baseline in 2015
assuming no inter-district commuting. If workers are not allowed to commute outside of
districts, eliminating redistribution altogether leads in a higher welfare loss of about 2
percent. Furthermore, the optimal extent of redistribution is higher at a level close to
30 percent. Workers are not able to access districts with higher productivity without
moving into these districts. Then, workers agglomerate in these districts, contributing
to increasing intra-district fiscal spillover. As a result, there is a demand for greater
redistribution.
Panel (b) of Figure 1.8 plots the changes in the worker welfare under the assumption
of no migration and job finding costs. While not optimal, eliminating redistributive
intergovernmental transfers lead to a sizable increase in welfare by about 2.3 percent.
This implies that the need for redistribution across districts is small when workers can
46
migrate across districts freely. With no migration and job finding costs, it becomes easier
for workers to access districts with higher productivity. At the same time, in the presence
of redistributive intergovernmental transfers, workers find it profitable to reside in net-
receiving districts with positive inter-district fiscal spillovers at the expense of longer
commute because they benefit from local government goods and services more than their
tax contribution. Therefore, with no migration and job finding costs, lowering the extent
of redistribution increases the overall efficiency of the economy.
1.9 Conclusion
In this paper, I make three contributions to our understanding of local provision of
government goods and services as a determinant of the spatial distribution of workers.
First, I present a quantitative general equilibrium in which workers make both migration
and commuting decisions, which have been traditionally studied separately. The key
prediction of the model is a gravity equation summarizing the distribution of workers in
terms of three locations: previous residence, current residence, and workplace.
Second, I combine the framework with the quasi-natural experiment leading to plausibly
exogenous variation in local spending and estimate the key reduced-form elasticities of
worker mobility with respect to local government expenditure, residential density, and
home prices. In addition, I estimate the elasticities of worker mobility with respect
to spatial frictions (migration, commuting, and job finding). The key finding is that
the marginal valuation of local government spending is equal to 75 cents of after-tax
income. I show that there are large biases when the elasticity of migration with respect
to distance is estimated without accounting for commuting patterns and vice versa. The
results altogether show that where workers lived before matters for not only where they
live today, but only where they presently work.
Third, based on counterfactual policy experiments, I show that there exists a fiscal
arrangement (local taxation vs. intergovernmental transfers), which would maximize the
overall welfare of workers. I discuss how the optimal mix of local taxation and inter-
governmental transfers balances the trade-offs between the extents of intra-regional and
inter-regional fiscal spillovers. The results suggest that reducing the current extent of
redistribution observed in South Korea, thereby allowing local governments to rely more
on their local income tax, would increase the overall efficiency. Furthermore, spatial
frictions and their effects on worker mobility are important in determining an optimal
fiscal arrangement. If workers are assumed to live and work in the same location (the
key assumption in the migration literature), the importance of redistributive intergovern-
mental transfers are overemphasized. However, if workers can migrate without any costs
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(the key assumption in the commuting literature), the importance of local taxation (less
redistribution) is overemphasized.
Overall, I find that it is crucial to account for both margins of mobility (i.e., migration
and commuting) not only to understand the determinants and their effects on the spatial
distribution of workers and more broadly economic activity, but also to inform policy
makers of the welfare consequences from the spatial distribution of local government
spending.
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1.10 Figures and Tables
Figure 1.1: Commuting and Migration Patterns vs. Distance
(a) Commuting (b) Migration
Notes: This figure shows that the probabilities of commuting shown in Panel (a) and the probabilities of migration shown
in Panel (b) decrease as distances of commuting and migration increase. The probabilities of commuting and migration
are computed using the Population Census of South Korea (2005, 2010, and 2015). Each point corresponds to 5 percentiles
of commuting and migration distances.
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Figure 1.2: Spatial Distribution of Residential Density and Local Government
Spending
(a) Residential Density (b) Local Government Spending
Notes: The figure on the left plots the spatial distribution of workers in terms of their residences in 2015. The figure on
the right plots the spatial distribution of local government spending in 2015. Red (blue) districts indicate higher (lower)
values.
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Figure 1.3: Workers appear willing to migrate/commute longer with higher
government spending and lower housing prices
(a) Migration Distance vs. Local Gov’t Spending (b) Commute Distance vs. Local Gov’t Spending
(c) Migration Distance vs. Home Prices (d) Commute Distance vs. Housing Prices
Notes: This figure shows the raw correlation between how far workers migrate and commute and local government spend-
ing/Housing prices. Each observation is a district-year pair. The figures in the left plot the average distance that residents
have migrated over the past 5 years against local government spending in Panel (a) and against home prices in Panel (c).
The figure in the right plot the average distance of commuting for a resident for each district against local government
spending in Panel (b) and against the home prices in Panel (d).
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Figure 1.4: Marginal Income Tax Rates before and after 2008 and 2012
Notes: This figure plots the progressive income tax rates against income measured in 10 million KRW (approximately
10,000 USD) before and after the two episodes of national tax policy reforms in 2008 and 2012. The national income tax
rates are outlined in the Income Tax Act. Note the median after-tax income in South Korea in 2015 is 18,180 USD.
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Figure 1.5: Over-identifying Moments: Model vs. Data
(a) Number of Workers by Workplace (b) Number of Workers by Workplace
(c) Local Tax Revenue (d) CDF of Local Tax Revenue
(e) Share of Commercial Floor Space (f) CDF of Share of Commercial Floor Space
Notes: This figure compares 2015 data with model predictions of non-targeted moments. Panel (a) and (b) plot the spatial
distribution of workers by employment location. Panel (c) and (d) plot local tax revenues collected at each residence
measured in 1 million KRW. Panel (e) and (f) plot the shares of commercial floor space. The straight lines in Panel (a),
(c), and (e) are 45 degree lines.
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Figure 1.6: Aggregate Welfare Changes and Redistribution
Notes: This figure plots the changes in the aggregate consumption equivalent worker welfare relative to the welfare level
in baseline in which the extent of redistribution is equal to 0.3, the observed level in 2015.
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Figure 1.7: Changes Extent of Fiscal Spillover Changes and Redistribution
Notes: This figure plots the changes in extent of fiscal spillover to the baseline level in which the extent of redistribution
is equal to 0.3, the observed level in 2015. The extent of fiscal spillover measures the dispersion of local government
goods and services net of individual tax contribution (i.e., how much extra benefit workers enjoy due to spillovers) across
districts.
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Figure 1.8: Aggregate Welfare Changes under Alternative Assumptions
(a) Prohibitively Costly Commuting (b) Costless Migration and Job Finding
Notes: In this figure, I plot the changes in the consumption equivalent welfare of workers based on two alternative
assumptions about spatial frictions. First, I follow the common spatial redistribution imposed in the migration literature
(i.e., workers cannot work outside of their district of residence). I solve for a new equilibrium for 2015 assuming the
distance elasticity of migration equal to 0.007 as in Column (5) of Table 1.4, of commuting equal to ∞, and of job
search equal to 0. I compute the counterfactual outcomes and plot the changes in worker welfare relative to 2015 (extent
of redistribution = 30%) in Panel (a). Second, I follow the common spatial redistribution imposed in the commuting
literature (i.e., there is no bilateral cost of commuting and job search). I solve for a new equilibrium for 2015 assuming
the distance elasticity of migration equal to 0, of commuting equal to 0.074 as in Column (5) of Table 1.5, and of job
search equal to 0. I compute the counterfactual outcomes and plot the changes in worker welfare relative to 2015 (extent
of redistribution = 30 percent) in Panel (b).
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
A. Commuting Patterns
Commuters from Residence 666 0.274 0.236 0 0.773
Commuters to Workplace 666 0.298 0.210 0 0.916
B. Migration Patterns
Migrants to Residence 666 0.187 0.079 0.053 0.559
Out-Migrants from Residence 666 0.180 0.071 0.048 0.443
C. Local Government Budget
Total Local Expenditure 666 362,785 233,524 59,614 1,881,082
Per-Capita Local Expenditure 666 7.638 5.752 0.904 29.622
Local Income Tax Revenue 666 64,067 95,793 4,020 779,143
Intergovernmental Transfers 666 242,517 128,348 109,239 799,009
Notes: In this table, I report summary statistics computed based on 222 districts in 2005, 2010, and 2015. The data
used for Panel A and B is constructed from the Population Census of South Korea. Variable Commuters from Residence
measures the fraction of residents commuting outside of their district of residency. Variable Commuters to Workplace
measures the fraction of workers employed in a district who commute from other districts. Similarly, Variable Migrants to
Residence and Out-Migrants from Residence measure the fraction of residents in a district who moved in within 5 years
and the fraction of residents who moved out of a district within 5 years. Panel C is computed using the Yearbook of Local
Public Finance data. The unit for the values reported in Panel (c) is 1 million KRW (approximately 1,000 USD). See
Section 1.2.1 for the details on the data sources.
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Table 1.2: (OLS) Elasticities of Worker Mobility with respect to Local Government
Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: ln piorm,t lnpiorm,t ln piorm,t ln piorm,t
Local Government Expenditure, lnGr,t (βG = λ) -0.231*** 0.0965** 0.101 0.0957***
(0.0149) (0.0405) (0.141) (0.0299)
Number of Households, lnRr,t (βR = θλ) 0.120*** 0.0608** 0.297 0.590***
(0.0125) (0.0268) (0.218) (0.0522)
Floor Space Price, lnQr,t (βQ = (1− β)) -0.0416*** -0.0101 0.00802 -0.00148
(0.0129) (0.0334) (0.0336) (0.00653)
Observations 258,323 258,323 258,323 258,323
Fixed Effects:
Job Finding Pair ×Year (φom,t) N Y Y Y
Migration Pair (φor) N N Y Y
Commuting Pair (φrm) N N N Y
Notes: In this table, I report the OLS estimates of elasticities of worker’s mobility to local government expenditure and
resident population levels based on Equation 1.6, starting with a simple estimate without any fixed effects in Column
(1) and gradually adding the fixed effects discussed in Section 1.4.1.1. Column (4) corresponds to Equation 1.6 with the
full set of fixed effects. The sample is from 3 waves of the Population Census of South Korea in 2005, 2010, and 2015,
based on 3,500,232 male household heads who are employed between the ages of 25 and 60. Each observation corresponds
to a triplet of previous and current residences and workplace location. Robust standard errors in parentheses, with
multi-way clustering by migration pair × year, commuting pair × year, and a triplet of previous and current residences
and workplace: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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Table 1.4: Semi-Elasticity of Migration with respect to Distance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable: lnpiorm,t lnpiorm,t ln piorm,t ln piorm,t ln pior,t
distance dor (−ρ) -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.007***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0009) (0.001) (0.0001)
distance×2005 0.0001
(0.002)
distance×2010 0.0005
(0.002)
Fixed effects:
Commute Pair ×Year (φrm,t) N Y Y Y N
Job Finding Pair ×Year (φom,t) N N Y Y N
Origin ×Year (φo,t) N N N N Y
Current Residence × Year (φr,t) N N N N Y
Notes: In this table, I estimate the semi-elasticity of migration with respect to distance based on Equation 1.14, starting
with a simple estimate without any fixed effects in Column (1) and gradually adding the fixed effects. Column (3)
corresponds to Equation 1.14. Column (4) tests whether the semi-elasticity is time-invariant or not. In Column (5), I
report the estimated coefficient based on Equation (1.15) following the literature on migration. The sample is from 3
waves of the Population Census of South Korea in 2005, 2010, and 2015, based on 3,500,232 male household heads who
are employed between the ages of 25 and 60. Each observation corresponds to a triplet of previous and current residences
and workplace location for Columns (1) - (4). Robust standard errors in parentheses, with multi-way clustering by
migration pair × year, commuting pair × year, job finding pair × year, and a triplet of previous and current residences
and workplace for Columns (1) - (4) : ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1. The unit of observation for Column (5) is a pair
of previous and current residences. Robust standard errors in parentheses, with three-way clustering by previous residence
× year, current residence × year, and migration pair for Column (5): ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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Table 1.5: Semi-Elasticity of Commuting with respect to Distance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable: lnpiorm,t ln piorm,t ln piorm,t lnpiorm,t ln pirm,t
distance drm (−κ) -0.013*** -0.035*** -0.045*** -0.046*** -0.074***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
distance×2005 0.001
(0.001)
distance×2010 0.003**
(0.001)
Observations 258,323 258,323 258,323 258,323 20,676
Fixed effects:
Migration Pair ×Year (φor,t) N Y Y Y N
Job Finding Pair ×Year (φom,t) N N Y Y N
Current Residence ×Year (φr,t) N N N N Y
Workplace ×Year (φm,t) N N N N Y
Notes: In this table, I estimate the semi-elasticity of commuting with respect to distance based on Equation (1.16),
starting with a simple estimate without any fixed effects in Column (1) and gradually adding the fixed effects. Column
(3) corresponds to Equation (1.16). Column (4) tests whether the semi-elasticity is time-invariant or not. In Column (5),
I report the estimated coefficient based on Equation (1.17) following the literature on commuting. The sample is from 3
waves of the Population Census of South Korea in 2005, 2010, and 2015, based on 3,500,232 male household heads who
are employed between the ages of 25 and 60. Each observation corresponds to a triplet of previous and current residences
and workplace location for Columns (1) - (4). Robust standard errors in parentheses, with multi-way clustering by
migration pair × year, commuting pair × year, job finding pair × year, and a triplet of previous and current residences
and workplace for Columns (1) - (4): ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1. The unit of observation for Column (5) is a pair
of current residence and workplace location. Robust standard errors in parentheses, with three-way clustering by current
residence × year, workplace location × year, and commuting pair for Column (5): ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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Table 1.6: Semi-Elasticity of Job Finding with respect to Distance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: lnpiorm,t ln piorm,t ln piorm,t lnpiorm,t
distance dom (-δ) -0.001*** -0.004*** -0.016*** -0.015***
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.0003) (0.0004)
distance×2005 -0.002**
(0.001)
distance×2010 0.001
(0.001)
Observations 258,323 258,323 258,323 258,323
Fixed effects:
Commute Pair ×Year (φrm,t) N Y Y Y
Migration Pair ×Year (φor,t) N N Y Y
Notes: In this table, I estimate the semi-elasticity of commuting with respect to distance based on Equation (1.18),
starting with a simple estimate without any fixed effects in Column (1) and gradually adding the fixed effects. Column
(3) corresponds to Equation (1.18). Column (4) tests whether the semi-elasticity is time-invariant or not. The sample
is from 3 waves of the Population Census of South Korea in 2005, 2010, and 2015, based on 3,500,232 male household
heads who are employed between the ages of 25 and 60. Each observation corresponds to a triplet of previous and current
residences and workplace location. Robust standard errors in parentheses, with multi-way clustering by migration pair ×
year, commuting pair × year, job finding pair × year, and a triplet of previous and current residences and workplace:
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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Table 1.7: Summary of Parameterization
Parameter Description Value Method Source
α labor share 0.823 estimated Economic Census
1− β housing expenditure share 0.15 estimated HH Expenditure Survey
 shape parameter 3.54 estimated fixed effects
λ value of local gov’t goods 0.303 estimated Gravity Equation
θ net congestion 0.787 estimated Gravity Equation
ρ spatial decay of migration 0.009 estimated Gravity Equation
κ spatial decay of commuting 0.013 estimated Gravity Equation
δ spatial decay of job finding 0.005 estimated Gravity Equation
τ income tax rate 0.245 observed Income Tax Act
ς local-national revenue sharing 0.091 observed Local Tax Act
χ extent of redistribution 0.35 observed Local Subsidy Act
{ςj} redistribution observed Local Subsidy Act
{Aj} productivity recovered PM+ZP
{B˜j} adjusted amenities recovered fixed effects
{Hj} floor space recovered Floor space market clearing
Notes: This table summarizes the estimates of the structural parameters of the model. Note that I estimate the value of
1− β using the Household Expenditure Survey of 2015. Alternatively, based on the estimation result summarized in Table
1.3 and the estimated value of , I can recover the structural value of 1 − β equal to 0.14. See Section 1.7 for a detailed
description of how the parameters above are estimated and recovered.
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Table 1.8: Determinants of Redistribution Policy in 2015
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Observed Redistribution Policy (ln ςr)
Residential Population (lnRr) 0.441*** 0.530*** 0.610*** 0.631***
(0.0269) (0.0285) (0.0284) (0.0578)
Amenities (ln B˜r) -0.170*** -0.184*** -0.187***
(0.0323) (0.0255) (0.0273)
Productivity (lnAr) -0.636*** -0.605***
(0.0906) (0.130)
Employment Population (lnLr) -0.0296
(0.0730)
Area (lnArear) 0.259*** 0.262*** 0.253*** 0.254***
(0.0146) (0.0126) (0.0113) (0.0111)
Observations 222 222 222 222
R2 0.619 0.668 0.744 0.744
Notes: In this table, I investigate the determinants of the rules of redistribution by regressing the log of percentage of the
total intergovernmental transfers each district receives against local characteristics. The dependent variation is the log of
the share of intergovernmental transers each district recieved in 2015. I begin with covariates of residential population and
area Column (1) and gradually introduce additional covariates across columns. Each observation correspond to a district
in 2015.
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1.11 Data Appendix
Wages
I construct wages for each district based on the Economic Census of South Korea in
2015. The Census surveys the universe of establishments in South Korea and records
the number of employees and the total costs of labor. I aggregate these two information
across establishments in each district and divide the total costs of labor by the number
of employees to obtain the district-level wages.
Floor Space Prices
The data source for floor space prices in 2015 is the universe of housing transaction records
provided by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport. Each record includes
information on the location of a property (district), month and year of purchase, year
built, lot size, etc. In order to obtain floor space prices representative for each district
in 2015, I employ a Case-Shiller type repeated sales approach at the district level. To to
so, I regress log of unit price on a set of dummies for year built, for month of purchase,
and for year of purchase excluding 2015 along with district-level fixed effects. I use the
estimated values of the district fixed effects (normalized such that the geometric mean is
equal to 1) as my data for district-level floor space prices in 2015.
Additional District Level Characteristics
KOSIS (Korean Statistical Information System) provides a wide range of summary statis-
tics describing district-level characteristics. I use the number of firms, number of firms
discharging waster water, divorce rates, suicide rates, and geographical land area for each
district to carry out cross-validation exercises comparing the model implied values of
productivity and amenities with district-level characteristics. In addition, I collected in-
formation on the total land area used for residential purposes from the Land Use Statistics
publicized by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport.
Annual Migration Rates
In order to understand the magnitude of migration rates across districts and across
provinces (groups of districts), I leverage the restricted-access administrative data, which
maintains the universe of migrant registry records in South Korea. This data is not used
for the empirical analysis of this paper because the records do not contain where migrants
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commute to. Notwithstanding its drawback, the records allow me to compute the annual
migration rates and compare their magnitudes with the migration rates in the U.S.
66
1.12 Supplementary Empirical Results
1.12.1 Local Income Taxes and Intergovernmental Transfers
Figure 1.9: Spatial Distribution of Local Government Revenue by Sources
(a) Local Income Tax (b) Share of Local Income Tax
(c) Intergovernmental Transfers (d) Share of Intergovernmental Transfers
Notes: The figure on the left plots the spatial distribution of local government revenue by its sources (local income taxes
and intergovernmental transfers) in 2015. The data source is the administrative data from the Ministry of Interior and
Safety of South Korea. The denominator of the shares plotted in Panel (b) and (d) are the sum of local income tax and
intergovernmental transfers for each district in 2015.
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Figure 1.10: Redistribution Paramters over Time
Notes: This figure plots the shares of the total local tax revenues allocated for intergovermental transfers each locality in
a given year again the shares five years ago. The estimated slope is equal to 1 for both (2005 vs. 2010 and 2010 vs. 2015).
1.12.2 Decomposition of Observed Spatial Distribution of Work-
ers
In order to understand the importance of the three spatial linkages (costs of migration,
commuting, and job finding) in explaining the observed variation in the spatial distribu-
tion of workers piorm,t, I carry out a type of variance decomposition exercise. First, I purge
out location-specific factors So,t, Sr,t, and Sm,t by residualizing piorm,t by the location spe-
cific fixed effects interacted with year dummies, φo,t, φr,t, and φm,t. Second, I regress the
residual on the fixed effects for each bilateral linkage, φor, φrm, and φom and obtain the
predicted value pˆiorm.55 Mechanically, the predicted value is completely explained by φor,
φrm, and φom together. By regressing pˆiorm on each of the pair-wise fixed effects of the
55 The value of R2 resulting from this regression is 0.72. Further interacting the set of bilateral fixed
effects with year dummes only increases the value of R2 to 0.79.
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bilateral linkages one at a time, I summarize how much of the variation is explained by
spatial linkages; the results are summarized in the table below. The migration linkage
alone explains 41% of the variation; the commuting linkage explains 8%; the job finding
alone explains 10%. Furthermore, an R2 resulting from accounting any combination of
two linkages together is higher than the sum of R2’s resulting from accounting each of
the linkages separately.
Table 1.9: Decomposition of Observed Variation in the Data
Regressors R2 Regressors R2
φor 0.4097 dor 0.0700
φrm 0.0836 drm 0.0394
φom 0.1000 dom 0.0563
φor and φrm 0.8590 φor and φrm + dom 0.9051
φor and φom 0.5498 φor and φom + drm 0.8729
φrm and φom 0.3216 φrm and φom + dor 0.5154
Notes: This table reports the values of adjusted R2 resulting from regressing the predicted spatial distribution of workers
pˆir0rm on the regressors listed in each row. The predicted distribution is computed based on the regression of the observed
spatial distribution of workers residualized by location specific factors on the fixed effects of all three bilateral linkages of
migration, commuting, and job finding.
Distances between origins and workplace locations together with the fixed effects of
the migration and commuting linkages explain 91% of the observed variation. Distances
of commuting together with the fixed effects of migration and job finding explain 87%.
Lastly, distances of migration with the fixed effects of commuting and job finding accounts
for 52% of the observed variations. Based on this simple exercise, I draw the following
conclusions. First, net of the location specific factors, the spatial linkages of migration,
commuting, and job finding are important determinants of the spatial distribution of
workers. Second, the extent to which the commuting linkage explains the variation
significantly improves along with the job finding linkage.
1.12.3 Inference
In this section, I discuss how I address issues related to estimating standard errors es-
timating the key elasticities of worker mobility. The concern overall is that the errors
in each specification can be correlated in two ways. First, there is a classic clustering
concern explained in Moulton (1990). Second, one may worry about the serial correlation
over time within a panel dimension Bertrand et al. (2004). In order to address these con-
cerns, I report standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and allow multi-way
clusterings.
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First, with respect to estimating Equation (1.6), I allow errors to correlate across pre-
vious residences and across workplace locations sharing the same current residence in a
given year. In addition, the serial correlation within each of the panel dimension (a triplet
of previous residence, current residence, and workplace location) over time. Second, I
conservatively cluster the standard errors at the migration-pair level when estimating
Equation (1.14), at the commuting-pair level when estimating Equation (1.16), and at
the job-finding-pair level when estimating Equation (1.18).
1.12.4 Travel Time vs. Distance of Commuting
Figure 1.11: Travel Time vs. Distance of Commuting
Notes: This figure plots average commuting time in minutes for each of 5 percentiles of commuting distance for each survey
year (2005, 2010, and 2015) of the Population Census of South Korea.
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Table 1.10: Commuting Time (min) vs. Distance (km)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable: Commuting Time (τ (time)rm,t )
Distance (τrm) 0.788*** 0.915*** 0.928*** 1.017***
(0.00801) (0.00784) (0.00868) (0.00839)
τrm × 2005 1.066***
(0.0121)
τrm × 2010 0.919***
(0.0119)
τrm × 2015 1.061***
(0.0121)
Observations 21,799 21,799 21,799 21,799 21,799
R2 0.428 0.615 0.598 0.658 0.660
Fixed effects:
Residence-Year (φr,t) N Y N Y Y
Workplace-Year (φm,t) N N Y Y Y
Notes: This table shows the relationship between distance of commuting and self-reported commuting time reported in the
Population Census of South Korea. Each observation is a residence-workplace pair for each year of 2005, 2010, and 2015
with a positive number of workers reported to commute between residential and workplace locations. Robust standard
errors in parentheses clustered at the residence-year, the workplace-year level: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
As used in Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) and Morten and Oliveira (2018), an alternative measure
to define the cost of commuting is travel time for commuting. Since travel time is surveyed
in the Census, I compute average travel times in minutes for all bilateral commuting
pairs. Figure 1.11 shows a linear relationship between commuting distance and travel
time. Furthermore, inspecting the relationship between commuting distance and time
across 2005, 2010, and 2015, there does not seem to be changes in commuting technology.
To formalize, I estimate the following specification:
timerm,t = φr,t + φm,t + κ
timedrm + ε
time
rm,t.
The results are presented in 1.10. Column (1) shows a raw correlation between distance
and time. Across columns, I gradually introduce the fixed effects. According to Column
(4), which corresponds to the equation above, travel time of commuting increases when
distance of commuting increases by 1 kilometer. In order to understand whether or
not this one-to-one relationship is stable over time, I re-estimate the equation above by
interacting distance of commuting (time-invariant) with year dummies. The results are
summarized in Column (5). The estimated coefficients for 2005, 2010, and 2015 are not
statistically different from each other. I conclude that distance is a reasonable proxy
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for commuting time. The advantage of using travel times may be that measurement
errors are averaged out by taking averages of travel times between localities observed
at the individual-commuter level. However, average travel time changes over time, and
such changes may be correlated with unobserved changes at the residence-workplace pair
level that could also affect the spatial distribution of workers (e.g., an introduction of
commuter rail). This is not the case for distances as they are fixed over time.
1.12.5 Omitted Variable Bias in OLS Estimates of Elasticities
of Worker Mobility with respect to Local Government
Goods and Home Prices
Table 1.11: Elasticities of Worker Mobility with respect to Local Government
Goods-OVB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable: lnpiorm,t lnpiorm,t lnpiorm,t lnpiorm,t lnpiorm,t
lnGr,t (βG = λ) -0.231*** 0.0965** -0.433*** -0.452*** 0.0957***
(0.0149) (0.0405) (0.0213) (0.0227) (0.0299)
lnRr,t (βR = θλ) 0.120*** 0.0608** 0.480*** 0.482*** 0.590***
(0.0125) (0.0268) (0.169) (0.142) (0.0522)
lnQr,t (βQ = (1− β)) -0.0416*** -0.0101 -0.0251* -0.0431*** -0.00148
(0.0129) (0.0334) (0.0135) (0.0136) (0.00653)
Observations 258,323 258,323 258,323 258,323 258,323
Fixed Effects:
Job Finding Pairs (φom,t) N Y N N Y
Migration Pairs (φor) N N Y N Y
Commuting Pairs (φrm) N N N Y Y
Notes: In this table, I report the OLS estimates of elasticities of worker mobility to local government expenditure,
residential density, and home prices based on Equation 1.6, starting with a simple estimate without any fixed effects in
Column (1). I introduce the fixed effects for job finding pairs interacted with time in Column (2), the fixed effects for
migration pairs in Column (3), and adding the fixed effects for commuting pairs in Column (4). Column (5) reports
the OLS estimates with all the fixed effects, separately introduced in Column (2)-(4) and corresponds to Equation 1.6.
The sample is from 3 waves of the Population Census of South Korea in 2005, 2010, and 2015, based on 3,500,232
male household heads who are employed between the ages of 25 and 60. Each observation corresponds to a triplet of
previous and current residences and workplace location. Robust standard errors in parentheses, with multi-way clustering
by migration pair × year, commuting pair × year, and a triplet of previous and current residences and workplace:
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
More formally, the directions of bias with respect to the OLS estimates are expressed as
follows:
β̂OLSG
β̂OLSR
β̂OLSR
 =

βG
βR
βQ
+

(σ2Rσ
2
Q − σ2RQ)σGζ + (σGQσRQ − σGRσ2Q)σRζ + (σGRσRQ − σGQσ2R)σQζ
(σGQσRQ − σGRσ2Q)σGζ + (σ2Gσ2Q − σ2GQ)σRζ + (σGRσGQ − σRQσ2G)σQζ
(σGRσRQ − σGQσ2R)σGζ + (σGRσGQ − σRQσ2G)σRζ + (σ2Gσ2R − σ2GR)σQζ
 /A(1.38)
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where A = σ2Gσ2Rσ2Q + 2σGRσRQσGQ − (σ2Gσ2RQ + σ2Rσ2GQ + σ2Qσ2GR) > 0 by the Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality. Also, note that all the variance and covariance terms are conditional
on the set of fixed effects (fixed effects of origin-workplace-by-year, migration pair, com-
muting pair).
1.12.6 Validity of Instrumental Variables based on the Tax Re-
forms with Sorting
The quantitative spatial model I present in this paper assumes that the workers are born
with initial residences and have heterogeneous preferences for locations. They are other-
wise homogeneous. Therefore, I do not take a stance in potential reallocation of workers
based on sorting. However, a residence with a greater share of its residents with higher
education (skill) may generate a higher amenity value relative to other residences (Dia-
mond, 2016). In this case, the error term in Equation (1.6) would include the distribution
of workers by education piedu|r,t.
The exclusion restriction (1.8) is violated due to sorting only if the fiscal reforms re-
sulted in making residences relatively more or less attractive by changing the educational
composition within districts. Since I observe the contemporaneous shares of workers by
education levels from the Population Census of South Korea, I can test whether the tax
reforms directly affected the educational composition of workers at their residences. I
consider the following specification:
pib|r,t = φr + ηb′,bτb′,t + ζb,r,t, (1.39)
where the dependent variable pib|r,t is the demeaned fraction of workers with educational
level b (low and high, which proxy the low and high income brackets in the tax schedule)
living in residence r in year t; the residence fixed effects φr captures the baseline differences
in the dependent variable; τb′,t is the tax rates in year t for income bracket b′. With the
residence fixed effects, if an estimated value of ηb′,b is statistically different from zero,
then I reject the hypothesis that the changes in tax rates for income bracket b′ had no
impact on the changes in the distribution of workers with education level b.
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Table 1.12: Tax reforms did not affect education distribution
(1) (2)
A. Educational Attainment: Low (pilow|r,t)
Tax Rate (Low) τlow,t 3.79e-09
(0.00115)
Tax Rate (High) τhigh,t 2.38e-09
(0.000738)
B. Educational Attainment: High (pihigh|r,t)
Tax Rate (Low) τlow,t -1.35e-09
(0.000582)
Tax Rate (High) τhigh,t -6.44e-10
(0.000382)
Observations 666 666
Notes: This table reports the estimation results based on Equation (1.39). Each estimated coefficient corresponds to the
effect of changes in tax rates on changes in the educational composition of residences. The sample is constructed from 3
waves of the Population Census of South Korea in 2005, 2010, and 2015, based on 3,494,198 individual household heads
who are employed between the ages of 25 and 60. Each observation corresponds to a residence for each year. Robust
standard errors in parentheses clustered at the residence level: ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Table 1.12 reports the estimation results. All the coefficients are not statistically differ-
ent from zero, nor are they economically significant. In sum, I draw a conclusion that the
tax reforms did not result in changes in the attractiveness of residences based on their
educational composition of workers. Therefore, predicted tax contributions by low and
high income groups are orthogonal to the contemporaneous education distribution.
1.12.7 Alternative (Parsimonious) Specification to Estimate the
Elasticities of Worker Mobility with respect to Local
Government Goods and Home Prices
ln piorm,t = lnφo,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
φ˜o,t
+ lnφm,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
φ˜m,t
+ ln(εor,tεrm,tεom,tε
′
orm,tDorDrmDom)
−
+βG lnGr,t − βR lnRr,t − βQ lnQr,t + ln B˜r,t
(1.40)
Equation 1.40 is the expression for the log transformation of the gravity equation (1.5),
augmented with the time subscripts wherever applicable. For expository purposes, I
unpack the stochastic error term εorm,t into four components: εorm,t = εor,tεrm,tεom,tε′orm,t;
I assume each of εom,t and ε′orm,t follows a log normal distribution with mean equal to 1.
I consider a parsimonious specification alternative to the main estimating equation (1.6)
as follows:
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ln piorm,t = lnφo,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
φ˜o,t
+ lnφm,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
φ˜m,t
+φor+φrm+βG lnGr,t−βR lnRr,t−βQ lnQr,t+ln B˜r,tεom,tε′orm,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
ζ′orm,t
.
(1.41)
The difference between Equation 1.5 and Equation 1.41 is that the stochastic error term
εom,t is loaded onto the error term ζ ′orm,t in Equation 1.41. Both specifications are con-
sistent with the model. I summarize the OLS estimates, first-stage estimates, and 2SLS
estimates based on Specification 1.41 in Table 1.13. The results are qualitatively and
quantitatively similar to the results reported in Table 1.3.
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1.12.8 2SLS Results based on Migration and Commute Flows
Table 1.14: Estimation Results based on Migration and Commutie Flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Both Migration Flows Commuting Flows
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
VARIABLES ln piorm,t ln piorm,t lnpior,t ln pior,t ln pirm,t ln pirm,t
lnGr,t (βG = λ) 0.0957*** 1.072*** 0.357*** -1.522*** 0.302*** 4.935***
(0.0299) (0.387) (0.0197) (0.188) (0.0315) (0.749)
lnRr,t (βR = θλ) 0.590*** -0.844 1.118*** 3.205*** 1.113*** -3.293***
(0.0522) (0.622) (0.0361) (0.267) (0.0512) (0.852)
lnQr,t (βQ = (1− β)) -0.00148 -0.490*** 0.0424*** 0.568*** -0.0288*** -2.011***
(0.00653) (0.0672) (0.00386) (0.0226) (0.00729) (0.222)
Observations 258,323 258,323 70,427 70,427 20,676 20,676
Fixed Effects:
φom,t, φor, φrm Y Y N N N N
φo,t, φor N N Y Y N N
φm,t, φrm N N N N Y Y
Notes: In Column (1) and (2), I report the OLS and 2SLS estimates of the effects of local government spending, residential
density, and housing prices based on worker mobility defined in terms of both migration and commuting. In Colimn (3)
and (4), I report the OLS and 2SLS estimates based on migration flows alone. In Column (5) and (6), I report the OLS
and 2SLS estimates on commuting flows alone.
Recall the gravity equation of the model is given by:
piorm,t =
(B˜r,t(1− τm,t)w˜m,tGλr,t)pio,t
(εorm,tDorDrmDomQ
1−β
r,t R
θλ
r,t)

/
J∑
r′=1
J∑
m′=1
(B˜r′,t(1− τm′,t)w˜m′,tGλr′,t)
(εor′m′,tDor′Dr′m′DomQ
1−β
r′,t R
θλ
r′,t)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Φo,t
Summing it over workplace location, I derive an expression for migration flow:
piom,t =
(B˜r,tG
λ
r,t)
pio,t/Φo,t
(DorQ
1−β
r,t R
θλ
r,t)

J∑
m=1
(
(1− τm,t)w˜m,t
εorm,tDrmDom
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ALMAor,t
Then, I derive an estimating equation by taking the log transformation:
lnpior,t = φo,t + φor + λ︸︷︷︸
βG
lnGr,t − θλ︸︷︷︸
βR
lnRr,t − (1− β)︸ ︷︷ ︸
βQ
lnQr,t + ζ
mig
or,t , (1.42)
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where φo,t = lnφo,t/Φo,t; φor = lnDor; ζ
mig
or,t = ln B˜r,tALMAor,t. The relevance of the
instrumental variables (tax reforms and historical residential density) holds as when us-
ing the worker mobility (migration and commuting jointly). The exclusion restriction
requires:
E

IV lowr,t ζ
mig
or,t |φo,t, φor
IV highr,t ζ
mig
or,t |φo,t, φor
IV Rr,tζ
mig
or,t |φo,t, φor
 = 0.
This is violated because IV lowr,t and IV
high
r,t are functions of tax rates. And, the error terms
includes ALMAor,t, which is also a function of tax rates. Therefore, 2SLS estimates would
be inconsistent. In particular, the direction of bias in 2SLS estimate for βG is downward
∵ cov(Gr,t, ζmigor,t < 0). Note that if Drm is equal to 1 (i.e., no spatial friction from
commuting), then exclusion restriction is satisfied. Therefore, observing biases in 2SLS
estimates using migration implies it is important to take commuting into account.
Similarly, I sum piorm,t over previous residence, I derive an expression for commuting
flow:
pirm,t =
(B˜r,t(1− τm,t)w˜m,tGλr,t)
(DrmQ
1−β
r,t R
θλ
r,t)

J∑
o=1
pio,t/Φo,t
(εorm,tDorDom)︸ ︷︷ ︸
AMMArm,t
Then, I derive an estimating equation by taking the log transformation as follows:
lnpirm,t = φm,t + φrm + λ︸︷︷︸
βG
lnGr,t − θλ︸︷︷︸
βR
lnRr,t − (1− β)︸ ︷︷ ︸
βQ
lnQr,t + ζ
com
rm,t, (1.43)
where φm,t = ln((1 − τm,t)w˜m,t);φrm = lnDrm; ζcomrm,t = ln B˜r,tAMMArm,t. Similarly, the
relevance of the instrumental variables (tax reforms and historical residential density)
still holds since the relevance did not hinge on the assumptions of spatial frictions. The
exclusion restriction requires,
E

IV lowr,t ζ
com
or,t |φm,t, φrm
IV highr,t ζ
com
or,t |φm,t, φrm
IV Rr,tζ
com
or,t |φm,t, φrm
 = 0.
The exclusion restriction in this case is violated. In this case, IV lowr,t and IV
high
r,t are
functions of tax rate, while the error terms includes AMMAor,t also a function of tax
rates because Φo,t includes tax rates. Therefore, 2SLS estimates would be inconsistent.
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In particular, the direction of bias in 2SLS estimate for βG is upward ∵ cov(Gr,t, ζcomrm,t >
0). Note that if Dor is equal to 1 (no spatial friction from migration), then exclusion
restriction is satisfied. Therefore, observing biases in 2SLS estimates based on commuting
flows implies that migration needs to be taken into account.
In Table 1.14, I report the OLS and 2SLS estimates based on Equation (1.6) in Column
(1) and (2) using both migration and commuting flows, Equation (1.42) in Column (3) and
(4) using migration flows alone, and Equation (1.43) using commuting flows alone. The
results altogether show that in order to consistently estimate the elasticities of interest
leveraging the tax reforms, both migration and commuting need to be considered jointly.
(φm,t-OVB) If a district is located near employment locations with high wages, then
the average income of the residents in this district is high. Because of the redistributive
intergovernmental transfers, the local government expenditure is low. The fixed effects
for employment locations address the omitted variable bias rising from the negative cor-
relation between local labor market returns and local government spending.
(φm,t-Exclusion Restriction) Without the fixed effects for workplace location, the ex-
clusion restriction of the proposed instruments based on tax reforms is violated because
the tax rates directly affects worker mobility.
(φo,t-OVB) There are two factors specific to origin: the initial distribution of workers
across residential location and multilateral resistance. So, the fixed effects capture the
effects of augmented migrant market access. If a residence is situated around places with
higher values of migrant market access, this residence is likely to have a greater number of
migrants, resulting in a higher residential density. In turn, higher population is likely to
be positively correlated with local spending because of a high tax base and redistribution
favoring dense localities.
(φo,t-Exclusion Restriction) Exclusion redistribution is violated unless these fixed effects
are introduced because the multilateral resistance term is a function of tax rates.
1.13 Supplementary Quantitative Results
1.13.1 Adjusted After-TaxWages and Fréchet Shape Parameter
pim|rr0 =
Mm
(
(1−τm)wm
Dr0mDrm
)
∑S
m′=1Mm′
(
(1−τm′ )wm′
Dr0m′Drm′
) (1.44)
Take log transformation both sides. Then, add the costs of job finding and commuting.
Then, regress the left hand side variable on the fixed effects of workplace location and
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migration pairs. I recover the adjusted after-tax wages from the estimated fixed effects
of workplace locations.
I estimate the dispersion parameter by taking the ratio of the dispersion of adjusted
after-tax wages and the dispersion of observed after-tax wages. The estimated value of 
is equal to 3.5, which is statistically significantly different from zero at the 1 percent.
1.13.2 Local Productivity
Figure 1.12: Spatial Distribution of Productivities
Notes: This figure plots the recovered values of productivity for each district using the model with the data in 2015. Section
1.7.3 explains how the values are recovered from the estimated fixed effects.
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Figure 1.13: Recovered Local Amenities vs. Number of Firms
(a) Number of Firms
(b) Number of Dirty Firms
Notes: This figure plots the values of log productivity recovered in Section 1.7.3 against number of firms in Panel (a) and
firms discharging wastewater in Panel (b) in 2015. Each point corresponds to 5 percentile of number of firms.
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1.13.3 Adjusted Amenities
Figure 1.14: Recovered Amenities in 2015
Notes: This figure plots the recovered amenity values for each district using the model with the data in 2015. Section 1.7.3
explains how the amenity values are recovered from the estimated fixed effects.
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Figure 1.15: Recovered Local Amenities vs. Measures of Quality of Life
(a) Suicide Rate
(b) Divorce Rate
Notes: This figure plots the values of adjusted amenities recovered in Section 1.7.3 against two measures proxying the
quality of life observed in 2015: suicides per 100,000 residents in Panel (a); number of divorces per 1,000 couple in Panel
(b). Each point corresponds to 5 percentile of the quality-of-life measures.
1.13.4 Fiscal Decentralization Policy Parameters
• Observed Data: Total Expenditure Gr and its sources: local tax revenue LTr and
intergovernmental transfers ITr
• Local government spending:
Gr = ς
S∑
m=1
τmwmpim|rRr + ςr(1− ς)χ
S∑
r′=1
S∑
m′=1
τm′wm′pim′|r′Rr′ (1.45)
where ς˜ denotes the fraction of total local tax revenue delivered to the national
government 1− ς = 0.9 multiplied by the fraction of the national tax revenue used
for redistribution χ = 0.35. This implies that (1 − χ)(1 − ς) = 0.5915 of the local
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tax revenue is used for the national government. This also means that in total
about 40 percent of the local tax revenue (i.e., extent of fiscal decentralization)
is spendt locally. When I conduct counterfactual policy experiments. I keep the
extent of fiscal decentralization constant at 40 percent and only change the extent of
redistribution, ranging from 0 to 40 percent. Also, I keep the rules of redistribution
({ςj}Jj=1, where ςj = ITj∑J
j′=1 ITj
) constant at the 2015 values. When the extent of
redistribution is equal to 0%, local government spending is solely financed by local
tax revenue from residents. When it is equal to 40%, local government spending is
completely determined by intergovernmental transfers.
Figure 1.16: Redistribution Parameters in 2015
Notes: This figure plots the observed values of rules of redistribution (ςr) in 2015 for each residence. The districts in red
receives greater shares of intergovernmental transfers from the national government than the districts in blue. The shares
sum up to 1.
1.13.5 Algorithm to Solve the Model
I briefly describe the iterative algorithm used to solve for the equilibrium of the model
(Ahlfeldt et al., 2015; Monte et al., 2018; Tsivanidis, 2019); See Appendix 1.13.5 for de-
tails. Section 1.6.5 characterizes the equilibrium of the model and the system of equations
to be solved. First, I make initial guess for a set of endogenous variables. Second, using
these initial values, I solve the system of equations of the model for a new value of the
endogenous variables. Third, I update the guess for the equilibrium by taking a weighted
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average of the initial and the new values. Lastly, I iterate this process until the new and
initial values converge.
I solve for stock of floor space for each district appealing to the market clearing for
floor space in Section 1.6.3. First, in equilibrium, the residential floor space demanded
is a function of after-tax wages ((1− τ)wm), conditional commuting probabilities (pim|r),
residential population (Rr), and per-unit floor space prices (Qr) given housing expenditure
share (1 − β) as in Equation (1.27). Second, the commercial floor space demanded is
determined by local productivity (Aj), employment population (Lj), and floor space
prices (Qj) given labor share in production (α) as in Equation (1.28). I set floor space
stock of a district equal to the sum of floor space demands for residential and commercial
uses computed based on the tax rate from Section 1.7.2 and local productivity recovered
above as well as the observed data on wages, floor space prices, conditional commuting
probabilities, and residential and employment population.
1.13.6 Goodness of Fits relative to Alternative Specifications
Table 1.15: Goodness of Fits: Model vs. Alternatives (Migration)
∑
(Xrestrictionr −Xdatar )2∑
(Xbaseliner −Xdatar )2
Restrictions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ρ = 0 δ =0 ρ = 0 ρ = 0 ρ = ρlit
δ = 0 δ = 0 δ = 0
κ = κlit κ→∞ κ→∞
Xr =
Rr 1.16 1.09 2.47 2.61 1.34 3.60
Gr 1.12 1.10 1.87 1.86 1.95 2.83
Lm 1.19 1.14 3.16 3.17 1.97 4.81
Notes: In this table, I show the goodness of fits under alternative assumptions on the spatial frictions relative to the
baseline model. Each value reported in this table corresponds to the sum of squared residuals relative to the baseline
model. Therefore, a value higher than 1 implies that the base line model performs better in predicting the observed values.
I solve for an equilibrium assuming that migration is costless in Column (1), job finding is costless in Column (2), both are
costless in Column (3), and both are costless with the spatial decay of commuting equal to the value estimated following
the commuting literature (Column (5) of Table 1.5). In Column (5), I assume that commuting is prohibitively costly.
Column (6) assumes the value of spatial decay of migration equal to the value estimated following the migration literature
(Column (5) of Table 1.4) while job finding is costless.
1.14 Supplementary Theoretical Results
1.14.1 Derivation of the Gravity Equation in Section 1.3
Because the indirect utility is equal to the idiosyncratic component of utility (zirm) mul-
tiplied by the indirect utility of the systematic component (vorm in Equation (1.3)), the
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distribution of utility for a worker from origin o living in district r and working in dis-
trict m is also Fréchet distributed. Therefore, the cumulative distribution function of the
utility is
Frm(u) = Pr[U ≤ u] = Pr(z ≤ u× v−1orm), (1.46)
where z ∼ G(z) = exp(−TrMmz−). It follows that
Frm(u) = exp(−TrMmBr(1− τm)wm
DormQ
1−β
r
(
Gr
Rθr
)λ
u−) ≡ exp(−Φormu−). (1.47)
I denote frm to be the density function. Conditional on their origin o, workers choose a
pair of residence r and workplace m that achieves that maximum utility. Therefore, the
probability of choosing a residence-workplace pair (residence r and workplace location
m) conditional on having come from origin o is expressed as follows:
pirm|o = Pr[urm|o ≥ max{ujk};∀j, k]
=
∫ ∞
0
∏
k 6=j
Frk(u)×
(∏
j 6=r
∏
k
Fjk(u)
)
frm(u)du
=
∫ ∞
0
∏
j
∏
k
Φormu
−(+1) exp(−Φojku−)du
=
∫ ∞
0
Φormu
−(+1) exp(−Φou−)du,
where Φo =
∑J
r=1
∑J
m=1Φorm. Evaluating the integral above, the probability of choosing
residence r and workplace m conditional on origin o is:
pirm|o =
TrMm
(
Br(1−τm)wm
DormQ
1−β
r
(
Gr
Rθr
)λ)
∑J
r′=1
∑J
m′=1 Tr′Mm′
(
Br′ (1−τm′ )wm′
Dor′m′Q
1−β
r′
(
Gr′
Rθ
r′
)λ) ≡ ΦormΦo (1.48)
Because the maximum of a sequence of Fréchet distributed random variables is itself
Fréchet distributed. Therefore,
Fo(u) = exp(−Φou−), where Φo =
J∑
r=1
J∑
m=1
TrMmBr(1− τm)wm
DormQ
1−β
r
(
Gr
Rθr
)λ
. (1.49)
Based on the distribution of utility defined above, the expected utility for workers with
origin o is given by:
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E[u|o] =
∫ ∞
0
Φou
−e−Φou
−
du = Γ
(
− 1

)
Φ1/o ≡ u¯o. (1.50)
1.14.2 Isomorphism of the Gravity Equation
I show that the gravity equation (1.5) is isomorphic to the types of gravity equations
derived in the literature on costly movements of people: commuting and migration.
1.14.2.1 Commuting Literature
The literature on commuting decisions assume free mobility in terms of migration. There-
fore, there is usually no discussion on how workers are distributed across space before
they make their commuting decisions. The underlying assumption in this literature is
that there is no cost of enabling each commuting possibility via migration and job finding.
This assumption translate to setting both ρ and δ equal to zero in my model presented
in Section 1.3. Then, the distribution of workers by current residence and workplace is
independent to the distribution of workers by initial residence. Therefore, Equation (1.5)
does not vary by initial residence o and is given by:
pirm =
TrMm
(
Br(1−τm)wm
DrmQ
1−β
r
(
Gr
Rθr
)λ)
∑S
r′=1
∑S
m′=1 Tr′Mm′
(
Br′ (1−τm′ )wm′
Dr′m′Q
1−β
r′
(
Gr′
Rθ
r′
)λ) , (1.51)
where Drm is a commuting cost, a function increasing in distance between r and m.
Further assuming no tax on wage (i.e., τm = 0 for all m) and no utility derived from local
government goods and services (i.e., λ = 0), Equation (1.51) is identical to the gravity
equations based on the spatial models of Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) and Monte et al. (2018).
1.14.2.2 Migration Literature
The literature on migration decisions generally considers movements of people across
relatively larger spatial units such that workers are likely to work and live in the same
spatial unit upon migrating. Accordingly, in this literature, there is no distinction between
a workplace and a residence since workers are assumed to work and live in the same
locations. This assumption can be implemented in my model by setting the commuting
cost to a workplace outside of residence equal to ∞. Then, the migration patterns of
workers are summarized by:
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pior =
TrMr
(
Br(1−τr)wr
DorQ
1−β
r
(
Gr
Rθr
)λ)
pio∑S
r′=1 Tr′Mr′
(
Br′ (1−τr′ )wr′
Dor′Q
1−β
r′
(
Gr′
Rθ
r′
)λ) , (1.52)
where Dor is the iceberg cost associated with migration. Again, assuming to tax on
wage and no benefits from local government goods and services, Equation (1.52) shares
the same structure as the gravity equations based on the spatial models of migration
considered in Bryan and Morten (2018) and Morten and Oliveira (2018).
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Chapter 2
Do Pro-Natalist Cash Transfers
Work? Evidence from Local
Programs in South Korea
Wookun Kim, UCLA1
Many countries now experience fertility rates below the 2.1-replacement
level of fertility and have experimented with some pro-natalist policy
measures to encourage childbearing. Since 1983, the total fertility rate
of South Korea has stayed below the replacement level, reaching the
lowest in the world in 2005. This paper exploits a unique setting in
South Korea to identify the causal effects of pro-natalist cash transfers
on birth outcomes. In particular, a cash transfer of 1,000 USD increased
the total fertility rate by 0.022 children per woman or 1.8 percent. Next,
decomposing total fertility rates by birth parity and age of mothers
reveals that the pro-natalist cash transfers had parity-specific effects
and did not have effects on fertility rates of adolescents. Lastly, I find
no evidence of changes in health outcomes at birth and son preference
due to the cash transfers.
1 Link to most recent version: www.wookunkim.com/research. I thank Adriana Lleras-Muney, Kathleen
McGarry, Youssef Benzarti, and Manisha Shah for their encouragement and guidance. I also thank
many participants at UCLA applied-micro seminars and the annual PAA meeting in Denver 2018 for
helpful comments. All errors are mine.
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2.1 Introduction
Many countries have undergone fertility transitions, shifting from 5 to 8 children per
woman as recently as 1980 to 2 or fewer children per woman (Strulik et. al., 2015). In
many countries, fertility rates are below the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman.
Policy makers have expressed growing concerns about the negative impacts of low fertility
rates, further exacerbated by an aging population (Morgan, 2003; Frejka et. al., 2010;
Harper, 2014). Many developed countries now have implemented policies to boost fertility
such as cash transfers, paid and unpaid parental leave for childbearing, and tax benefits.2
In this paper, I investigate the effects of local pro-natalist programs in South Korea
on fertility. In South Korea, local governments provided congratulatory cash transfers
to parents for having babies to rectify national fertility declines. The generosity of cash
transfers varied widely across localities, birth orders or parities. To identify the causal
effects of local pro-natalist programs on fertility outcomes, I exploit this rich variation
in cash transfer amounts and policy implementation timing across 222 districts of South
Korea over a period of 15 years. The fertility outcomes I study include both quantity of
births (i.e., fertility rates and parity-specific birth rates) and quality of health outcomes
(i.e., birth weight and gestation).3 I collected local policy information from four different
sources, and constructed panel data by merging the local pro-natalist cash transfer, with
local characteristics, including fertility outcomes such as total fertility rates, age-specific
birth rates, and age-specific parity-specific birth rates.
The results suggest a positive and significant effect of pro-natalist cash transfer on the
number of births, but no meaningful effects on birth weight and pregnancy duration.
First, total fertility rates increased by 0.0216 children per woman, or 2 percent, with a
cash transfer of 1,000 USD. Second, when decomposing the effects of cash transfer by
birth parity, I find that cash transfer for a birth parity affected the birth rates of the
corresponding parity, but did not change the birth rates of the other birth parities. In
other words, the effects of cash transfer are parity-specific. Third, the cash transfer only
increased the fertility rates between the ages of 20 and 39 of the female population, more
active in making fertility decisions, and had no impact on the fertility rate of adolescents
or females older than 40. Fourth, by studying the potential policy effects on the female
marriage age and average age of mothers at birth, I conclude that the positive effects of
2 Fleckenstein and Lee (2014) provide detailed pro-natalist policy changes in Britain, Germany, South
Korea, and Sweden; Frejka et. al. (2010) summarize pro-natalist policies implemented in East Asia.
Gauthier (2007) presents a literature review of findings on the effects of various pro-natalist policies.
3During the sample period, some districts were merged and split. I restrict the sample to 222 districts,
which did not undergo redistricting, and construct a balanced panel of districts.
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cash transfer on the number of births is driven by an increase in the number of children
ever born per woman, rather than changes in birth timing. I also find no changes in
pregnancy duration and birth weight, implying no meaningful changes in the qualitative
aspects of fertility from the cash transfer. Lastly, given the prevalent son preference
in the context of South Korea (Edlund and Lee, 2013), I test the policy effects on sex
composition at birth and find no evidence of strengthening of son preference.
The key identification assumption is that, conditional on covariates and given province-
by-year fixed effects, the generosity of cash transfer across districts is orthogonal to quan-
tity and quality of birth. A potential threat to identification arises if the cash-transfer
generosity is correlated with unobserved district characteristics that are also correlated
with fertility outcomes. To address this concern, first I show that the results are robust to
changing the course of identifying variation from cross-sectional to over-time within each
district. Furthermore, I implement an instrumental variable strategy and show that the
2SLS estimator produces similar results to the results based on the fixed effects model.
Lastly, I conduct a placebo test by permuting histories of cash transfer across districts
to supplement the consistency of the results.
My contribution to the literature is two-fold. First, to the best of my knowledge, this
is the first paper to estimate causal effects of pro-natalist cash transfer on birth rates by
taking advantage of variation in cash transfer generosity across time and space. As a con-
sequence of data limitations, the previous literature on cash transfer for childbearing has
mainly focused on difference-in-difference strategies and regression discontinuity designs,
and comparing the fertility outcomes before and after cash transfer implementation, or
a one-time change in generosity in a region, while using unaffected regions or ineligible
families as a control group (Milligan, 2005; Boccuzzo et. al., 2008; Cohen et. al., 2013;
González, 2013). Hong et. al. (2016) have also examined the local government transfers
in South Korea. Their results may suffer from errors-in-variables bias and weak moment
condition problem (Newey and Windmeijer, 2009). I consider this paper a complement
to their with a improved policy data set, alternative identification strategies, and new
findings on the heterogeneous effects of the baby bonus across birth parities and ages
of mothers. My analysis shows that the cash transfers had parity-specific effects: cash
transfers for a birth parity only affect the birth rates of that birth parity, not those of
the lower or higher birth order. Furthermore, I provide evidence that the changes in the
fertility rate from the cash transfers are driven by an increase in completed fertility, as
opposed to changes in the timing of childbearing.
Second, I examine the effects of pro-natalist cash transfer on the qualitative dimension
of fertility in addition to the quantity of births. Given that the explicit objective of pro-
natalist policies is to increase the number of births, it is important to test if an increase
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in births brings about decrease in the quality of those births. There is limited evidence
on whether or not pro-natalist cash transfer affects the quality of birth. Amarante et. al.
(2016) find that cash transfer reduced the incidence of low birthweight for poor families
in Uruguay, but they do not investigate whether this improvement in quality was at
the expense of quantity. The literature testing the quantity-quality model of fertility
(Becker and Lewis, 1973) has found mixed or no evidence of tradeoffs (Black et. al.,
2005; Angrist et. al., 2010; Liu, 2014) and family size on quality (Mogstad and Wiswall,
2016). I contribute to this literature by showing that there are no statistically significant
changes in the observed health outcomes at birth (birth weight and pregnancy duration).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, I provide contextual
background on the pro-natalist policies in South Korea, primarily focusing on the local
pro-natalist cash-transfer programs. Section 2.3 describes the data. I discuss my iden-
tification and empirical strategies in Section 2.4 and then present the results in Section
2.5. Section 2.6 concludes with a summary of important findings and recommendations
for future research.
2.2 Policy Background
Before the 1960s in South Korea, women on average had 6 children or more. However,
the fertility rates of South Korea started to fall in early 60s and have stayed below
the 2.1 replacement level since 1983. The decline in the fertility rates did not stop
until 2005, when the total fertility rates reached the lowest point at 1.05 children per
woman, the lowest in the world according to the World Bank. In 2006, the national
pro-natalist movement started with the promulgation of the First Basic Plan for Low
Fertility and Aged Society. This was followed by the Second in 2011 and the Third
in 2016. As summarized in Lee (2009), the First Basic Plan consisted of five pillars: 1)
attenuating the socioeconomic burden of childcare for families with children; 2) expansion
of childcare infrastructure; 3) expansion of support for pregnancy and childbirth; 4)
increasing compatibility between work and home; and 5) promoting gender-equal family
and social culture. Should certain agendas drafted in the Plans be executed, all the
districts would be uniformly affected. For instance, one of a few policies that resulted
from the Basic Plan is childcare support. Starting from 2013, childcare support has been
provided unconditionally to every third child uniformly across South Korea. Moreover, it
is important to know that the Basic Plans operated at the national level, and the national
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government cannot specify policy prescriptions for local governments.4
Independent of the national pro-natalist efforts, the local governments have adopted
and funded their own cash transfer programs to encourage childbirth since 2001. There
are some important empirical facts about the local policy to note. First, one of the re-
markable aspects of the local pro-natalist policies in South Korea is that all the programs
provide cash transfer differing in generosity by birth parity across localities, and that this
is the only policy measure they adopt for their pro-natalist program. In other words, the
only benefit local governments provide to their residents after having a newborn baby
is cash transfer. Second, cash transfer generosity for third children is representative of
pro-natalist policy for each locality. It is the general consensus among the local gov-
ernment officials in charge of pro-natalist cash transfer that cash transfer for the third
child is determined first, and then cash transfer generosity for the other parities take
the generosity for third child as a benchmark. For the remainder of the paper, I only
focus on cash transfers for third children of less than 7,200,000 KRW (or approximately
7,200 USD) when referring to overall cash-transfer generosity, excluding the top 5 percent
of the sample with strictly positive cash transfer. Third, since the first implementation
of pro-natalist cash transfer in 2001 by 23 districts, all the districts adopted their own
pro-natalist cash transfer by 2013. Lastly, the generosity increases over time; the mean
cash transfers are 100 USD in 2001, 1,727 USD in 2008 and 2,663 USD in 2015. The
local pro-natalist cash-transfer policy adoption rate and the average cash transfer gen-
erosity from 2000 to 2015 are plotted in 2.1. In sum, there exist both cross-sectional and
within-district over-time variations in cash-transfer generosity.5
2.3 Data
In order study the effects of the local pro-natalist cash-transfer programs on birth out-
comes, I constructed an annual panel dataset based on multiple administrative sources
from 2000 to 2015 for 222 districts that belong to 15 provinces. The panel dataset can be
broadly categorized into three components: local pro-natalist cash-transfer information,
4As Kim (2013) writes, the Basic Plans launched by the national government “set abstract goals and
directions, but did not specify guidelines for local policy formulation.”
5 The Ministry of Family and Welfare reports that the take-up rate of local cash-transfer policy is
estimated to be close to 100 percent. Negligible transaction costs arising from simple, convenient
application processes may explain high take-up rates (Currie, 2006; Kleven and Kopczuk, 2011). It
is required by the law to register every baby within 30 days of birth at a civic center. In every civic
center, the sections for birth registry and cash-transfer application are always adjacent to each other.
It takes about 10 minutes to complete the required forms to receive cash transfer. To validate, I
collected the take up information for 68 districts during the sample period and find that the average
take-up rate for 68 districts is 99.98 percent.
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number of births and measures of quality, and local characteristics.
2.3.1 Local Cash-Transfer Policy Data
The data on local pro-natalist cash transfer is constructed from three different courses.
First, the Ministry of Health and Welfare of South Korea has published the Annual Case
Study of Local Government Population Policies since 2008. The case studies provide
the information regarding cash-transfer amounts by parity, eligibility, and whether each
program is new or continued from the previous year. This is the only official source that
allows a direct cross-sectional comparison across districts. However, there is no informa-
tion prior to 2007 and the case studies are based on the reports voluntarily submitted
by local governments. It is often the case that its local pro-natalist cash-transfer details
are updated correctly if a district chooses not to share its cash-transfer program with the
Ministry. Second, the Enforced Local Laws and Regulations Information System (ELIS),
operated by the Ministry of the Interior, is an alternative source for data. This online
system provides a vast majority of the laws and regulations enacted by local government
entities since 1995 and contains detailed information regarding the local pro-natalist cash-
transfer policies. However, at the local level, it is often the case that there exist some
discrepancies between the regulation laid out at the time of enactment and their actual
implementation. For instance, a local government may not be able to start the program
until a few months after its effective date due to lack of administrative or financial re-
sources. Lastly, I exercised the Right to Know under the Official Information Disclosure
Act and submitted a formal request for detailed information on its pro-natalist policies
to each local government via Open Information System (OIS). In order to ensure the
accuracy, I cross-checked the information from the three sources and verified the data
with a telephone survey of every local government to resolve any discrepancies. Panel A
of Table 2.9 in the Appendix provides the summary statistics of cash transfer by parity.
2.3.2 Quantity and Quality Measures of Birth and Sex Compo-
sition Data
I constructed annual data on quantity and quality measures of birth at the district level
from the Korean Statistical Information Service (KOSIS) and Microdata Integrated Ser-
vice (MDIS), both operated by the Bureau of Statistics of South Korea. KOSIS provides
annual district-level total fertility rates, the main outcome variable of interest. In order
to further decompose number of births by year and by district, I turn to MDIS, which
manages all the birth registry records in South Korea. The year, sex, and parity of a birth,
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district in which records were registered, the ages of parents, birth weight in kilograms,
and pregnancy duration in weeks are observed for every record. In order to test whether
or not number of births changed due to timing of birth (i.e., delaying birth or bringing it
forward), I also extracted the information on the mean ages of parents for all births and
by parity. As measures of quantity of birth in additional total fertility rates, I constructed
parity-specific and/or age-specific birth rates for each district from 2000 to 2015 based
on the birth registry records. To measure “quality”, I calculated the mean birth weight,
the fraction of low birth weight (less than 2.5 kilograms), the mean pregnancy duration,
and the fraction of premature births (fewer than 37 weeks) for all births and by parity.
For sex composition at birth, differences in the number of male and female births and
female-to-male ratio at birth for all births and by parity were calculated. The summary
statistics of the computed quantity and quality measures, and sex composition of birth
are presented in Panels B to E of Table 2.9 and Table 2.10.
2.3.3 Local Characteristics Data
In order to control for district characteristics that are potentially correlated with fertility
outcomes and local pro-natalist cash transfer, I constructed annual district-level charac-
teristics data from three sources: KOSIS, Finance Integrated System and the National
Election Commission. The demographic characteristics include proportion of female pop-
ulation, proportion of adult population, death rate, marriage rate, average female and
male ages at first marriage, population density, and net migration per 1,000 people. Gov-
ernment characteristics include per capita budget, party identification, and gender of
governing head. Other district characteristics include number of firms, number of labor-
ers, and number of kindergartens. These variables are summarized in Panels F to H of
Table 2.11.
2.4 Empirical Strategy
In order to motivate the main empirical strategy to identify the causal effect of local
pro-natalist policy on fertility outcomes, I present some preliminary findings based on
auxiliary specifications. Exploiting the national pro-natalist policy implementation in
2006 and the variation in the timing of local policy implementation, I estimate the dif-
ference in total fertility rates pre-post implementation with district fixed effects. The
overall results provide prima facie evidence that the national policy had a positive effect
on total fertility rates; the total fertility rates were declining prior to 2006 and reversed
this trend thereafter as shown in Figure 2.1. The estimation results are summarized in
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Table 2.12. In order to estimate the causal effect of local policy, I introduce year fixed ef-
fects in my main empirical model to control for nation-wide policy effects as well as other
time-varying aggregate unobservables. Next, based on different implementation timing
for each district, I conduct an event study. I semi-parametrically estimate the local policy
effects before and after based on the specification exploiting the cross-sectional variation
in timing of policy implementation within province as follows:
TFRd,t = γp,t +
13∑
τ=−13
γ
(τ)
1 D
(τ)
d,t +X
′
d,t−1Γ + νd,t, (2.1)
where
{
D
(τ)
d,t
}13
τ=−13
is a set of dummy variables indicating whether or not district d of
province p in year t is τ years after its policy implemebtation with D(0)d,t as a leave-out.
Figure 2.2 plots the estimated local policy effects before and after implementation. None
of the coefficients is statistically significantly different from zero and the standard errors
increase when moving away from implementation year, indicated by the 95% confidence
intervals based on standard errors clustered at the district level following Bertrand, Du-
flo, and Mullainathan (2004). All the estimates after implementation are positive and
increase in time since implementation. This serves as evidence that the local policy is
likely to have a positive effect on total fertility rates. The larger standard errors are likely
due to the cross-sectional variations in cash-transfer generosity. To summarize, because
each district adopts its policy with varying generosity and the generosity increases after
its adoption, it is important to take the variation in cash-transfer generosity into consid-
eration. Therefore, the main empirical model takes generosity as the main explanatory
variable to estimate the causal effect of local pro-natalist policy.
The main identification strategy is based on a weighted least squares model with the
province-by-year fixed effects, exploiting the cross-sectional variation in cash-transfer
generosity within province and year. The female population between the ages of 15 and
49 is used as regression weight, based on the definition of total fertility rates. Naturally,
the identifying assumption is that the cash-transfer generosity is exogenous conditional
on the observed district-level characteristics by province and year. I now present my main
empirical model to estimate the overall local policy effect on total fertility rates at the
district level as follows:
TFRd,t = βp,t + β1CTd,t−1 +X
′
d,t−1Γ + d,t, (2.2)
where CTd,t−1 is a lagged cash transfer (approximately in 1,000 USD) in district d of
province p. Xd,t−1 is a vector of lagged district-level demographics, government, and other
characteristics. Standard errors are clustered at the district level, allowing autocorrelation
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overtime for each district.
A potential threat to identification arises if there are unobserved factors that are cor-
related with both the cash-transfer generosity and total fertility rates. For instance,
a greater level of wealth of a district may allow its local government to provide more
generous cash transfer, and a district with a wealthier population may have a higher
fertility rate. In this case, the coefficient estimate would be biased upward. Although
per-capita government budget and financial independence rate are used as control vari-
ables, this problem may persist. Therefore, in order to address this type of threat from
omitting unobserved time-invariant district-level characteristics, I exploit the changes in
cash transfers within districts over time, instead of the within-province cross-sectional
variation in cash transfer, and check whether the estimates of the effects of local policy
on total fertility rates are sensitive to this change. In addition, migrations of beneficiaries
into and migrations of non-beneficiaries out of districts with more generous cash transfer
can overestimate the local policy effect. Because one of the control variables, net migra-
tion rate, is a simple difference of inflow and outflow of population, this variable may not
reveal much information about how much of inflow or outflow of population is beneficia-
ries. In order to address this concern, I propose an instrumental variable defined as lagged
average cash transfer generosity of adjacent districts in the same province and implement
the two-stage least squares method. The relevance condition of the proposed instrument
can be tested. The condition for instrument exogeneity is justified by circumventing the
simultaneity using the lagged average cash-transfer generosity of contiguous districts in
the same province. Furthermore, it is unreasonable to anticipate that the female popu-
lation of a district responds to the cash transfers of the neighboring districts. Therefore,
the exclusion restriction is not likely violated. Given the validity of the instrument, I
apply a Durbin-Wu-Hausman specification test of the null hypothesis that the previous
WLS estimate of policy effect is not statistically different from the two-stage least squares
estimate. Failure to reject the null provides supportive evidence for unbiasedness of the
WLS estimate with the province-by-year fixed effect, implying an insignificant degree
of biases arising from endogeneity. Lastly, I provide supportive results from a placebo
test. For this exercise, I permute the histories of cash transfer across districts within
province and estimate placebo effect based on my main empirical model with a “wrong”
history of treatment assigned to each district. Repeating the procedure 100,000 times, I
nonparametrically estimate the distribution of the placebo policy effect.
After verifying that within-province cross-sectional variations in cash transfers are plau-
sibly exogenous conditional on the observed district-level characteristics, I extend the
analysis to study the effects of local policy on birth rates by parity, age of mother, and
quality and sex-composition of birth. First, decomposing the total fertility rates by parity
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and taking advantage of the variations in cash transfer by parity, I separately estimate an
econometric model for each parity o for first, second, and third parities in the following
form:
CBR
(o)
d,t = pip,t +
3∑
o=1
pi
(o)
1 CT
(o)
d,t−1 +X
′
d,t−1Γ + 
(o)
d,t , (2.3)
where CBR(o)d,t is crude birth rates for parity o in district d of province p in year t
and CT (o)d,t−1 is cash-transfer generosity for parity o in approximately 1,000 USD. When
estimating the policy effect on crude birth rates for parity o, it is reasonable to expect no
significant effects from cash transfer generosity for parities less than o. The other more
probable spillover is from cash transfers for higher birth parities. For example, if parents
with one child are forward looking, they may choose to have a second child so that they
would receive the cash transfer for their third child after having their second child. If this
were the case, the effect of cash transfer for third children on birth rate of second children
would be positive and significant. This explains a potential mechanism through which
birth rate of a lower parity is affected by cash transfers for higher parities. Therefore,
by including the cash transfers for all parities in the model, I test the extent of spillover
effects across parities, and the results show no spillover effects (i.e., the effects of cash
transfers are parity-specific).
Second, in order to examine the policy effect on birth rates by age of mother, I regress
age-specific birth rates on overall cash-transfer generosity, weighted by the corresponding
age-specific female population. Based on the parity specificity of local policy effect, I
further decompose the total fertility rates by age of mother and birth parity and study
the effects of local policy on age-and-parity-specific birth rates. Third, it may be the
case that the cash transfers only have tempo effects rather than quantum effects; local
cash transfer may only hasten the timing of pregnancy, as opposed to increasing the
number of births. I estimate the effects of cash transfer on female age at first marriage
and mother’s age structure upon delivery of a child to test whether the cash transfers
actually increased the total number of births per woman or simply perturbed the timing
without affecting the total number of children a woman would have on average. Fourth,
questions regarding possible quantity-quality trade-off are addressed by estimating the
effects of cash transfer on birth weight and pregnancy duration as proxies of quality at
birth. Lastly, I further access potential impacts of local policy on son preference extant
in the context of South Korea using the difference between male and female birth rates
and its ratio as dependent variables.
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2.5 Results
2.5.1 Local Policy Effects on Quantity of Births
Overall Policy Effect on Total Fertility Rates—Table 2.1 reports the results from
estimating the overall effect of local pro-natalist cash transfer on total fertility rates.
I start with estimating β1 in Equation (2) without any fixed effects or the covariates
in Column 1 of Panel A and gradually introduce the province fixed effects, year fixed
effecst, both fixed effects, and province-by-year fixed effect across columns. The estimate
in Column 1 suggests that total fertility rates on average increased by 0.0558 with cash
transfer of 1,000 USD. This estimate is biased because the orthogonality of cash transfers
and total fertility rates is violated. After controlling for all of time-invariant province-
level characteristics with the province fixed effects, the coefficient estimate drops to 0.0323
according to Column 2. However, this estimate is likely still biased upward from positive
aggregate shocks that could potentially include the national policy effect discussed earlier.
To address this concern, year fixed effects are included and the estimation result indeed
shows a moderate drop to 0.0259 in Column 3. Finally, Column 4 reports the local policy
effect after completely absorbing all province-level characteristics, both time-varying and
time-invariant, by interacting the province and year fixed effects. The estimate is positive
at 0.0179, but statistically not significant.
With the province-by-year fixed effects, Equation (2) estimates the local policy effect,
effectively comparing fertility rates and cash-transfer generosity across districts within
each province for each year. However, the estimates of the coefficient and its standard
error for the local policy effect suffer from omitting district-level characteristics that are
potentially correlated with both cash-transfer generosity and total fertility rates. For
instance, a district with a high population density may have less generous cash transfer,
but have a higher fertility rate. Moreover, a district with a governing head who belongs
to a conservative party is associated with less generous cash transfer. If people who
vote for conservative party members are likely to have preference for greater number of
children, then excluding the information about party identification of governing heads
results in underestimation of the local policy effect. In Panel B, I report the estimates
of the local policy effects with the full set of province-by-year fixed effects, gradually
adding observed district-level demographics, government, and other characteristics across
columns. Column 2 presents the policy effect after introducing a set of demographic
characteristics. The estimate is significant at the 5-percent significance level and indicates
a strong positive local policy effect. Including a set of government characteristics in
Column 3 and that of other local characteristics in Column 4, the estimated policy effects
99
do not change in a meaningful way and are still statistically significant. In conclusion,
according to the coefficient estimate from the fully saturated model in Column 4, a cash
transfer of 1,000 USD increased total fertility rates by 0.0216 children per woman or 1.8
percent on average.6
I test the robustness of the causal policy effect identified based on the cross-sectional
variation in the generosity of cash transfer by estimating the local policy effect based
on two alternative models. The estimate of local policy effect on total fertility rate
is potentially biased if there are unobserved time-varying district-level characteristics
that are correlated with the generosity of cash transfer and total fertility rates. First, I
introduce district and year fixed effects to the fully saturated model instead of province-
by-year fixed effects. The identifying assumption for this approach is that changes in total
fertility rate and in cash-transfer generosity are uncorrelated with changes in district-
level unobservables conditional on a set of observed characteristics. Second, I employ
an instrumental variables approach using the lagged average cash-transfer generosity of
neighboring districts in the same province as an instrument given the plausible validity
of the instrument. The estimates of the policy effect based on two alternative models are
summarized in Table 2.2. I report the previous estimate based on the preferred cross-
sectional variation in Column 1 of Table 2.2. In Column 2, the local policy effect is
identified off of the changes in cash-transfer generosity over time within district. The
coefficient is significant and suggests that total fertility rate increases by 0.0221 children
per woman with a cash transfer in the amount of 1,000 USD.
The last three columns of Table 2.2 report the estimates based on the instrumental
variable approach. The reduced form estimate in Column 3 suggests that the lagged
average cash-transfer generosity of neighboring districts increased total fertility rate by
0.0118 children per woman. According to Column 4, the first stage coefficient is posi-
tive and statistically significant, confirming the relevance condition for the instrument.
This result implies an increase in cash transfer by 412 USD in response to a 1,000 USD
increase in the lagged average cash transfer of neighboring districts. In Column 5, the
estimate based on the two-stage least squares approach is 0.0288, statistically significant.
Applying a Durbin-Wu-Hausman specification test, I find an F-statistic equal to 0.76
and cannot reject the null hypothesis at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent significance levels (p-value
= 0.3841), suggesting that there is no statistical difference between the estimates from
weighted least squares and two-stage least squares methods. Lastly, Figure 2.4 plots the
6 Figure 2.3 in the Appendix presents a set of scatter plots in which each circle corresponds to a residual
cash-transfer generosity on the horizontal axis and residual total fertility rate on the vertical axis
from unweighted and weighted regressions by female population between the ages of 15 and 49. Size of
hollow circles reflects the female population between the ages of 15 and 49. The residuals are estimated
based on the preferred model in Equation (2) with the full set of observed district characteristics.
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distribution of placebo policy effect, nonparametrically estimated from 100,000 iterations
of permuting the treatment histories among districts within provinces and running the
preferred empirical model. I reject the null hypothesis that the estimated policy effect in
Column 1 of Table2.2 and the placebo effect are the same at the 1-percent significance
level (p-value = 0.0001). Cross-examining the estimates of local policy effect on total
fertility rates from different models, I conclude that the estimate of causal local pol-
icy effect from the preferred model using the within-province cross-sectional variation in
cash transfer (Column 1) is robust to different identification assumptions and estimation
methods, therefore plausibly unbiased.7
Birth Rates by Parity and Age of Mother— Table 2.3 presents regressions esti-
mating the effect of cash transfer on parity-specific birth rates. Column 1 estimates the
effect of cash transfer for first children on birth rates for first children based on Equation
(3) by assuming no spillover effects across parities (i.e. pi(2)1 = pi
(3)
1 =0) . The coefficient
estimate is positive and statistically significant and suggests that birth rates for first
children increased by 2.771 first children per 1,000 women or 15.56 percent with a cash
transfer of 1,000 USD for first children. Should parents be forward looking and base their
decision to have a first child on the benefits offered for higher birth orders, birth rates
for first children would be affected by cash transfer for high birth orders. If this is indeed
the case, cash transfers for second and third children would have positive effects on birth
rates for first children. To test whether this is the case, I estimate Equation (3) without
the no-spillover restrictions in Column 2. While the coefficient estimate for cash transfer
for first children does not change in a meaningful way and stays statistically significant,
the estimated effects of cash transfers for higher-order births are statistically not different
from zero. This implies that the cash-transfer effect is parity-specific for first children and
that the cash transfers did not inframarinally affect fertility. Moreover, this result rules
out a potential mechanism that birth rates for first children increased due to increased
births of unwanted babies as an unintended consequence of cash incentives brought by
the local pro-natalist programs.
The results for crude birth rates for second children are very much line with the previous
results. The effect of cash transfer for second children is consistently estimated in Column
3 and Column 4 of Table 2.3. According to the estimation result in Column 3, a cash
transfer of 1,000 USD increased birth rate for second children by 1.353 births per 1,000
women or 9.81 percent. Column 4 indicates that birth rates for second children were
7 In the Appendix, I provide additional evidence that there are no other district characteristics chang-
ing along with birth rates and cash transfers. Figure 2.6 in the Appendix presents a set of figures
plotting the nonparametric estimates of selected district characteristics before and after local policy
implementation. Table 2.13 reports the estimated effects of cash-transfer generosity on selected district
characteristics.
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unaffected by the cash transfer for third children. Furthermore, the coefficient for cash
transfer for first children is also insignificant. This serves as a falsification test because
it is obvious to expect that cash transfers for first children does not affect birth rates
of second children. Lastly, the estimation results for birth rates for third children are
positive, statistically significant, and consistently estimated in Column 5 and Column 6;
it suggests that a cash transfer of 1,000 USD increased crude birth rates for third children
by 0.916 births per 1,000 women or 3.06 percent. Once again, the results in Column 6
show that cash transfer for first and second children did not have an impact on birth
rates for third children as the coefficient estimates for cash transfers for first and second
children are not significantly different from zero. The results in Table 2.3 altogether imply
that the cash-transfer effects were parity-specific and that the magnitude of policy effect
decreases with birth parity.
Overall local policy effects on birth rates by age of mother are reported in Table 2.4.
Column 1 takes crude birth rates of the female population between the ages of 15 and
19 as the dependent variable. The estimate of policy effect is negative, but close to zero
and statistically insignificant. This indicates that the cash incentive provided by local
governments did not affect adolescent birth rates. From Column 2 to Column 7, the
estimated overall policy effect on birth rates of the female population for each age group
is positive, increasing with age of the female population younger than 35 and decreasing
thereafter. However, the estimates are statistically significant at 10 percent except the
one in Column 2. The standard error for the estimated policy effect in Column 2 is large
almost certainly due to the fact that there are generally much less mothers between the
ages of 20 to 24 with two children whose decision to have a third child would be affected
by cash transfer for third child. Although positive, the results in Column 6 and Column
7 suggest that the policy effects on birth rates of female population between the ages of
40 to 49 are negligible. This result comes as no surprise because the female population
in these age groups are likely to have completed their fertility decisions.
In light of the previous finding that cash transfers have parity-specific effects, Table
2.5 completely characterizes the local policy effects by parity and the female population
between the ages of 20 and 39, who are more active in their fertility decisions. In Panel
A, age-specific birth rates for first children are regressed on cash-transfer generosity for
first children. The estimates are positive and statistically significant across columns,
implying that the cash transfer is most effective for females between the ages of 25
and 29. Panel B reports the results for second children. While all the estimates are
positive and statistically significant across age groups, cash transfers for second children
had greater effects for the female population between the ages of 25 to 34. Finally, the
results assessing the effects on birth rates for third children indicate that the cash-transfer
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policies were effective and relevant for the female population between the ages of 30 and
39. Consistent with the previous results on parity-specific birth rates, the estimated
policy effects in Table 2.5 decrease with parity for each age group.
Female Age at First Marriage and Age of Mother at Birth— Table 2.6 provides
evidence that the positive effects of cash transfer on quantity of births are not driven by
timing and spacing of births. In Panel A, I assess the effects of cash transfer by parity
on average female age at first marriage. Although marriage is not required for receiving
cash transfer, average female age at first marriage is likely to decrease in cash-transfer
generosity if potential mothers were simply to actualize their fertility plans early, thus
more likely to get married at an earlier age. In Column 1, the estimated effect of cash
transfer for first children on average female age at first marriage is positive and significant
at the 10-percent level. The result implies that a cash transfer of 1,000 USD lowered the
average female age by 19 days. The estimates in Column 2 and Column 3 are closer to
zero and statistically not different from zero, suggesting that the cash transfers for second
and third children did not have impacts on average female age at first marriage. Column
4 includes cash transfers for first, second, and third children as explanatory variables
and finds that only cash transfers for first children have positive and significant effect as
before. The results presented in Panel A of Table 2.6 indicates that local pro-natalist cash
transfer did not result in early marriage for the female population, which could have also
brought fertility forward in time. Panel B investigates whether or not the cash-transfer
program had any impacts on the average age of mothers. The majority of the estimates
are negative; mothers were on average younger by 1 to 28 days due to a cash transfer
of 1,000 USD. However, none of the coefficients is significantly different from zero across
columns. Panel B provides strong evidence against a mere tempo effect of local cash
transfers. The results reported in Table 2.6 suggest that the increase in number of births
was not driven by merely adjusting the timing of birth forward and reducing the duration
of time between births.
2.5.2 Local Policy Effects on Health Outcomes at Birth and Son
Preference
Birth Weights and Pregnancy Duration—I assess the local policy effects of pro-
natalist cash transfer on quality measures of birth and report the results in Table 2.7.
First, the estimate in Column 1 of Panel A indicates no evidence on overall changes in
average birth weights in kilograms due to cash transfer. When investigating the effects by
birth parity in Column 2, Column 3, and Column 4, I only find a negative yet significant
effect for second children. However, while significant, the estimated effect for second
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children suggests a decrease in birth weight only by 5.51 grams or by 0.012 percent.
In addition, all of the estimates presented in Panel B indicate no change in number of
incidences of birth with low birth weight, defined by less than 2.5 kilograms. Another
quality measure of birth observed is pregnancy duration in weeks. I report the estimated
policy effects on average pregnancy duration (in Panel C) and fraction of premature
births, defined by 37 weeks or earlier (in Panel D). None of the results is significantly
different from zero, suggesting that pregnancy duration was not impacted by cash transfer.
The estimation results presented in Table 2.7 should be interpreted with caution. I
acknowledge that the results do not speak to improvement in quality at birth. This is
because it is not certain what the optimal levels of birth weight and pregnancy duration
are. Unless they are known, it is not possible to discern whether or not a positive
or negative coefficient means an increase or a decrease in quality of birth. However,
provided that the coefficients are close to, and statistically indistinguishable from zero, I
claim that there were no meaningful changes in birth weight and pregnancy duration of
births and thus conclude no quality improvement or decline due to cash transfer.
Sex Composition—As Edlund and Lee (2013) find, preference for sons in South
Korea is still prevalent in the 21st century, particularly for higher-order births. Given
this general proclivity for sons, I attempt to answer whether or not this tendency was
intensified by the local pro-natalist cash-transfer programs. The effects of cash transfer
on sex composition at birth are evaluated in Table 2.8. Column 1 of Panel A examines
the overall policy effect on the difference between male and female crude birth rates. The
estimate is negative, which implies that the difference in birth rates between male and
female decreases, yet is statistically not different from zero. The estimated effects for first
and second children in Column 2 and Column 3 are not statistically different from zero.
However, the policy effect is positive and significant for the gap between the male and
female birth rates for third children. This serves as additional evidence for son preference
already extant for third children, but not for changes in son preference. In Panel B, I
estimate the effects on female to male ratio at birth. The estimated coefficients across
columns, each indicating effects for overall, first, second, and third births, are statistically
not different from zero. To sum up the results on son preference, there indeed existed
son preference for third children, but I find no suggestive evidence that cash transfer
exacerbated sex composition due to son preference.
2.6 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, I study the effects of pro-natalist cash-transfer policy on quantity and
quality outcomes of birth. To do so, I collected detailed policy information on local
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cash-transfer programs for all the districts in South Korea while verifying its accuracy
from four different sources. This paper improves the identification of policy effects on
fertility rates and other characteristics of births by exploiting the episodes of pro-natalist
cash-transfer policy adoption and changes in cash-transfer generosity for each parity at
the local level. I corroborated the consistency of the estimated policy effect on total
fertility rates by re-estimating the policy parameter based on two alternative models and
implementing a placebo test. In Appendix, I provide a set of figures (Figure 2.6) and a
table (Table 2.13) that serve as additional robustness checks to illustrate that no relevant
variables systematically changed along with adoption and generosity of cash transfer and
fertility rates.
I find overall positive causal effects of cash transfer on quantity measures of birth and
no meaningful effects on quality and sex composition of birth. Furthermore, cash transfer
for each parity only affected the birth rates of the corresponding parity. For instance,
cash transfer for second children did not increase birth rates for first and third children.
While birth rates of adolescence and women older than 40 were not affected, cash transfer
had positive effects on birth rates of the female population between the ages of 20 and 39,
who are more active in their fertility decisions. Cash transfer had no meaningful effects on
average female age at first marriage and average ages of mothers. This suggests that the
estimated policy effects were mostly driven by the increase in completed fertility, rather
than a temporary increase in births due to changes in timing of childbearing. Lastly, I
find no evidence that local cash-transfer policies changed quality measures of birth and
tendency to favor sons over daughters for higher-order births.
A cash transfer of 1,000 USD increased total fertility rates by 0.0216 children per
woman, ceteris paribus. This implies that the benefit elasticity of fertility evaluated
at the mean of strictly positive cash transfers (2,042 USD) and the mean total fertility
rate (1.218 children per woman) is about 0.036. In other words, a 1 percent increase in
cash transfer raised the total fertility rate by 0.036 percent. This implies elasticity is
rather a conservative estimate due to potential downward bias from strict eligibility and
imperfect take-ups. However, this potential bias is unlikely because, as discussed earlier,
the eligibility condition is satisfied for most cases, as the only requirement is residency
and the observed take-up rate is 100 percent. On the one hand, the implied elasticity
from this paper is smaller than the estimates of benefit elasticity from the similar papers,
which computed the elasticity of fertility from various forms of financial incentives to
range from 0.05 to 0.248, summarized in Cohen et. al. (2013). On the other hand, when
evaluated at the mean annual disposable household income in South Korea (19,372 USD
in 2014 according to OECD’s Better Life Index), the elasticity is 0.34, consistent with the
related estimates of 0.3-0.4 in Black et. al. (2008) and theoretical prediction of positive
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income elasticity for higher-income countries in Becker and Thomas (1976).
Although there have been some efforts to assess the effectiveness of pro-natalist policies
apart from cash transfers, the results from the studies that examine the effects of parental
leave and tax benefits on fertility are often mixed (Lalive and Zweimüller, 2009; Andersson
and Duvander, 2006; Whittington et. al., 1990; Crump et. al., 2011). The overall results
of the paper provide convincing evidence that cash transfer is an effective form of policy
measure to increase completed fertility and number of children ever born per woman
without changing the quality and sex composition at birth. There are some important
issues unaddressed in this paper, which stipulate separate future research. First, as it
was the case in the context of the pro-natalist policies in South Korea, it is often the
case that the interests of local governments and their federal government align, each
implementing own policies. It is uncertain whether the policies administrated at different
tiers of government reinforce or undermine each other. Second, this paper skirted an
important normative question. What is the optimum level of population? Third, a
greater number of births means there are more mothers and fathers taking time off from
work if not exiting the labor market. Lastly, although there were no apparent short-run
effects of cash transfer on quality measures at birth, the cash transfer may change the
level of parental investment in children’s human capital, which, in the long run, would
accumulate to educational and labor-market outcomes.
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2.7 Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1: Local Pro-natalist Policy and Total Fertility Rate over Time
(a) Cash Transfer Generosity and Prevalence
(b) Cash Transfer Prevalence vs. TFR
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Figure 2.2: Total Fertility Rates Before and After Local Policy Implementation
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Table 2.1: The Effect of Local Cash Transfer on Total Fertility Rates
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Fertility Rates (TFRd,p,t)
A. Fixed Effects
Cash Transfer (CTd,p,t−1) 0.0558*** 0.0323*** 0.0259*** 0.0179
(0.00923) (0.00697) (0.00990) (0.0137)
Observations 3,256 3,256 3,256 3,256
R2 0.057 0.503 0.572 0.598
Province FE N Y Y N
Year FE N N Y N
Province-by-Year FE N N N Y
B. Control Variables
Cash Transfer (CTd,p,t−1) 0.0179 0.0255** 0.0246** 0.0216**
(0.0137) (0.0101) (0.00993) (0.00958)
Observations 3,256 3,256 3,253 3,246
R2 0.598 0.840 0.843 0.850
Mean Dependent Variable 1.218 1.218 1.218 1.218
Province-by-Year FE Y Y Y Y
Control for:
Demographic Characteristics N Y Y Y
Governmental Characteristics N N Y Y
Other Characteristics N N N Y
Notes: (i) Clustered standard errors at the district level in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Weighted by
female population between the ages of 15 and 49; (ii) Demographic characteristics include proportion of female population,
proportion of adult population, death rate, marriage rate, ages at first marriage for men and women, and log of population
density and net migration rate; (iii) Government characteristics include per-capita budget, financial independence rate,
party identification and gender of governing head, and land trade rate; (iv) Other characteristics include number of firms
and number of laborers per 1,000 people and number of kindergartens per 1,000 children
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Table 2.2: Local Policy Effects on Total Fertility Rates Based on Alternative Models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
WLS WLS Reduced First 2SLS
Dependent variables: TFRd,p,t TFRd,p,t TFRd,p,t CTd,p,t−1 TFRd,p,t
Cash Transfer (CTd,p,t−1) 0.0216** 0.0221*** 0.0288***
(0.00958) (0.00459) (0.00846)
Avg. CT of Adjacent Districts 0.0118*** 0.412***
(0.00426) (0.0703)
Observations 3,246 3,246 3,246 3,246 3,246
R2 0.850 0.931 0.929 0.717 0.930
Mean Dependent Variable 1.218 1.218 1.218 1.218 1.218
Province-by-Year FE Y N N N N
Year FE N Y Y Y Y
District FE N Y Y Y Y
Notes: (i) Clustered standard errors at the district level in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Weighted by
the total number of births of the corresponding parity; (ii) Across columns, the same set of control variables are used as
the fully specified model in Column 4 of Panel B of Table 2.1
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Table 2.3: The Local Cash Transfer Effects by Parity
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fertility rates for parity 1st 1st 2nd 2nd 3rd 3rd
Cash Transfer for 1st child 2.771*** 2.947*** 0.409 0.0334
(0.496) (0.511) (0.553) (0.123)
Cash Transfer for 2nd child -0.167 1.353*** 1.303*** 0.0160
(0.212) (0.272) (0.379) (0.0738)
Cash Transfer for 3rd child 0.00813 -0.0273 0.0916*** 0.0830**
(0.0641) (0.0669) (0.0259) (0.0332)
Observations 3,279 3,279 3,234 3,234 3,246 3,246
R2 0.954 0.954 0.932 0.932 0.920 0.920
Mean Dependent Variable 17.8009 17.8009 13.7967 13.7967 2.9897 2.9897
Notes: (i) Clustered standard errors at the district level in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Weighted
by female population between the ages of 15 and 49; (ii) Across columns, the same set of control variables and the
province-by-year fixed effects are used as the fully specified model in Column 4 of Panel B of Table 2.1; (iii) I exclude the
observations with cash transfers for first, second, and third children above the 95th percentile.
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Table 2.4: The Local Cash Transfer Effects by Parity and Age of Mother
Age Group of Mother
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Fertility rates for age group: 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-45 45-49
Cash Transfer (CTd,p,t−1) -0.00665 0.335 1.657* 1.802* 0.345* 0.0113 0.000526
(0.0346) (0.234) (0.846) (0.974) (0.204) (0.0366) (0.00399)
Observations 3,246 3,246 3,246 3,246 3,246 3,246 3,246
R2 0.700 0.905 0.926 0.887 0.922 0.807 0.229
Mean Dependent Variable 1.4489 19.5648 92.6862 95.5670 26.8431 3.3446 0.1618
Notes: (i) Clustered standard errors at the district level in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Weighted
by female population of the corresponding age groups; (ii) Across columns, the same set of control variables and the
province-by-year fixed effects are used as the fully specified model in Column 4 of Panel B of Table 2.1.
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Table 2.5: The Local Policy Effects by Parity and Age of Mother
Age Group of Mother
(1) (2) (3) (4)
20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39
Dependent Variable: Age-Specific Birth Rates of First Child
Cash Transfer for 1st Child 1.731** 7.835*** 4.584*** 0.972***
(0.769) (2.584) (1.759) (0.441)
observations 3,279 3,279 3,279 3,279
R2 0.897 0.914 0.905 0.913
Mean Dependent Variable 14.6809 58.7699 40.1044 8.2664
Dependent Variable: Age-Specific Birth Rates of Second Child
Cash Transfer for 2nd Child 0.675*** 3.368*** 3.544*** 0.701**
(0.178) (1.023) (1.193) (0.341)
observations 3,234 3,234 3,234 3,234
R2 0.849 0.917 0.852 0.907
Mean Dependent Variable 4.4935 30.3459 45.1602 12.0937
Dependent Variable: Age-Specific Birth Rates of Third Child
Cash Transfer for 3rd Child 0.0171 0.0611 0.323*** 0.164**
(0.0165) (0.0535) (0.0986) (0.0526)
observations 3,246 3,246 3,246 3,246
R2 0.559 0.857 0.877 0.806
Mean Dependent Variable 0.3698 3.3539 9.5182 5.6079
Notes: (i) Clustered standard errors at the district level in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Weighted by
female population of the corresponding age groups; (ii) Across columns, the same set of control variables and the
province-by-year fixed effects are used as the fully specified model in Column 4 of Panel B of Table 2.1; (iii) I exclude the
observations with cash transfers for first, second, third children above the 95th percentile.
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Table 2.6: Local Policy Cash Transfer Effects on Timings of Marriage and Birth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Dependent variable: Female Age at First marriage
Cash Transfer for 1st Child 0.0523* 0.0393*
(0.0281) (0.0222)
Cash Transfer for 2nd Child -0.0117 -0.0330
(0.0167) (0.0204)
Cash Transfer for 3rd Child 0.00418 0.0108
(0.00502) (0.00739)
Observations 3,279 3,234 3,246 3,246
R2 0.980 0.980 0.980 0.980
Mean Dependent Variable 28.4171 28.4171 28.4171 28.4171
B. Dependent Variable:
Age of Mother at Birth for Parity: Overall 1st 2nd 3rd
Cash Transfer for 1st Child -0.00440 0.0765 -0.0101 -0.0218
(0.0448) (0.0623) (0.0637) (0.0760)
Cash Transfer for 2nd Child -0.0207 -0.0300 -0.0407 -0.0230
(0.0374) (0.0365) (0.0401) (0.0589)
Cash Transfer for 3rd Child -0.00731 -0.00365 -0.0106 -0.0189
(0.0134) (0.00936) (0.0101) (0.0160)
Observations 3,246 3,279 3,234 3,246
R2 0.972 0.972 0.970 0.861
Mean Dependent Variable 30.1491 29.0136 30.8710 33.0159
Notes: (i) Clustered standard errors at the district level in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Weighted by
total number of first marriage for women for Panel A and by the total number of births of the corresponding parity for
Panel B; (ii) Across columns, the same set of control variables and the province-by-year fixed effects are used as the fully
specified model in Column 4 of Panel B of Table 2.1; (iii) I exclude the observations with cash transfers for first, second,
and third child above the 95th percentile.
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Table 2.8: Local Policy Effects Son Preference
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall 1st 2nd 3rd
A. Difference of Gender-Specific Fertility Rates
Cash Transfer for 1st Child 0.0679
(0.0619)
Cash Transfer for 2nd Child 0.0199
(0.0286)
Cash Transfer for 3rd Child -0.00237 0.0114**
(0.00613) (0.00577)
R2 0.417 0.278 0.324 0.530
Mean Dependent Variable 0.3221 0.3491 0.3119 0.2414
B. Female to Male Ratio at Birth
Cash Transfer for 1st Child -0.00736
(0.0123)
Cash Transfer for 2nd Child 0.00380
(0.00617)
Cash Transfer for 3rd Child 0.00102 -0.00349
(0.00134) (0.00473)
R2 0.175 0.087 0.084 0.375
Mean Dependent Variable 0.9348 0.9502 0.9464 0.8397
Observations 3,246 3,279 3,234 3,246
Notes: (i) Clustered standard errors at the district level in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Weighted by
the total number of births of the corresponding parity; (ii) Across columns, the same set of control variables and the
province-by-year fixed effects are used as the fully specified model in Column 4 of Panel B of Table 2.1; (iii) I exclude the
observations with cash transfers for first, second, third children above the 95th percentile.
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2.8 Appendix A: Additional Figures and Tables
Table 2.9: Summary Statistics (A/B)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
A. Cash Transfer Generosity
Cash Transfer for 1st Child 3,552 0.0409 0.216 0 5.100
Cash Transfer for 2nd Child 3,552 0.170 0.437 0 7.540
Cash Transfer for 3rd Child 3,552 0.609 1.177 0 18.80
Cash Transfer for 4th Child 3,552 0.804 1.585 0 18.80
Cash Transfer for 5th Child 3,552 0.917 1.857 0 24
B. Quantity Measures at Birth
Total Fertility Rate 3,552 1.218 0.220 0.696 2.470
Birth Rate of 1st Child 3,552 17.80 5.982 2.972 149.1
Birth Rate of 2nd Child 3,552 13.80 5.224 2.566 106.2
Birth Rate of 3rd Child 3,552 2.990 1.492 0.592 26.79
Birth Rate for Female Age 15-19 3,552 1.400 1.159 0 27.55
Birth Rate for Female Age 20-24 3,552 19.45 14.27 0 410.8
Birth Rate for Female Age 25-29 3,552 92.91 47.80 18.51 853.7
Birth Rate for Female Age 30-34 3,552 96.35 36.23 11.68 1,062
Birth Rate for Female Age 35-39 3,552 26.95 13.05 2.732 352.7
Birth Rate for Female Age 40-44 3,552 3.312 1.613 0 32.17
Birth Rate for Female Age 45- 3,552 0.166 0.168 0 3.924
Birth Rate of 1st Birth for Female Age 20-24 3,552 14.63 10.18 0 261.4
Birth Rate of 2nd Birth for Female Age 20-24 3,552 4.443 3.999 0 138.9
Birth Rate of 3rd Birth for Female Age 20-24 3,552 0.361 0.491 0 13.88
Birth Rate of 1st Birth for Female Age 25-29 3,552 58.86 26.40 10.46 529.6
Birth Rate of 2nd Birth for Female Age 25-29 3,552 30.38 20.72 3.145 359.1
Birth Rate of 3rd Birth for Female Age 25-29 3,552 3.449 3.132 0 50.89
Birth Rate of 1st Birth for Female Age 30-34 3,552 40.48 18.93 2.910 500.3
Birth Rate of 2nd Birth for Female Age 30-34 3,552 45.38 16.74 6.018 474.4
Birth Rate of 3rd Birth for Female Age 30-34 3,552 9.668 5.559 0 106.8
Birth Rate of 1st Birth for Female Age 35-39 3,552 8.326 4.900 0 117.5
Birth Rate of 2nd Birth for Female Age 35-39 3,552 12.11 6.364 0 153.5
Birth Rate of 3rd Birth for Female Age 35-39 3,552 5.621 2.564 0 72.42
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Table 2.10: Summary Statistics (C/D/E)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
C. Quality Measures at Birth
Birth Weight 3,552 3.235 0.0292 3.070 3.404
Birth Weight for 1st Child 3,552 3.228 0.0297 3.036 3.426
Birth Weight for 2nd Child 3,552 3.240 0.0325 3.021 3.442
Birth Weight for 3rd Child 3,552 3.261 0.0520 2.573 3.767
Fraction of Low Birth Weight 3,552 0.0522 0.00765 0 0.121
Fraction of Low Birth Weight for 1st Child 3,552 0.0516 0.00865 0 0.146
Fraction of Low Birth Weight for 2nd Child 3,552 0.0512 0.0104 0 0.141
Fraction of Low Birth Weight for 3rd Child 3,552 0.0589 0.0191 0 0.333
Pregnancy Duration 3,552 38.84 0.231 37.26 39.71
Pregnancy Duration for 1st Child 3,552 39.07 0.208 37.50 39.87
Pregnancy Duration for 2nd Child 3,552 38.61 0.268 35.67 39.69
Pregnancy Duration for 3rd Child 3,552 38.54 0.338 35.17 39.77
Fraction of Premature Birth 3,552 0.0531 0.0113 0 0.140
Fraction of Premature Birth for 1st Child 3,552 0.0477 0.0106 0 0.145
Fraction of Premature Birth for 2nd Child 3,552 0.0560 0.0142 0 0.227
Fraction of Premature Birth for 3rd Child 3,552 0.0686 0.0236 0 0.333
D. Gender Composition at Birth
Difference of Male and Female Births 3,552 0.253 0.332 -2.232 2.510
Difference of 1st Male and Female Births 3,552 0.318 0.355 -2.564 3.531
Difference of 2nd Male and Female Births 3,552 0.270 0.329 -3.773 3.319
Difference of 3rd Male and Female Births 3,552 0.200 0.244 -1.420 3.528
Female to Male Ratio 3,552 0.935 0.0465 0.618 1.541
Female to Male Ratio for 1st Birth 3,552 0.950 0.0648 0.519 1.889
Female to Male Ratio for 2nd Birth 3,552 0.947 0.0712 0.375 1.944
Female to Male Ratio for 3rd Birth 3,552 0.839 0.175 0 4.500
E. Age of Mother at Birth
Age of Mother 3,552 30.24 1.121 27.16 32.86
Age of Mother for 1st Birth 3,552 29.04 1.252 24.85 32.08
Age of Mother for 2nd Birth 3,552 31.03 1.218 27.32 34.06
Age of Mother for 3rd Birth 3,552 33.23 0.954 29.05 38
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Table 2.11: Summary Statistics (F/G/H)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
F. Demographic Characteristics
% Female Population 3,552 0.414 0.0214 0.337 0.487
% Adult Population 3,552 0.497 0.0459 0.260 0.580
Death Rate 3,330 4.888 2.226 1.472 47.17
Marriage Rate 3,552 0.0128 0.00378 0.00247 0.103
Female Age at First Marriage 3,552 28.39 1.299 24.09 31.62
Male Age at First Marriage 3,552 30.96 1.078 28.08 35.26
Log(Population Density) 3,552 8.044 1.737 2.968 10.30
Net Migration per 1000 People 3,552 0.0266 14.14 -83.47 147.6
G. Local Government Characteristics
Financial Independence Rate 3,330 40.60 17.55 6.400 95.30
Per Capita Budget 3,327 1.462 1.525 0.239 21.87
Conservative Party 3,330 0.626 0.484 0 1
Female Government Head 3,330 0.0171 0.130 0 1
Land Trader per 1000 People 3,323 41.83 88.63 0.640 1,372
H. Other Characteristics
# Firms per 1000 People 3,330 66.46 30.98 16.20 528.5
# Laborers per 1000 People 3,330 330.0 207.2 64.82 2,970
# Kindergartens per 1000 Children 3,330 0.673 0.452 0.179 5.184
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Table 2.12: Diff-In-Diff Estimates of Pro-natalist Policy Effect on TFR
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3)
Total Fertility Rate (TFRc,p,t) National Local Interaction
Post National Policy Implementation (Pt) 0.174*** 0.170***
(0.00689) (0.00723)
Post Local Policy Implementation (Ad,p,t) -0.00823 -0.0365*
(0.00643) (0.0204)
Pt × Ad,p,t 0.0315
(0.0207)
Observations 3,320 3,320 3,320
R-squared 0.907 0.893 0.907
District FE Yes Yes Yes
Control for District Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Control for Province and National Trends Yes Yes Yes
Notes: (i) Clustered standard errors at the district level in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Weighted
by female population between the ages of 15-49; (ii) District characteristics include demographic, government, and other
characteristics listed in Table 2.11; (iii) Province and national trend control variables include female and male unemployment
and labor force participation rates, gross regional domestic product (province-level), and number of new houses (province-
level).
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Figure 2.3: Residual Analysis: Weighted vs. Unweighted
A. Unweighted
(a) (b)
B. Weighted by Female Population between the Ages of 15 and 49
(c) (d)
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Figure 2.4: Placebo Test
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Figure 2.5: Health Measures at Birth Before and After Policy Implementation
(a) Birth Weight
(b) Pregnancy Duration
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Figure 2.6: Robustness Checks
(a) Female Population between the ages of 15 and 19
(b) Female Population between the ages of 20 and 24
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(c) Female Population between the ages of 25 and 29
(d) Female Population between the ages of 30 and 34
125
(e) Female Population between the ages of 35 and 39
(f) Female Population between the ages of 40 and 44
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(g) Female Population between the ages of 45 and 49
(h) Average Female Age at First Marriage
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(i) Average Age of Mother
(j) Average Age of Mother at 1st Birth
128
(k) Average Age of Mother at 2nd Birth
(l) Average Age of Mother at 3rd Birth
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(m) Average Male Age at First Marriage
(n) Average Age of Father
130
(o) Average Age of Father at 1st Birth
(p) Average Age of Father at 2nd Birth
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(q) Average Age of Father at 3rd Birth
(r) Number of Deaths
132
(s) Number of Move-Ins
(t) Number of Move-Outs
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Table 2.13: Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Dependent Variable: Female Population of Age
Total 15-19 20-24 25-29
Cash Transfer (CTd,p,t−1) -574.5 -57.78 68.72 175.8
(1,614) (117.7) (112.2) (130.4)
Observations 3,230 3,230 3,230 3,230
R-squared 0.720 0.695 0.738 0.756
B. Dependent Variable: Female Population of Age
30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
Cash Transfer (CTd,p,t−1) 83.88 -23.61 -79.84 -89.20
(144.7) (150.4) (156.7) (141.7)
Observations 3,230 3,230 3,230 3,230
R-squared 0.737 0.716 0.706 0.714
C. Dependent Variable: Father’s Age at
Any Birth 1st Birth 2nd Birth 3rd Birth
Cash Transfer for 1st Child 0.0232
(0.0636)
Cash Transfer for 2nd Child 0.00973
(0.0376)
Cash Transfer for 3rd Child 0.0189 -0.00350
(0.0124) (0.0180)
Observations 3,230 3,271 3,218 3,230
R-squared 0.957 0.960 0.950 0.750
D. Dependent Variable: Male Age at
1st Marriage # Deaths # Move-Ins # Move-Outs
Cash Transfer (CTd,p,t−1) -0.00114 -15.82 45.48 89.86
(0.00639) (14.95) (576.8) (560.0)
Observations 3,230 3,024 3,230 3,230
R-squared 0.960 0.610 0.727 0.740
Notes: (i) Clustered standard errors at the district level in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; (ii) Across
panels and columns, the same set of control variables and the province-by-year fixed effects are used as the fully specified
model in Column 4 of Panel B of Table 2.1.
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2.9 Appendix B: Determinants of Policy Implemen-
tation Timing and Cash Transfer Generosity
Many factors can be behind the background of a local government’s decision to adopt
the pro-natalist cash transfers. A local government may have been concerned with it
history of low fertility rates and decided to adopt pro-natalist cash transfer policy. In
this section, I formally study the determinants of the policy adoption and cash transfer
generosity.
First, I consider a static model specified as below:
Y Rd,T = αo +X
′
d,Tβ + ψp + νd,T , (2.4)
for each year T = 2000, ..., 2005, where Y Rd,T denotes the number of years until district
d adopts the transfer policy in year T . Xd,T is a vector of district-level characteristics.
I introduce the providence fixed effects ψp to account for provincial-level characteristics
that may affect the dependent variable. Table 2.14 presents the results using year 2000
as a base year. Across the columns, I progressively add the fixed effects and explanatory
variables. In Column (1), I begin with a set of demographic measures. Column (2)
introduces the province fixed effects. I include district-government characteristics in
Column (3) and other local characteristics such as local employment density and number
of kindergartens in Column (4).8 In Table 2.15, I repeat the same analysis for years until
2005. Note that the number of observations decreases across columns because I only
consider the districts without the transfer program in each year.
After controlling for the providence fixed effects in Column (2) of Table 2.14, the coeffi-
cients on TFR become insignificant thereafter. The signs of the coefficients on population
characteristics are fairly consistent, and the coefficients on percent adult population and
death rate continue to increase and become significant in Column (5) along with area
of land traded per 1000 people and financial independence rate. Holding everything else
constant, as a local government is more financially independent, it is likely to adopt a
pro-natalist cash transfer policy early.
The coefficients on area of land traded, number of firms and number of laborers per
1000 people are significant cross columns in Table 2.15. On the one hand, the first two are
positively associated with revenue. Greater revenue generated from higher numbers of
land transactions and local income may imply that a local government is less incentivized
8District-level characteristics correspond to observed local characteristics directly pertaining to local
governments or factors that may influence local fiscal capacities.
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to adopt pro-natalist cash transfer policy for more people and children. On the other
hand, the coefficient on number of laborers per 1000 people are negative. Number of
people working in a district is hardly equal to actual number of residents, and they are
not pay local tax. Holding everything else kept constant, a local government may view
greater number of laborers in its jurisdiction as a potential revenue source and want to
attract them with pro-natalist policy.9
In sum, I note that some of the districts characteristics that are more related to gov-
ernment revenue and budget are more correlated with policy adoption decision. Total
fertility rates do not seem to play a role in determining policy adoption timing.
Understanding the determinants of cash transfer amounts is challenging. I showed
that policy adoption decision is closely related to potential local fiscal gains. However, a
decision on the amount of cash transfer requires a local government to postulate associated
costs as well as potential benefits. For instance, if its adult population is relatively large,
expected cost of a pro-natalist cash transfer is large because there are high number of
potential beneficiaries. In order to prevent budget deficit, a local government with high
adult population is likely to set comparatively lower comparatively lower amounts. If
financial dependence on the national government is high, there is a tension between the
interest of increasing revenue via pro-natalist cash transfers and its budget constraint.
If potential gains are greater than expected costs, a local government may set relatively
higher cash transfer amounts. Taking the mechanism driven by revenue benefits, there
may be strategic interactions among local governments within each province: competing
for population. Note that it is unlikely for people to move across provinces just because
of baby bonuses. In order to address this type of concern, I control for the province and
year fixed effects.
I study the determinants of cash transfer amounts in two ways. I focus on samples
with strictly greater than 0 cash transfer amounts. Under this truncation approach, I
forgo the information during when districts do not have pro-natalist cash transfer policy.
The dependent variable is cash transfer amounts in 1,000,000 KRW. The explanatory
variables are lagged one year as cash transfer amounts are generally determined prior to
implementation. Table 2.16 summarizes the results. Like in the case of policy adoption
decision, total fertility rates do not seem to play a role in determining generosity. This is
understandable again because the concerns about the low fertility rates are mutual across
9 In addition, I consider a probit model to study the probability of policy adoption, defining the de-
pendent variable as an indicator taking the value of one if a district has a cash transfer policy and
using the same set of district characteristics. Taking bureaucratic inertia and administrative lag (e.g.
enactment process can take up to a few months) into account, I lag the district characteristics by one
year. The results are available upon request: they are similar to those reported in Table 2.14 and
Table 2.15.
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districts and district governments’ decision is driven by revenue benefits via pro-natalist
policy. As predicted, percentage of adult population lowers cash transfer amount.10
Unlike the case of policy adoption, the variables associated with revenue and budget
benefits are no longer significant. There are two factors that are worth mentioning.
The coefficients on conservative party is negative and significant. Next, the number of
childcare facilities run by local governments per 1000 children reduce the cash transfer
amount. If there are a greater number of childcare facilities, districts may be financially
constrained to provide less cash transfers, or may find it only necessary to relatively lower
cash transfers given its extant child benefits available in its jurisdiction.
10 Table 2.17 reports the results of a similar analysis based on Heckman’s control function approach
(Heckman, 1976). The results closely resemble the estimates using the truncation method, reported
in Table 2.16.
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Table 2.14: Determinants of Policy Adoption I (Base Year: 2000)
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Years till Adoption from 2000
Total Fertility Rate -2.945*** -0.759 -0.667 -0.657
(1.130) (0.996) (1.020) (1.033)
% Female Population -17.59 4.050 9.119 4.787
(14.86) (14.78) (14.61) (15.07)
% Adult Population 14.73 12.08 20.86** 17.24*
(9.159) (8.919) (9.188) (9.669)
Death Rate -0.0804 -0.0520 -0.122* -0.126*
(0.0719) (0.0608) (0.0660) (0.0731)
Marriage Rate 19.39 9.589 19.56 33.19
(47.99) (41.37) (40.54) (42.36)
Female Age at First Marriage 0.426 -0.562 -0.114 -0.191
(0.394) (0.357) (0.371) (0.377)
Male Age at First Marriage -0.147 0.727* 0.768* 0.813*
(0.444) (0.422) (0.432) (0.435)
Log(Population Density) -0.455*** -0.181 0.0207 -0.0852
(0.144) (0.171) (0.183) (0.202)
Net Migration Per 1000 People -0.000440 0.00403 0.00734 0.00596
(0.00731) (0.00632) (0.00630) (0.00664)
Financial Independence Rate -0.0359*** -0.0270*
(0.0109) (0.0143)
Per Capita Budget 0.0262 0.0655
(0.184) (0.226)
Conservative Party 0.339 0.397
(0.271) (0.279)
Land Trade per 1000 People 0.00414** 0.00402**
(0.00178) (0.00180)
# Firms per 1000 People 0.0122
(0.00921)
# Laborers per 1000 People -0.00248
(0.00192)
# Kindergartens per 1000 Children -0.448
(0.542)
Observations 222 222 219 219
R-squared 0.260 0.526 0.565 0.570
Province FE N Y Y Y
Notes: (i) Clustered standard errors at the district level in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; (ii) District
characteristics in base year 2000 are used as covariates.
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Table 2.15: Determinants of Policy Adoption I (Base Year: 2001-2006)
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years till Adoption from year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total Fertility Rate -0.178 1.297 0.194 -1.702 1.053 -0.537
(0.971) (1.135) (1.242) (1.248) (1.328) (1.368)
% Female Population 0.0754 12.80 7.193 -9.428 13.02 1.005
(14.60) (14.58) (16.65) (15.84) (16.37) (15.28)
% Adult Population 14.75 15.68* 18.17* 14.71* 15.56* 6.966
(9.226) (8.960) (9.573) (8.494) (8.921) (8.941)
Death Rate -0.0909 -0.0696 -0.0931 -0.0995 -0.0512 -0.173*
(0.0815) (0.0709) (0.0758) (0.0709) (0.0902) (0.103)
Marriage Rate 19.40 -7.629 5.001 21.45 -16.12 35.52
(44.50) (45.70) (44.65) (39.07) (72.74) (80.78)
Female Age at First Marriage -0.653* -0.198 -0.00814 0.439 0.326 -0.201
(0.394) (0.367) (0.379) (0.369) (0.343) (0.352)
Male Age at First Marriage 0.776* 0.00387 0.412 -0.295 -0.169 -0.123
(0.399) (0.307) (0.401) (0.321) (0.272) (0.330)
Log(Population Density) -0.110 -0.0337 -0.0211 -0.239 -0.114 -0.200
(0.201) (0.201) (0.217) (0.212) (0.205) (0.184)
Net Migration per 1000 People -0.0110 -0.0127* 0.00221 -0.00990 0.000540 0.00415
(0.00783) (0.00713) (0.00865) (0.00821) (0.00932) (0.00834)
Financial Independence Rate -0.0184 -0.00602 -0.0312* -0.0239 -0.0165 -0.00994
(0.0149) (0.0154) (0.0180) (0.0149) (0.0141) (0.0126)
Per Capita Budget -0.0324 -0.0755 -0.0630 0.143 0.0537 0.0539
(0.199) (0.0886) (0.0780) (0.111) (0.116) (0.0762)
Conservative Party 0.379 0.920*** 0.933*** 0.818*** 0.998*** -0.657*
(0.275) (0.311) (0.331) (0.311) (0.300) (0.395)
Female Governing Head -0.146 0.790 1.124 1.102 0.247
(1.115) (0.952) (1.081) (0.991) (1.358)
Land Trade per 1000 People 0.00339** 0.00362*** 0.00463*** 0.00352*** 0.00306*** 0.00395***
(0.00137) (0.00130) (0.00125) (0.000901) (0.000799) (0.000910)
# Firms per 1000 People 0.0142 0.0149* 0.0119 0.0161* 0.0130* 0.0142*
(0.00879) (0.00839) (0.00934) (0.00825) (0.00763) (0.00723)
# Laborers per 1000 People -0.00268 -0.00286* -0.00171 -0.00303* -0.00247 -0.00288**
(0.00178) (0.00167) (0.00193) (0.00168) (0.00155) (0.00135)
# Kindergartens per 1000 Children -0.276 -0.105 -0.0897 -0.454 -0.374 -0.517
(0.519) (0.426) (0.454) (0.393) (0.439) (0.417)
Observations 220 218 198 197 174 154
R-squared 0.574 0.590 0.309 0.360 0.342 0.466
Notes: (i) Clustered standard errors at the district level in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; (ii) District
characteristics in the corresponding base year are used as covariates.
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Table 2.16: Determinants of Cash Transfer Generosity I
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash Transfer (CTd,p,t)
Total Fertility Rate 1.255* 0.847 0.714 0.775
(0.747) (0.895) (0.900) (0.940)
% Female Population 32.17** 19.44 16.20 15.75
(14.09) (13.95) (13.83) (13.83)
% Adult Population -0.0756 -7.668 -11.41* -11.47*
(5.699) (6.199) (6.596) (6.724)
Death Rate 0.0679 0.0708 0.0865 0.0884
(0.0722) (0.0483) (0.0615) (0.0627)
Marriage Rate -28.94** -9.893 -20.31 -18.80
(12.90) (12.57) (14.38) (21.13)
Female Age at First Marriage 0.516*** 0.0338 -0.0280 -0.0530
(0.188) (0.187) (0.189) (0.201)
Male Age at First Marriage 0.192 0.374 0.307 0.312
(0.234) (0.273) (0.264) (0.264)
Log(Population Density) -0.370*** -0.0677 -0.0316 -0.0772
(0.136) (0.165) (0.172) (0.188)
Net Migration per 1000 People -0.00121 -0.00178 -0.00295 -0.00324
(0.00593) (0.00500) (0.00503) (0.00484)
Financial Independence Rate 0.0202** 0.0282**
(0.00900) (0.0123)
Per Capita Budget 0.0141 0.0179
(0.0648) (0.109)
Conservative Party -0.421** -0.420**
(0.195) (0.193)
Female Governing Head 0.0732 0.0242
(0.401) (0.390)
Land Trade per 1000 People 3.48e-05 8.23e-05
(0.00122) (0.00116)
# Firms per 1000 People 0.00687
(0.00706)
# Laborers per 1000 People -0.00129
(0.00114)
# Kindergartens per 1000 Children -0.0808
(0.547)
Observations 1,987 1,987 1,986 1,986
R-squared 0.303 0.474 0.480 0.482
Province-by-Year FE N Y Y Y
Notes: (i) Clustered standard errors at the district level in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; (ii) Observations
one year prior to policy adoption and onwards are used; (iii) The covariates are lagged a year.
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Table 2.17: Determinants of Cash Transfer Generosity II
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash Transfer (CTd,p,t)
Total Fertility Rate 1.448* 0.699 0.649 0.690
(0.777) (0.969) (0.967) (0.999)
% Female Population 31.72** 20.06 17.28 17.21
(14.04) (14.11) (13.73) (13.97)
% Adult Population -2.135 -7.461 -10.98* -11.13
(5.540) (6.203) (6.497) (6.792)
Death Rate 0.0523 0.0545 0.0841 0.0835
(0.0730) (0.0444) (0.0588) (0.0598)
Marriage Rate -21.66 -8.903 -20.03 -17.96
(13.30) (13.13) (15.24) (20.47)
Female Age at First Marriage 0.654*** 0.164 0.109 0.0946
(0.181) (0.219) (0.226) (0.242)
Male Age at First Marriage 0.298 0.126 0.0827 0.0870
(0.254) (0.281) (0.277) (0.278)
Log(Population Density) -0.367*** -0.0408 -0.0173 -0.0269
(0.135) (0.149) (0.156) (0.170)
Net Migration per 1000 people -0.000822 -0.00115 -0.00244 -0.00238
(0.00594) (0.00481) (0.00475) (0.00467)
Financial Independence Rate 0.0207** 0.0216*
(0.00861) (0.0111)
Per Capita Budget -0.0161 -0.00199
(0.0670) (0.0968)
Conservative Party -0.382** -0.361*
(0.188) (0.190)
Female Governing Head -0.0458 -0.208
(0.432) (0.468)
Land Trade per 1000 people 9.83e-05 0.000128
(0.000863) (0.000825)
# Firms per 1000 People 0.00290
(0.00622)
# Laborers per 1000 People -0.000348
(0.00104)
# Kindergartens per 1000 Children -0.0958
(0.502)
Observations 1,987 1,321 1,321 1,321
R-squared 0.306 0.412 0.417 0.417
Province FE N Y Y Y
Year FE N Y Y Y
Notes: (i) Clustered standard errors at the district level in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; (ii) Observations
one year prior to policy adoption and onwards are used; (iii) The covariates are lagged a year.
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